Eric Voegelin\u27s Mystical Epistemology and Its Influence on Ethics and Politics. by Burchfield, Charles Warren
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1994
Eric Voegelin's Mystical Epistemology and Its
Influence on Ethics and Politics.
Charles Warren Burchfield
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burchfield, Charles Warren, "Eric Voegelin's Mystical Epistemology and Its Influence on Ethics and Politics." (1994). LSU Historical
Dissertations and Theses. 5782.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/5782
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
University Microfilms International 
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Order Number 9508555
Eric V oegelin’s m ystical epistem ology and its influence on ethics  
and politics
Burchfield, Charles Warren, Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1994
UMI
300 N. ZeebRd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

ERIC VOEGELIN'S MYSTICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
ITS INFLUENCE ON ETHICS AND POLITICS
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Political Science
by
Charles W. Burchfield 
B.A., The University of Alabama, 1985 
M.A., The University of Mississippi, 1989 
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1993 
August 1994
ACKOWLEDGEMENTS 
I want to thank all the people whose ideas, writings, or 
conversations have helped me develop the intellectual 
perspective which informs this work. First, I wish to 
express my deepest gratitude and indebtedness to my mentor, 
Professor G. Ellis Sandoz, for his constant encouragement, 
suggestions, and inspiration. It was he who first kindled my 
tremendous admiration and respect for Voegelin's thought.
I also have had the benefit of insightful comments and 
suggestions from Professors Cecil L. Eubanks, James R. 
Stoner, Keith A. Boeckelman, Edward H. Henderson, Robert C. 
McMahon, and Andrew A. King, all of whom gave their time to 
read the manuscript. I am indebted to them and to several 
other faculty members for their generous support and 
encouragement of my academic endeavors throughout the years 
of my studies.
Finally, I am grateful to my family and friends who have 
helped me through the years with their prayer, support, 
encouragement and patience.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................ ii
LIST OF FIGURES.................. . .............. ..........iv
ABSTRACT..................................................... V
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION.................................... 1
CHAPTER TWO A RESISTANCE TO UNTRUTH:
THE CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM.....................12
The Recovery of Lost Meaning...................... 26
The Analogical Nature of Communication:
Theory of Symbolic Compactness and 
Differentiation and the Corresponding
Priestly and Prophetic Movements...................35
The Experience of Order in History. ........   56
CHAPTER THREE AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF MYSTICISM:
THE LOVE OF SELF OR THE LOVE OF
GOD..........  69
Symbolizations and the Postulate of Balance.......85
CHAPTER FOUR THE CONSTANCY OF HUMAN NATURE AND THE
EQUIVALENCES OF EXPERIENCES AND 
SYMBOLIZATIONS: EXPERIENTIAL TRUTH
AND ECUMENICALISM.......................... 92
Love and Death............   105
CHAPTER FIVE MYSTICAL EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT
OF MODERN, ANCIENT, AND CHRISTIAN THEORIES 
OF KNOWLEDGE..........   124
CHAPTER SIX THE NOETIC SCIENCE OF MAN: A
PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCE OF POLITICS.........149
CHAPTER SEVEN THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF VOEGELIN'S MYSTICAL EPISTEMOLOGY.......180
CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSION..................................203
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................... 214
VITA 224
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1..................................................156
iv
ABSTRACT
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
and analyze Eric Voegelin's theory of knowledge, and to see 
what implications it has on his theories of ethics and 
politics. The profundity of Voegelin's epistemological 
search and recovery is apparent when placed in the context of 
his disillusionment with and resistance to the dominant 
epistemology of his day, namely, positivism.
Through a recovery and restoration of the symbolizations 
of classical and Christian philosophy, Voegelin searches for 
and finds experiential knowledge which is gained through 
faith in search of understanding (fides quaerens 
intellectum), which brings about a vision of the whole and a 
formation of the heart (fides caritate formata) in the 
individual person through divine-human participation. These 
findings have important ethical and political implications. 
If we are to be whole persons, our communities must reflect 
our whole realm pf being and experience. The radical 
fragmentation of the social field into its parts— the 
religious, political, and educational— creates fragmented and 
deformed people. This diagnosis, coupled with Voegelin's 
epistemology and its call for ecumenicalism, lead to a 
therapy, which is that we must heal our communities and the 
individuals within them. The various realms of the social 
field, the realms of our experience, should work together as 
one, while at the same time checking and balancing one
v
another to insure that one does not rise toward an eclipse of 
the other. Such is the basis for community.
Voegelin's mystical epistemology, his new science of 
politics, and their implications for modern thought and 
modern life recover and restore the noetic and pneumatic 
sciences to their proper and necessary place, which is a 
serious study of human existence and man's relationship to 
society, the world, and God.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
If the heart is sensitive and the intellect keen, 
then a glance at the world will suffice to see 
the misery of creatures and to sense the paths to 
salvation; if they are insensitive and dull, then 
massive impressions are necessary to draw out the 
weak feelings. The sheltered prince's son saw 
for the first time a beggar, an invalid, and a 
dead man— and became the Buddha. A modern writer 
sees the mounds of corpses and the horrible 
destruction of thousands in the chaos of postwar 
Russia; it occurs to him that the world is not in 
order, and he writes a series of modest novels.
The one sees in suffering the nature of creation 
and searches for salvation in the 'Weltgrund;' 
the other sees it as an evil condition, that can 
and should be actively countered. Some souls 
address the inadequacy of the world more 
strongly; some deny the existential magnificence 
of creation. The one experiences a Beyond as 
real only when it is accompanied by splendor and 
bustle, by force and terror of a superior power 
in the form of a sovereign person and 
organization; for the other, the visage and 
demeanor of each person are transparent and allow 
his divine solitude to shine through.1
The over-riding motivation behind Voegelin's life work
is found in his struggle to make sense of the problem of
evil— individual, moral, social, and political, and to
reconcile it with the human experience of God. Voegelin
recognizes that he lives in a broken world. He seeks
understanding, healing, and reconciliation in the promises
of the Goodness of God. The openness toward and search for
xEric Voegelin, Political Religions (Lewiston, New York: 
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 14-15.
1
the Ground2, and its resultant mystagogia and fides caritate 
formata (formation of the heart) is Voegelin's answer to 
much of the evil he observes in the world. As long as 
humans persist in their selfish and Godless derailments and 
deformations, the mass molestation and killing of innocents 
will continue. Voegelin exhorts each individual to stretch 
out his or her withered hand to God and be healed (faith in 
search of understanding).
This endeavor will require an examination of Voegelin's 
insight into the ontological symbolizations of the past, 
that lead to a rediscovery of the quaternary view of 
reality; a reality made up of God, man, society, and the 
world, and a thorough analysis of the meaning and importance 
of the symbolizations that lead him to this rediscovery. 
This is an integrally necessary part of the analysis because 
it is ultimately the epistemological foundation upon which 
Voegelin's philosophy is grounded, namely the reality of 
divine-human participation. This mystical, participatory, 
epistemological grounding in the divine ground of being is 
to be experienced by the individual through the erotic 
drawing forth (tugging) and meaningful movements of various 
symbolizations found in the philosophical records of human 
experiences of the divine. In turn, these symbolizations,
2For a good discussion on the search for the Ground and 
its constancy in all civilizations throughout human history, 
see Eric Voegelin, "In Search of the Ground," Conversations 
With Eric Voegelin (Montreal: Perry Printing Limited, 1980),
1-36.
3created by individuals who have had such experiences, lead
others to experiences of divine-human participation.
Accordingly, this research will focus on experiential
symbols such as meditation, vision, anamnesis, divine ground
of being, the It-reality, the metaxy, fides quaerens
intellectum, cognitio fidei, and the Good, and explain how
these inter-relate to form a mystical epistemology, an
epistemology in which individual human beings attain
knowledge from experience through participation within the
divine Nous. Voegelin's contention that human consciousness
participates in the divine ground and that human knowledge
is apperceived and grounded in a human-divine participation
will be examined. We will discover a two-directional
attraction and response based in the love between the ground
and the human heart.3
the openness of man's existence toward the ground 
is dependent on the something in man that can 
respond to a theophany and engage in the quest of 
the ground. This something in man, as it is
discovered on the occasion of the response, Plato 
has symbolized as the 'daimon' (Timaeus, 90a), 
Aristotle as the 'theion' fNicomachean Ethics. 
1177b28ff). This divinest part (theiotaton) in 
the psyche is the human 'nous' that can
participate in the divine 'Nous'.4
3The two-directional aspect of divine-human 
participation will be discussed and analyzed at greater 
length, later in this work. See Voegelin's analysis of the 
thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther on the 
meaning of love and friendship (amicitia) in the divine-human 
encounter in the as yet unpublished manuscript: "Studies in
the History of Political Ideas."
“Eric Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 237.
4The divine-human encounter and the openness of the
individual to the ground of being are important keys to
understanding and defining Voegelin's mystical philosophy.
This research, therefore, will attempt to bring definition
and clarity to the ascent to the mystical vision and its
epistemological implications, which are results of
theophanic experiences.
The revelatory process [comes about when] the 
hidden god behind the intracosmic gods lets 
himself become manifest in visionary and auditory 
experiences, or in the "sound of gentle 
stillness", or in the meditative probing of the 
seeker, and thus be known against the background 
of his unknowability, the man who responds to the 
presence becomes conscious of his response as an 
act of participation in divine reality. He 
discovers the something in his humanity that is 
the site and sensorium of divine presence; and he 
finds such words as "psyche", or "pneuma", or 
"nous", to symbolize the something. When he 
participates in theophanic event, his 
consciousness becomes cognitively luminous for 
his own humanity as constituted by his relation 
to the unknown god whose moving presence in his 
soul evokes the movement of response.5
From this analysis, it will be shown that the modern
distinction between faith and reason is overstated and that
many of the symbolizations of the past can, and should, now
be understood as experiential responses to theophanies. It
follows, therefore, that the conventional distinction
between faith and reason in our modern interpretations of
classical philosophical texts must be reformulated, since
the modern misinterpretation of philosophical works has
5Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age. 8.
5derailed modern thought6, leading it into the creation of
various forms of eclipsed realities— deformed 
misinterpretations of philosophical symbolizations and 
insights that were originally based in divine-human 
participation and communion. These deformations of the 
meanings of philosophy from the originally intended 
epistemic insights have resulted in doxaic, contorted, and 
misinterpreted assertions about the very meaning of
philosophy and have created epistemological reductionisms. 
The epistemological reductionisms in modern philosophy, in 
turn, have resulted in the creation of eclipsed realities—  
pseudo-realities that deny the whole of human reality and, 
therefore, derail individuals, societies, and political 
systems into deformative world views and systematic ethical 
and political creations that are not fit for human 
existence. "When thing-reality displaces It-reality the 
cosmic whole is denied."7
The next step, then, will be an examination of
Voegelin's descriptive and interpretative accounts of 
various classical philosophers and their personal,
6For a more complete treatment of the modern derailment 
and deformation, see: Brian Shaw, "On the Reasonableness of
the Modern Age: Five Critiques," Ph.D. dissertation, The
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1982 (not 
available for this research).
7Steven R. McCarl, "Eric Voegelin On Reason and Myth", 
(as yet unpublished paper presented at the Southwestern 
Social Science Association 1994 Annual Convention, April 2, 
1994), 8.
experiential encounters with the divine ground— theophanies 
that result in epiphanies of knowledge, which Voegelin 
argues are the basis of true philosophy; a true philosophy 
in which knowledge and truth claims are deeply grounded 
within individual, human-divine, participatory experience, 
and not from the perspective of an objective, non- 
participatory onlooker. Finally, Voegelin's last work, 
"Quod Deus Dicitur", which deals with the meditations of 
Aristotle, Plotinus, Plato, Goethe, Saint Paul, Saint 
Anselm, and Saint Thomas Aquinas will merit special 
attention. This examination will then be tied to Voegelin's 
contention that the structure of the psyche apperceives the 
structure of reality because the order (structure of the 
human mind) that is in the human psyche is of the same 
nature as the order that is in the divine ground of being.8 
This will lead to Voegelin's attempt to rediscover and 
recapture the anamnetic experiences of the past and the 
present in order to discern what a healthy consciousness is 
and what kind of implications it has for the order of
8For a more complete analysis of Voegelin's 
understanding of the noetic structure of the psyche, see 
Kenneth Paul Keulman, "The Balance of Consciousness: The
Noetic Structure of the Psyche in the Theory of Consciousness 
of Eric Voegelin," Ph.D. dissertation, St. Michael's 
College, Institute of Christian Thought, (University of 
Toronto, 1980), (not available for this research). For a 
thorough discussion of Voegelin's philosophy of order, see
David J. Levy, The Measure of Man:_____Incursions in
Philosophical and Political Anthropology (Columbia, Missouri: 
University of Missouri Press, 1993), 55-60.
history.9 Much of this work will entail exegeses of "Quod 
Deus Dicitur", "On Debate and Existence”, "Reason: The
Classic Experience", and writings on late medievalism and 
early modernism from, the as yet unpublished, "Studies in 
the History of Political Ideas."
After this diagnosis10, the Voegelinian therapy will be 
examined, a therapy which will be shown to be deeply 
grounded in a mystical epistemology of anamnetic exercises 
that uncovers a theory of consciousness that is not based on 
eclipsed views of reality, but rather, man and his reality 
as they truly are. This results in descriptions of healthy 
consciousnesses which can be used as anthropological models 
to create a healthy society fit for human life.11
9For an in-depth overview and analysis of the concept of 
order in reality and in human thought, see the essays in Paul 
G. Kuntz, ed., The Concent of Order (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1968), esp. Eric Voegelin, "Configurations 
in History," 180-188.
10For further reading on Voegelin's analysis of the 
crisis and illness of modernity, see: William C. Havard,
"Voegelin's Diagnosis of the Western Crisis," in Denver
Quarterly 10 (1975), 127-134.
“For other analyses of Voegelin's theory of 
consciousness, see Eugene Webb, "Eric Voegelin:
Consciousness as Experience and Symbolization," in 
Philosophers of Consciousness: Polanvi. Lonercran. Voegelin.
Ricoeur. Girard Kierkegaard (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1988), 91-136. Also see Paul Caringella, 
"Voegelin: Philosopher of Divine Presence," in Eric
Voegelin's Significance for the Modern Mind, ed. Ellis 
Sandoz, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1990), 177-182, 184-185. Also see Glenn Hughes, Mystery and 
Mvth in the Philosophy of Eric Voegelin (Columbia, Missouri: 
University of Missouri Press, 1993), 11-40. Also see Thomas 
W. Heilke, Voegelin on the Idea of Race: An Analysis of
Modern European Racism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
The relevance of Voegelin's epistemology will be judged 
according to how well it is able to discern the meaning of 
experiential symbolizations and experiences which modern 
positivism does not concern itself with. In short, its 
value will rest on whether it is able to offer significant 
contributions to our understanding of human knowledge and 
human experience more fully, and whether it is able to lead 
individuals to the experiences which he argues the 
symbolizations embody.
The agenda in this research, therefore, is: (1) to
perform a systematic explication of Voegelin's epistemology 
that comes from his analysis of the history of philosophy 
and the rediscovery of lost meanings, (2) to examine and 
evaluate Voegelin's epistemology, (3) to examine how the 
epistemological meaning of the philosophy of the past has 
since been warped and misinterpreted, resulting in 
deformations which show up in the various modern 
manifestations of gnostic diseases that eclipse the 
realities of individual human existence, human societies, 
and politics, and finally, (4) to examine and analyze his 
diagnostic and therapeutic conclusions, especially the 
ethical and the political.
The structure of this dissertation will follow the 
following format: Chapter Two will present Voegelin's
critique of positivism. This is an integral part of the
University Press, 1990), 25-30, 32.
analysis, for it sets up the methodological problem which 
must be overcome. This is the beginning point for 
Voegelin's thought, because it is the basis of the untruth 
that Voegelin resisted. Chapter Three will examine the lost 
horizons of reality and the primacy of individual 
experience. It will deal with describing and analyzing the 
modes of representational and communicative symbolizations. 
Chapter Four will examine and analyze Voegelin's mystical 
epistemology, the need for ecumenicalism, and his theory of 
the equivalences of experiences and symbolizations. It will 
attempt to describe, clarify, validate, and analyze the 
mystical dimension of philosophical knowledge. Chapter Five 
will examine Voegelin's epistemology in relation to other 
theories of epistemology from the modern, classical and 
Christian thinkers, with an emphasis on the recovery of 
truth from hellenic and Christian philosophy. Chapters Six 
and Seven will use this analysis to draw out the ethical and 
political implications of mystical epistemology and the need 
for ecumenicalism. Finally, Chapter Eight will review and 
summarize the entire work and draw the general implications 
of the various parts which make up the whole.
Voegelin's greatest philosophical achievement is his 
rediscovery of the meanings of the symbolizations found in 
philosophy and religion. A great deal of the meaning had 
been lost or distorted in modernity due to 
misinterpretations of past symbolizations and myths. This
10
was caused by the reductionist views of eclipsed realities 
which do not recognize that the source and grounding of the 
symbolizations and myths are in the mystical vision12. His 
achievement was possible only because he was able to recover 
and discern the meditative qualities of faith and reason in 
the works of old, and therefore, make the important 
epistemological distinction between episteme and doxa. Such 
a discovery makes this research extremely important, because 
if Voegelin's epistemological interpretations are correct, 
they revolutionize the meaning of philosophy and science and 
force new interpretations and understandings of much of the 
greatest philosophical works of the past.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the 
epistemological question, because it is the foundation of 
all philosophical thought. It is the necessary foundational 
framework for all of human thought. The Voegelinian 
epistemology, if true, offers a ground upon which knowledge 
can rest and grow, and leads to possible solutions to the 
problems of skepticism and relativism.
Symbols and ideas have consequences, as the young 
Voegelin realized quite readily in his resistance to the 
horrors and atrocities done in the spirit of the warped and 
deformed symbolizations and theories of the pseudo­
12Voegelin's use of the term 'vision' is developed quite 
extensively in "The Beginning and the Beyond", Eric Voegelin, 
The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. ed. T. A. Hollweck and 
P. Caringella, Vol. 28, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana
State University Press, 1990), 227-232.
11
scientific untruths of National Socialism. Symbols and 
ideas have consequences, and those consequences can be good 
or evil, but they require an epistemological grounding in 
order to make sense. In the absence of such a grounding, we 
are left in an epistemological quagmire of uncertainty, in 
which many possible consequences can follow, and from which 
judgments of good or evil have little basis.
The consequences of Voegelin's thought are far 
reaching. The discoveries and potential solutions of 
Voegelin's philosophy can revolutionize modern philosophy, 
and the resultant therapeutic consequences of the discovery 
of lost insights and knowledge could very well allow us to 
make existence in society and the world a much more healthy 
and happy affair.
CHAPTER TWO
A RESISTANCE TO UNTRUTH:
THE CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM
Why study Voegelin's theory of knowledge? Because it 
is the foundation upon which all of his philosophy rests. 
Voegelin recognizes that epistemology is the ground of 
philosophical and scientific theory. Any truth claim, by 
its very nature, is an epistemological claim. In order to 
understand and evaluate his thought, it is necessary that we 
examine and evaluate his answers to the two fundamental 
epistemological questions: what can I know? and how can I
know it?13
Voegelin is not satisfied with the modern theories of 
knowledge. He finds them to be deficient, partial, and 
dangerous as foundations for philosophy and social science. 
He believes that they leave out important parts of our 
experiences of reality and, therefore, lead to distorted 
claims about reality. This, in turn, leads to deformed 
persons, and, therefore, to deformed societies and 
governments. He argues that reality is greater than human 
thought has comprehended, and that our experiences of 
reality are greater than modern theories of knowledge have 
accounted for.
13For a more thorough discussion of the extent of 
epistemological questioning in contemporary philosophical 
inquiry, see Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary 
Epistemology (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985), 1-4.
12
13
If man exists in the metaxy, in the tension 
"between god and man," any construction of man as 
a world-immanent entity will destroy the meaning 
of existence, because it deprives man of his 
specific humanity. The poles of the tension must 
not be hypostatized into objects independent of 
the tension in which they are experienced as its 
poles. The misconstructions can assume the form 
of elementary logical mistakes...[o]r they can, 
more elaborately, misuse man's bodily existence 
for the purpose of reducing the metaleptic 
tension, through causal explanation, to the 
organic and inorganic strata of being in which it 
is founded. Or since the discovery of the Nous 
and the symbolization of the metaxy are facts in 
the history of humanity, they can psychologize 
the symbols engendered by the tension into 
projections of an immanent psyche.14
It follows, therefore, that Voegelin's major motivation 
is to resist the untruth and the perversion of theoretical, 
religious, political and philosophical symbols and ideas, 
and to find the truth that man can know. Voegelin 
recognizes that thought, which includes myth, revelation15, 
and philosophy, articulates reality— the epistemological and 
ontological dimensions of reality arise simultaneously and 
cannot be severed except for analytical reasons. Man cannot 
know reality from an Archimedean point of view, because his 
epistemological status cannot be divorced from the reality 
of which he is a part and which is part of him.
14Eric Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience", in
The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. 280.
15For an excellent analysis of Voegelin's theory of 
revelation, see Eugene Webb, "Eric Voegelin's Theory of
Revelation," in Eric Voegelin's Thought:____ A Critical
Analysis, ed. Ellis Sandoz, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke
University Press, 1982), 157-178.
14
Voegelin believes that the untruth, and its resulting 
ideological perversions are caused, in part, by the 
destructiveness of positivism.16 Positivism is the 
prevailing epistemological paradigm for social science 
today. Most of what passes for social science in the modern 
world is based on its tenets and most of our modern ethical 
and political theories are grounded in it.
Voegelin came to the realization that resistance was 
required only after struggling with the untruth and 
deformation of the world in which he lived. He found 
himself the member of a society and a nation that was caught 
up in social scientism— National Socialism and race theory—  
and he found these systems and their political consequences 
to be unacceptable as a human habitat. Through his 
resistance to these theoretical constructs and systems, he 
recognized that there was an underlying perverse foundation- 
-positivism— which they shared with one another. He 
realized that there were important things lacking in the 
social science of his day, for that science ignored the
16For a throrough treatment of Voegelin's critique of 
positivism, see William C. Havard, Jr., "Notes on Voegelin's 
Contributions to Political Theory," in Eric Voegelin's 
Thought; A Critical Appraisal, ed. Ellis Sandoz, (Durham, 
North Carolina; Duke University Press, 1982), 88-89, 91-92. 
Also see Ellis Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics 
Beyond Behavioralism," in The Post-Behavioural Era; 
Perspectives on Political Science, ed. George Graham and 
George W. Carey, (New York: David McKay and Company, 1972),
285-305. Also see Ellis Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science 
of Politics: An Examination of the Political Theory and
Ideas of Eric Voegelin," in Discourse (Summer 1993), 3-9.
15
spiritual aspects of human existence and contained no 
principles or values through which to critique political 
reality. Indeed, what purported to be social science was 
not social science at all. It was, instead, a system built 
upon a partial view of reality (materialism) which claimed 
to view the whole of reality, and it eclipsed (denied) all 
other aspects of reality and existence and relegated them to 
the level and category of subjectivity.
German social scientists were able to participate in 
the Nazi horrors because their science was based on this 
deficient methodology. It was value-free science— with no 
morals to help stop the evil. In the absence of moral 
philosophy and moral law, their social science was able only 
to describe what was the case within the limits of sensory 
experience as "facts."17 They had no basis for offering 
ethical judgments or prescriptions. Voegelin concludes that 
this is no science of man at all, for it omits integral 
parts of what it means to be human.
Although Voegelin was initially reacting to the 
disorder of National Socialism, he quickly surmised that the 
particular disease of National Socialism was merely a 
manifestation of the more widespread illnesses of modernity.
17For a good discussion of Voegelin's critique of the 
fact-value dichotomy, see Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin: 
Philosopher of History (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1981), 45-46, 80, 82-84. Also see Dante Germino, "The 
Fact-Value Dichotomy as an Intellectual Prison," in Modern 
Age 23:2 (1979), 140-144.
16
It only takes a glance at the rest of the world to observe
that all is not well in the rest of the world, too. Moral
and political evil is real and widespread, and the reality
of it is not merely a matter of academic fancying. The
malaise is existentially present as a matter of life and
death— a matter of human existence, itself.
While much of what goes on in politics is atrocious,
the academic crisis of modernity is no less serious. There
is something quite wrong with the state of knowledge in the
academies, indeed, the state of knowledge in academics helps
to create, sustain, and perpetuate political disorder.
There are numerous schools of thought, each of which claims
to be all-encompassing and yet, seems to be mutually
exclusive of one another, while at the same time, each is
lacking various aspects of the horizons of true reality.
This curious default of the school 
philosophies...was curious because it assumed the 
form not of a lack but of a superabundance of 
theories of consciousness and methodologies of 
the sciences....I had to raise the question why 
do important thinkers like Comte or Marx refuse 
to apperceive what they apperceive quite well?
Why do they expressly prohibit anybody to ask 
questions concerning the sectors of reality they 
have excluded from their personal horizon? why 
do they want to imprison themselves in their 
restricted horizon and to dogmatize their prison 
reality as the universal truth? and why do they 
want to lock up all mankind in the prison of 
their making?....An instrument of consciousness,
I had to conclude, has no instrument other than 
the concrete consciousness of the analyst....[It 
requires] a permanent effort at responsive 
openness to the appeal of reality, at bewaring of 
premature satisfaction, and above all at avoiding 
the self-destructive phantasy of believing the 
reality of which it is a part to be an object
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external to itself that can be mastered by 
bringing it into the form of a system.18
Voegelin begins his philosophical journey out of a sense of
perplexity due to the partial realities and untruths to
which he was exposed. But if he sees the prevailing
metaphysics of modernity as only partial views of reality,
then he is required to show the part of reality which they
are missing.19 Specifically, he is required: one, to
demonstrate that the prevailing modern metaphysical and
epistemological views are deficient; and two, to demonstrate
the true metaphysical and epistemological views of reality.
The rest of this chapter will deal with Voegelin's
demonstration that the prevailing modern metaphysical and
epistemological theory of positivism is deficient. Chapter
Three will deal with his demonstration of what he considers
to be the true metaphysical and epistemological views of
reality.
The central questions of philosophical analysis, and
the necessary starting points for analyses of order, are
18Eric Voegelin, "Rememembrance of Things Past", in 
Anamnesis, trans. Gerhart Niemeyer (Columbia, Missouri: 
University of Missouri Press, 1978), 3-4.
19Voegelin is certainly not the only thinker to perceive 
the partial and eclipsed modern metaphysical views of 
reality, nor is he alone in calling for remedies. For a 
thoughtful and systematic discussion and analysis of this 
problem, see Leszek Kolahowski, Metaphysical Horror (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1988). Also see James V. Schall, Reason. 
Revelation, and the Foundations of Political Philosophy 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 225-
240.
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what is reality?, and how and what can we know of it?
Voegelin opens his analyses of these questions by examining
the prevailing modern answers to these most basic questions-
-positivism and idealism. He argues that positivism is
grounded on two fundamental assumptions:
In the first place, the splendid unfolding of the 
natural sciences was co-responsible with other 
factors for the assumption that the methods used 
in the mathematizing sciences of the external 
world were possessed of some inherent virtue and 
that all other sciences would achieve comparable 
success if they followed the example and accepted 
these methods as their model.... It became
dangerous because it combined with the second 
assumption that the methods of the natural 
sciences were a criterion for theoretical 
relevance in general.20
The first assumption, if used only as a means for
studying certain aspects of human behavior, seems quite 
sound and valid. The problem arises when the first
assumption is coupled with the second, at which point the 
mathematizing methodology overthrows all other methods of 
inquiry and declares them to be unsound and invalid, that 
is, subjective. Voegelin argues that it is the second
assumption that is most problematic, for it leads to the 
conclusion that science, or the study of reality, is limited 
to that which can be known exclusively through the methods 
of the natural sciences. It follows, therefore, that
scientific claims based in any other method are
theoretically irrelevant and not scientific. Indeed, when
20Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1952), 4.
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reality can be described only through methods of the natural 
sciences:
problems couched in other terms [are] illusionary 
problems,... in particular metaphysical questions 
which do not admit of answers by the methods of 
the sciences of phenomena should not be 
asked,...realms of being which are not accessible 
to exploration by the model methods [are] 
irrelevant, and, in the extreme,...such realms of 
being [do] not exist.21
In short, these assertions lead to the frequently cited
distinction, in modernity, between science (positivism) as
being objective, and philosophy (especially ethics and
metaphysics), as being subjective. This distinction is
central to Marx' and Comte's thought and is their basis for
refusing to consider metaphysical questions.22 Modern
science has imposed a taboo on metaphysics and the asking of
metaphysical questions.
The strong foundation of the new temporality 
which has been developing in the centuries since 
the late Middle Ages, is the interpretation of 
the world as a store of existential facts of all 
degrees, and as the knowledge of its essential 
and causal relationships....The world as content 
has displaced the world as existence. The 
methods of science become the generally 
applicable forms for the study of the world's 
content....[T]he word "metaphysical” has become a 
curse-word.22
21Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 4.
22Voegelin thoroughly and insightfully analyzes this 
problem of refusing to discuss metaphysical questions in: 
The New Science of Politics. 23-26.
^Voegelin, Political Religions. 58.
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The practical consequences of the application of these
methods of science to a science of humanity are clear. Man
is no longer a complex creature with a body and a soul, with
physical and spiritual aspects, with freedom and creativity.
Humans are merely a small part of the content of the world.
Only the brute facts of his material being are to be
included in defining him. By ridding itself of the so-
called subjectivist aspects of man in the more traditional
views of man, modern science has understood man in a much
more essential manner, man has become a more simple,
quantifiable, fact.24
The political consequences of such a view of man have
the same results, namely, politics is reduced to a more
simple and quantifiable fact. This is illustrated in
Voegelin7s analysis of the modern state. He argues that the
modern textbook definition of state is "a federated union of
settled people, endowed with primal ruling power."25 He
points out, based on this definition, that:
"primal" can signify simply that the power has no 
source other than the State itself and that it is 
derived from nowhere else, that it is 
absolute....An absolute, primal power is a power
MFor an in-depth analysis of the defects of modern 
positivist political science, see "Voegelin and Politics," in 
Eric Voegelin7s Significance for the Modern Mind, ed. Ellis 
Sandoz (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University
Press, 1991), 12-45.
25Voegelin, Political Religions. 6-7.
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above all powers; it has no power beside or above 
it and lower powers exist only by its grace.26
It follows that the structure and power of the state are not
necessarily dependent on any anthropological, divine, or
more universal foundations, indeed, they require no
foundation at all. From these conclusions it follows that
there are no necessary theoretical or practical mechanisms
in place to control power.
If the state is absolutely powerful, then it may 
not have any internal bounds. The mechanical 
aspects of order and duty therefore belong to it, 
as do total obedience, the renunciation of 
personal opinion and debate, the denial of
personal spirit, and, at the same time, the
intensive presence of the spirit, which resides 
in the state.27
The importance of this modern view of the state is more than
mere academic interest or debate. Modern civilizations have
already experienced political systems based on this very
notion, and many millions of human lives have been
tyrannized by the anti-human practices of modern states.
It does not have to do with the accuracy of a
definition. It has to do with life and
death....The contact between one human being and 
another is interrupted; non-human ideologies 
stand opposed, and man is transformed into a cog 
in a machine, playing along mechanically in the 
bustle of life, outwardly warring and killing 
abstractly.28
26Voegelin, Political Religions. 9.
27Voegelin, Political Religions. 8.
28Voegelin, Political Religions. 9.
Voegelin disagrees with this understanding of man. He 
contends that social science must regain a humanistic 
understanding of humanity that includes his spiritual and 
moral natures, and understands him to be a creature of 
dignity. Man is more than a cog in a machine. Dividing 
reality into parts, and then isolating and eclipsing 
comprehensive reality with one or more of those parts, leads 
to partial and untrue views of reality which are 
deformations of knowledge, which directly lead to 
deformations of man. "Men allow the world content to grow 
to such a proportion that the world and God disappear behind 
it, but they cannot eliminate the problematics of their own 
existence.1,29 In short, the study of the world content is 
not sufficient for a science of man. So what is sufficient 
for a science of man? The answer to this question requires 
a different understanding of what man is.
Man experiences his creatureliness. Philosophy and 
science30 are, for Voegelin, comprehensive inquiries into 
the mysterious, unfolding whole of reality which cannot be
29Voegelin, Political Religions. 59.
30For a discussion on the significance of Voegelin's 
philosophy of science, see Patrick H. Byrnes, "The 
Significance of Voegelin's Work for the Philosophy of 
Science," The Beginning and the Beyond; Papers from the 
Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences. Supplementary Issue of 
Lonerqan Workshop. Vol. 4, (Chico, California: Scholars
Press, 1984), 93-95. Also see Hans Aufricht, "A Restatement 
of Political Theory: A Note on Voegelin's The New Science of
Politics." in Eric Voecrelin's Search for Order in History, 
ed. Stephen A. McKnight, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
Univei'sity Press, 1978) , 46-61.
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reduced to a this or that all-encompassing explanatory 
method.
Man experiences his existence as a creature and 
therefore as doubtful. Somewhere in the depths, 
at the umbilicus of the soul, there where it 
touches the cosmos, it strains. This is the 
place of those stimuli which are inadequately 
referred to as "feelings" and which are therefore 
easily confused with similarly named, superficial 
movements of the soul....Religiously motivated 
people describe them in images that only touch 
upon those features, and that they recognize in 
their own stimuli. They speak of primal feeling 
in order to indicate the depth of a "feeling" 
that is deeper in life's essence than other 
feelings. From this point they see the whole of 
existence....They come together from the 
"distentio", the dispersion of their being, and 
return to the point of their origin in order to 
rediscover in the act of "intentio", i. e., the 
reversion to God, themselves and Him.31
The major problem with methodologies, as well as
ideologies, is that by their very nature of being exclusive,
they lose the ability to penetrate and investigate the
existential meanings and mysteries of reality. The why
questions are replaced with the what and how questions, and
facts and definitions replace theory. In the process, the
why aspects of reality are severed and a partial, and
therefore, distorted view of reality eclipses true reality.
Accordingly, Voegelin argues that positivism, with its
emphasis on method as the criterion of science, and its
propensity to overshadow true reality, abolishes theoretical
relevance:
31Voegelin, Political Religions. 11-12.
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As a consequence, all propositions concerning 
facts will be promoted to the dignity of science, 
regardless of their relevance, as long as they 
result from a correct use of method. Since the 
ocean of facts is infinite, a prodigious 
expansion of science in the sociological sense 
becomes possible, giving employment to 
scientistic technicians and leading to the 
fantastic accumulation of irrelevant knowledge 
through huge "research projects" whose most 
interesting feature is the quantifiable expense 
that has gone into their production....The 
present concern is with the principle that all 
facts are equal— as on occasion it has been 
formulated--if they are methodically 
ascertained.... Much deeper than by the easily 
recognizable accumulation of trivialities has 
science been destroyed by the second 
manifestation of positivism, that is, by the 
operation on relevant materials under defective 
theoretical principles.32
The facts may be true and quite useful. But if they are not
critically examined for their relevance within an adequate
theoretical framework, then they can distort truth and
introduce findings and truth claims which are, in fact,
false.
...[T]he treatises of this type quite frequently 
are still indispensable because of their reliable 
informations concerning facts (bibliographical 
references, critical establishment of texts, 
etc.). The damage is rather done through 
interpretation. The content of a source may be 
reported correctly as far as it goes, and 
nevertheless the report may create an entirely 
false picture because the uncritical principles 
of interpretation do not permit recognizing them 
as essential. Uncritical opinion, private or 
public ("doxa" in the Platonic sense), cannot 
substitute for theory in science.33
32Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 8-9.
33Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 10.
In the third critique, Voegelin aims more specifically, 
at the fields of the social sciences. It is made against 
the ’’attempt at making political science (and social science 
in general) 'objective' through a methodologically rigorous 
exclusion of all 'value-judgements.'1,34 Voegelin points out 
that "the terms 'value-judgment' and 'value-free' science 
were not part of the philosophical vocabulary before the 
second half of the nineteenth century."35 He further argues 
that these notions are meaningless in themselves, but that 
they gain meaning only when they are opposed to judgments 
concerning facts, a notion created through the "positivist 
conceit that only propositions concerning facts of the 
phenomenal world are 'objective', while judgments concerning 
the right order of soul and society are 'subjective'."36 
Voegelin contends that this standard is nothing more than 
dogma, and a very dangerous one, at that.
It is this claim that Voegelin seeks to dispute. He 
argues that positivism is radically inadequate because it 
omits as irrelevant anything that cannot be experienced 
through the senses and defines them as merely subjective. 
Such a limited and narrow definition and understanding of 
science is not science at all, but is ideology. Science, in 
the true sense, is not as restricted as it has been defined
^Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 11.
35Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 11.
36Voegelin, The Mew Science of Politics. 11.
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in modernity, but rather "is a search for truth concerning
the nature of the various realms of being."37 All things
which contribute to the search are relevant to science.
Facts are relevant in so far as their knowledge 
contributes to the study of essence, while 
methods are adequate in so far as they can be 
effectively used as means for this end. 
Different objects require different methods....If 
the adequacy of a method is not measured by its 
usefulness to the purpose of science, if on the 
contrary the use of a method is made the 
criterion of science, then the meaning of science 
as a truthful account of the structure of 
reality, as the theoretical orientation of man in 
his world, and as the great instrument for man's 
understanding of his own position in the universe 
is lost.38
The Recovery of Lost Meaning 
The study of the essence or nature of the object is key 
for a proper definition of science. The proper object in a 
science of man is obviously man. Voegelin, therefore, sets 
out on a journey to inquire as to what past philosophical 
history might contain on this point, in the hope of 
recovering knowledge of the past. An early and important 
discovery and distinction is that the term nature itself, 
which comes from the Greek term physis, adequately 
translated within the context of its original use, refers 
"to constant structures in the movement of being, comprising 
gods and men, organic and inorganic— in other words, to
37Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 4.
38Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 5.
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something like a constitution of being."39 Historically, 
the term has gone through numerous transformative narrowings 
of definitional meaning. In Voegelin's investigation into 
the question "what is nature?,"40 he distinguishes four main 
phases in the classical Aristotelian meaning of nature.
In the first phase, he examines the definition of 
nature as exclusively the form of things, and he concludes 
that it is inadequate because it fails to recognize the 
constants of movement in reality. In the second phase, 
Voegelin points to the tension which Aristotle recognized 
between nature understood as the form of things and nature 
understood as including the constants of movement, which in 
much of modern thought is commonly referred to as the 
tension between being and becoming, loosely corresponding to 
ontology and process philosophy, respectively.41
The third phase is characterized by the recognition
that:
the partners of the cosmos separate into an
immanent world of relatively autonomous things
and a transcendent divine ground of being.
Between them is man as that being in whom the
39Voegelin, Anamnesis, 71.
40Voegelin, Anamnesis. 71-88.
41Voegelin, Anamnesis. 76-79. For a comprehensive
discussion and analysis of the influence of process 
philosophy on Voegelin's thought, see: Paul Grimley Kuntz,
"Voegelin's Experiences of Disorder Out of Order and Vision 
of Order Out of Disorder: A Philosophic Meditation on His
Theory of Order-Disorder," in Eric Voegelin's Significance 
For The Modern Mind, ed. Ellis Sandoz, (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 111-173.
dissociation occurs, in whom, however, God and 
world again are united in the manifold of 
experiences that elicits the rich vocabulary of 
"philia", "pistis", "elpis", "eros", "periagoge", 
"epistrophe", etc., as the corresponding manifold 
of expressions.42
This third phase is a transitional phase, a recognition of
metaxic existence and the philia (drawing or pulling) of the
transcendent Mystery, which leads to the fourth phase in the
classical Aristotelian meaning of nature in which:
[m]an enters into the known truth of his own 
order, i.e., of his nature, through the 
experience of himself as one who is experiencing 
order. This ontological complex makes sense only 
as a whole. Philosophy becomes senseless if it 
isolates one of its parts without regard to the 
others.43
In this final stage, noetic experience transcends the 
demiurgic experience of God. It defines the core of man's 
nature as "the openness of his being in questioning and 
knowledge about the ground of being."44 The fourth phase is 
the completion of the third, in which man has accepted the 
divine, transcendent, awe-inspiring vision through a 
formation of the heart (fides caritate formata), a 
periagoge, based in love.45 This experiential understanding
42Voegelin, Anamnesis. 81.
43Voegelin, Anamnesis. 81.
^Voegelin, Anamnesis. 88.
45For a discussion of Voegelin's understanding of faith 
(fides) and its foundational role in philosophy, see Paul 
Caringella, "Voegelin: Philosopher of Divine Presence," in
Eric Voegelin's Significance for the Modern Mind. 177, 179- 
180, 184, 190-191, 193-194, 197, 200-205.
of philosophy is the view which Voegelin argues has been 
lost and must be recovered.46 Man is capable of 
participating in the full range of experience of reality. 
Any true science worth the title science, therefore, must 
take the full range of existence and experience into 
consideration. It must examine and investigate reality as 
a comprehensive whole and must not close itself off from 
reality by fragmenting and isolating itself into parts, 
which results in eclipsed realities. Eclipsed realities are 
pseudo-realities which are fragmented and isolated parts of 
reality. They purport to be the whole of reality. They are 
created by the refusal to allow certain types of questions 
to be asked. Only the questions to which the approved 
methodology can be applied are permissible. In the process 
of usurping and closing off the answer to the metaphysical 
question of what is reality?, and by offering a part as the 
whole, they result in derailing individuals, societies, and 
political systems into false and deformative world views and 
systematic ethical and political artifices that are not fit 
for human existence.
The examination of human nature and human history 
through philosophical anthropology makes it clear that 
humans and their societies seek and discover meaning to
46Voegelin is not alone in his insistence on experiential 
truth and knowledge. For an interesting discussion of 
philosophical reason as reason based in experience, see Claes 
G. Ryn, Will. Imagination and Reason; Irving Babbitt and the 
Problem of Reality (Washington: Regnery Books, 1986), 79-94.
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their existence. It is a universal need which Voegelin 
recognizes as apparent when studying the symbolization of 
any culture, from any time, be it the cultures of the 
primitive Neanderthals of the Stone Age, the ancient 
Egyptians, or modern man. The creation of symbol and myth 
form paradigms of meaning through which humans can define 
and orient themselves. These paradigms allow people to 
recognize the order within themselves, their society, and 
the world. In the absence of such a framework, there is no 
cohesive substance through which to hold society and culture 
together.
Voegelin's philosophy should be read, "not as an
attempt to explore curiosities of a dead past, but as an
inquiry into the structure of the order in which we live
presently.1,47 One of the remedies for the disorder of any
time, including the present, is an inquiry into the
structure of order, and a leading malady of our time is the
adherence to ideology.
Ideology is existence in rebellion against God 
and man. It is the violation of the First and 
Tenth Commandments, if we want to use the 
language of Israelite order; it is the "nosos", 
the disease of the spirit, if we want to use the 
language of Aeschylus and Plato. Philosophy is 
the love of being through love of divine Being as 
the source of its order. The Logos of being is 
the object proper of philosophical inquiry; and 
the search for truth concerning the order of 
being cannot be conducted without diagnosing the
47Voegelin, Order and History. Vol. I, Israel and 
Revelation (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State
University Press, 1956), xiv.
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inodes of existence in untruth. The truth of 
order has to be gained and regained in the 
perpetual struggle against the fall from it; and 
the movement toward truth starts from man's 
awareness of his existence in untruth. The 
diagnostic and therapeutic functions are 
inseparable in philosophy as a form of 
existence.48
It is with this recognition that Voegelin sets out his 
inquiry into the order of man, society, God and history in 
his search for a philosophical science of man and
politics.49 After considering the varieties of
nationalisms, the Marxist and Freudian ideologies, the
positivist and progressivist schools, and the many other 
modern interpretations of reality and existence, Voegelin 
concludes that any one or combination of "their conceptions 
of man, society, and history are too obviously incongruent 
with the reality that is v/ithin the range of our empirical 
knowledge."50 Indeed, they are so incongruent that they 
have created distorted views of human existence and purpose 
in which there is little, if any, meaning or order, most 
especially because they deny the life of the spirit and 
intellect. In so doing, they either deny a paradigm of 
meaning and order to man altogether, as in the case of 
Nietzsche, or they create one which is so warped and 
malformed that it results in a monstrously, ill-constructed
48Voegelin, Israel and Revelation, xiv.
49See Ellis Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of
Politics," in Discourse (Montreal, Summer 1993), 3.
50Voegelin, Israel and Revelation, xiii.
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and misguided society, as in the case of Hobbes. With these 
reasons in mind, Voegelin calls for an empirical 
investigation— a historical, re-examination of the 
millennial search for order in man, God, society, and 
history with a view to a comprehensive, holistic 
understanding of reality.
The shortcomings of positivism, and the various forms 
of nationalisms and progressivisms which rest on it, are 
radically inadequate. They are based on only partial 
epistemological assumptions which create false foundations 
which result in eclipsed realities, or they are based in no 
epistemological foundations whatsoever, which results in 
nihilism and relativism. Either form leads to human and 
societal deformation due to the severance of whole realms of 
our existential being. Voegelin resists these views of man 
and politics.
Rather than concentrate on a torn out eclipsed fragment 
of reality called political science, he instead turned 
toward the metaphysical question of the whole of creation, 
of which it was a part, in order to seek and discern the 
recovery of lost horizons of reality. It is in this context 
that Voegelin defines philosophy as "the love of Being 
through the love of divine Being as the source of its 
order"51
51Voegelin, Israel and Revelation, xiv.
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It is with this understanding that Voegelin set out on
his journey to find an order to history. Voegelin began his
search with an investigation into the history of ideas. But
after many years of researching this history and writing a
"Studies in the History of Political Ideas"52, he came to
realize that the truth for which he was searching was not to
be found in a progressivist view of a right ordering of
ideas toward a culmination in an end of history or an
absolute idea, in the spirit of the Hegelian system of
thinking. His investigations led him to the realization
that the discovery and realization of truth must occur
experientially, in the mind of an individual human being,
who is open to the whole range of his or her metaxic
existence. Ideas do not exist outside of an individual
consciousness to think them. You cannot know humanity
(human nature) without knowing your own consciousness. To
know man requires you to know yourself. What is needed is
a philosophy grounded in an anamnetic vision.
The experience of consciousness is the experience 
of a process---the only process which we know 
"from within."...The systematic starting point of 
this problem was classically formulated by 
Schelling in his question: "Why is there
Something, why is there not rather Nothing?"
Every being implies the mystery of its existence 
o ver the a b y s s  of a p o s s i b l e  
nonexistence....Man's structure seems to be the 
ontic premise for man's transcending into the 
world, for in none of its directions of
52Voegelin, "Studies In the History of Political Ideas" 
(unpublished manuscript) , The Voegelin Institute for American 
Renaissance Studies, Louisiana State University.
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transcending does consciousness find a level of 
being which is not also one on which it itself is 
based. Speaking ontologically, consciousness 
finds in the order of being of the world no level 
which it does not also experience as its own 
foundation....The second experiential complex is 
the experience of meditation, at the climax of 
which the intention of consciousness is directed 
toward the contents of the world, not 
objectively, through the cogitato, but rather 
nonobjectively toward the transcendent ground of 
being.53
The second complex of consciousness, the experience of 
meditation, is more fully differentiated in "The Beginning 
and the Beyond: A Meditation On Truth”, in which Voegelin
differentiates his notions of theophany54 and philosophy by 
explicating the place of vision in his epistemology. In so 
doing, Voegelin places his philosophy more fully into the
realm of the mystical. The important truths of
philosophical inquiry are not so self-evident and mundane as 
to be easily captured and communicated in propositional 
language. The great insights into the truth of reality may 
very well be ineffable, in which case they can only be 
symbolized into pointers or crude approximations of what 
they are attempting to attest to. Considering all these 
problems, it is necessary to examine and develop a number of
53Voegelin, Anamnesis. 21-29.
MFor a discussion of Voegelin's understanding of 
theophany, see Dante Germino, "Eric Voegelin's Framework for 
Political Evaluation in His Recently Published Work," in Eric 
Voegelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1982), 119-121, 124-125.
Also see Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A
Biographical Introduction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1981), 200, 212, 225, 232-233.
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analytical categories used by Voegelin to explore reality. 
It must be noted that these categories are not independent 
of one another, nor is one logically prior to the other, 
they are, rather, simultaneous aspects of one existential 
reality. Accordingly, the rest of this chapter will 
investigate various major analytic categories of existential 
reality in order to set the groundwork for investigating 
Voegelin's epistemology.
The Analogical Nature of Communication:
Theory of Symbolic Compactness 
and Differentiation and the 
Corresponding Priestly and Prophetic 
Movements
Symbolizations and mythologies, and their roles in 
shaping man's understanding of the order within man, 
society, the world, and philosophy and religion, are 
recurring topics of investigation throughout the study of 
order and history in Voegelin's Order and History. Indeed, 
Voegelin's differentiation between pragmatic and 
paradigmatic histories is dependent upon how the various 
symbols and myths are to be interpreted, which is of the 
utmost concern and importance when considering the fact that 
Voegelin is attempting to discern meaning in history rather 
than merely tracing the sterile records of isolated 
historical facts through time. Disputes over the meaning of 
history and the proper interpretations of historical symbols 
and myths occurred not only in Voegelin's time, but also 
within the given cultures and times in which they were
36
created and sustained. When the lines are drawn in 
historical battles over how properly to interpret the 
symbols and myths of history, what emerges is a fight over 
the elasticity of these symbols and myths, which exhibits 
itself in the polar movements of the priestly and the 
prophetic traditions.55 These polarities of existential 
symbolism are illustrated clearly in Voegelin's analysis of 
the Hebraic tradition in Israel and Revelation and in his 
analysis of the Hellenic tradition in both The World of the 
Polis and Plato and Aristotle.
In all of these cases, he discerns movements toward 
differentiations of truths through leaps in being, epochal 
events that break the compactness56 of earlier cosmological 
myths.
55A good discussion of both Voegelin's and Bernard 
Lonergan's view of the priestly and prophetic modes of 
theological expression is offered by Michael P. Morrissey in 
Consciousness and Transcendence; The Theology of Eric 
Voegelin (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press,
1994), 220. Both Lonergan and Voegelin "would criticize the 
conceptualist reductionism of doctrine, the obstructionist 
tendency of doctrine to derail the experiential quest for 
truth among the spiritually insensitive, .. . [and] [b]oth would 
affirm the usefulness of doctrine to preserve experiential 
insights...."
56For a discussion of Voegelin's theory of compactness 
and differentiation, see Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin: 
Philosopher of History. 54, 133-38, 158, 164-66, 218, 259, 
279. Also see Joseph Michael Anthony McCarroll, "The Advance 
from Compactness to Differentiation," M.A. Thesis, National 
University of Ireland, 1982. Also see Ellis Sandoz, ed., 
Eric Voegelin's Significance for the Modern Mind. 108-110, 
113-121, 167-72.
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...[T]he Hellenic experience of God as the unseen 
measure of man is neither a sequel to the
Israelite experience of the God who reveals 
himself from the thornbush to Moses and from 
Sinai to his people, nor even an intelligible 
advance beyond it in the sense in which both of 
these experiences differentiate a new truth about 
the order of being beyond the compact truth of 
the myth. The leap in being.. .occurs twice in 
the history of mankind.... The two occurrences, 
while they run parallel in time and have in
common their opposition to the Myth, are 
independent of each other; and the two 
experiences differ so profoundly in content that 
they become articulate in the two different 
symbolisms of Revelation and Philosophy.57
In Israel and Revelation, we find the Hebraic battle
between the prophets and the codifiers of the law, a battle
between the prophetic call for retrospective interpretation
of the law and a return to the theme of Exodus, on the one
hand, and the rabbinical call for steadfastness in
resistance to change, on the other.58 The steadfast
resistance to change was a form of protective
conservationalism which often lost sight of the meaning of
the symbols and myths and often resulted in interpretations
of the symbols and myths as teachings in and of themselves,
rather than as the transmittive mode of meaning for which
they were created. The elasticity of the symbols and myths
57Eric Voegelin, Order and History. Vol. II, The World of 
the Polis (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State
University Press, 1957), 1.
58For a critical appraisal of Voegelin's analysis of the 
Old Testament and the Hebraic tradition, see Bernhard W. 
Anderson, "Politics and the Transcendent: Eric Voegelin's
Philosophical and Theological Analysis of the Old Testament 
in the Context of the Ancient Near East," in Political 
Science Reviewer, vol. 1, (1971), 1-30.
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was often lost in calcification and the meaning and 
applicability of the symbolizations became fixed. The 
responsibility of their decalcification and restoration 
rested on the shoulders of the prophets.
According to the Hebraic prophetic tradition, Judaism 
is a story of Exodus— a mass emigration of peoples toward a 
promised land of deliverance. Through a process of 
revelation in time and place, the history of Israel has 
unfolded an ever greater understanding of man and his 
relationship to the transcendent God by consistently and 
faithfully returning to the meaning of Exodus. The 
historical task of unfolding these truths, as well as 
communicating them to others, was the responsibility of the 
prophets. Beginning with the first prophet, Moses, whose 
name means to draw out, and moving through the successive 
generations of prophetic voices which faithfully cry out in 
the wilderness, calling the people of Israel to return to 
the deliverance of the Exodus, Voegelin presents to us the 
drama of the revelation of Yahwism in the history of Israel. 
He argues that the prophetic revelation of Yahwism is "the 
best recognizable 'contribution' of Israel to the 
civilization of mankind."59
What is it within the prophetic vision of Yahwism that 
leads Voegelin to the conclusion that it is the best 
recognizable contribution of Israel to the civilization of
59Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 186.
mankind? It is the ability to recognize the truth contained 
within the symbols and revelations of Yahwism and, after 
doing so, to work toward a reformation of the way the 
religion is understood, through retrospective interpretation 
and the creation of new symbols and myths. The function of 
the prophet is to restore the inner form of history. In the 
case of Israel, the prophets' mission was to call the people 
of Israel toward a transcendence over the despair of their 
mundane existence and toward an entry into a new life of 
forgiveness and spirituality. It was a call to recognize 
the order of God within the heart and the spiritual
community, rather than clinging to the order of God in the
political, earthly realm. Although the old order of
pragmatic history was perceived by later prophets
(especially Deutero-Isaiah) as passing away, there had 
always been a latent tension between government and the 
vision of the prophet, even in the absence of such a 
perception. The task of the later prophets was to take the 
meaning which was left in the symbols of the historical 
narrative and, through retrospective interpretation, to 
create and sustain a new Israel.
The genius of the prophets is in their ability to 
recognize the necessity of evolution in the understanding of 
religious truths and their ability to re-interpret and 
recreate the symbols which communicate those truths. It is 
in the movement toward a recognition of Yahweh as a non­
political, universal God that the prophetic revelation of 
Yahwism makes its best contribution to the civilization of 
mankind. Although "the universalism of the prophets was 
never quite successful, the reason...[is] in the political 
particularization of Yahweh, which the prophets themselves 
could never overcome radically, not even in the person of 
Deutero-Isaiah.1,60 But they tried, especially as they 
approached what they sa:w as the end of the old Israel in the 
pragmatic order of history. Whether through the insight of 
their own intelligence, or through divine revelation, or 
through a combination of both, the prophetic vision moved 
first, eschatologically, from the notion of an anointed King 
in time and within a concrete Israel, to a Messiah who would 
deliver the spiritual Israel forever, and second, to an 
"insight that existence under God means love, humility, and 
righteousness of action rather than legality of 
conduct. .. .,I<S1
The founding symbols and myths of the early historical, 
Hebraic narrative, before the codification of the truth, 
carried the basic theme to which the prophets continuously
called the people back. It is the theme of Exodus— of
deliverance— which runs through the story of Noah and the 
flood, through the drawing out of Moses from the Nile, 
through the deliverance of the people from their bondage in
60Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 216.
61Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 440.
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Egypt and the calling forth of them from the desert forty
years later. Although this recurrent Exodus theme runs
throughout the historical narrative of the Israelites, and
the prophets consistently call for the people to return to
it and repent, its meaning became especially pronounced in
the codification of the Torah.
The elevation and canonization of toroth to the rank of
sacredness caused an immediate recognition of the inherent
tension between the Word of God as spoken by the prophets
and the Word of God as spoken in the Torah, because the
setting down of the Torah in written form led to
calcification in the form of fundamentalism which lost sight
of the meaning of the symbols and myths and, instead,
brought about an interpretation of the symbol as a teaching
in and of itself, rather than as the transmittive mode of
meaning for which it was created. Once this took place and
the elasticity of the symbols was lost, it would seem that
there was little left to interpret. However:
[i]n their imaginative project of the rule of law 
(Rechtsstaat) the codifiers...successfully 
translated the divine order of love into an 
institutional model, counteracting thereby the 
apotheosis of the state, as well as the
conception of a secular order of law and
government in isolation against spiritual 
order.62
The mission of the prophet was to recognize this 
counteraction against the deification of the state and
62Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 377.
secular order and to incorporate it into his teaching. The
call to do so was necessitated by the rabbinical order, who
protected the interpretation of the codified Torah and were
resistant to changes or new interpretations. With the
perception of an impending doom for the old political order
of Israel, Isaiah and Jeremiah move "away from the concrete
Israel...."63 The banner of the prophetic crusade of
movement away from the concrete Israel is taken further by
the Deutero-Isaiah author, who presents us with yet another
drama of Exodus. With the symbolic language of the
prophetic, the prophet introduces three clusters of motives:
one, the historical events of exile, the liberation through
Cyrus, the fall of Babylon, and the vicissitudes of empire
in general, two: the contraction of Israel into the
solitary suffering of the prophet, and three: the message
of new things, and shapes them into the message of salvation
and God's self-revelation as Creator, Lord and Judge, and
Redeemer. In the prophet's vision of new things, he is
symbolically explaining and recreating, through
retrospective interpretation, the past history of
revelation. The questions of the people's conduct now lies
in the past, for:
Israel has suffered for its defection, and it has 
been forgiven. The appeal is therefore no longer 
concerned with conduct as measured by the 
Sinaitic legislation, but with the acceptance of 
God the Redeemer....[T]hrough Deutero-Isaiah,
63Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 491.
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finally, there emerged from existential suffering 
the experience of redemption in the present, 
right here and now. The movement that we called 
the Exodus of Israel from itself, the movement 
from the order of the concrete society toward the 
order of redemption was thus completed.64
A similar movement is made by Saint Augustine. He is
aware that:
the structure of history is the same as the 
structure of personal existence; and he [does] 
not hesitate to use, inversely, historical 
symbols to express the reality of personal 
tension....His conception of history as a tale of 
two cities, intermingling from the beginning of 
mankind to its end, conceives it as a tale of 
man's personal exodus written large.65
Saint Augustine's analysis of the problem of exodus in both
personal existence and that of a society is unsurpassed.
Voegelin views it as "philosophically perfect"66 and argues
that it is still a valid category today. The essence of
Augustine's insight into exodus is his realization of the
two ordering principles to man's soul, the love of self and
the love of God.
Between these two centers there is continual 
tension: man is always inclined to fall into the
love of self and away from the love of God. On 
the other hand, he is always conscious that he 
should orient himself by the love of God, and he 
tries to do so in many instances. Exodus is 
defined by St. Augustine as the tendency to 
abandon one's entanglements with the world, to
^Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 500-501.
65Voegelin, "Immortality: Experience and Symbol," in The
Collected Works, vol. 12, 78.
Voegelin, "Immortality," 105.
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abandon the love self, and to turn toward the
love of God.67
In The World of the Polis. we find a similar movement 
taking place in regard to the realization of the 
unseemliness of the Hellenic symbols and myths and, in the 
call to transform the unseemly symbols, a movement or 
"ascent from the experienced world to a generative principle 
(arche) ....1,68 This search for transcendent order and
truth, this movement toward exodus, eventually developed
through the differentiation of the compact symbols of Greek 
poetic and religious symbols. This took the form of a 
realization of the unseemliness of the symbols, especially 
the symbol of man as the hero and the symbol of divinity in 
the gods. Once the unseemliness of the symbols began to be 
elucidated, it was only a matter of time before the
metaphysical questions of first principles (archai) arose.
The search for first principles was a long and
difficult process. From the mythical, epical poetry of 
Homer and Hesiod, Voegelin traces the development of Greek 
thought from the important thematic symbols of blindness and 
seeing in the words of the poets to the ideas of becoming 
and being which will find their articulation in the works of 
later philosophers. With the penetration of the myth, we 
see a movement or "ascent from the experienced world to a
67Voegelin, "Immorality," 105.
68Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 133-134.
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generative principle (arche), be it water, fire or
air..."69, toward, eventually, an ever more universal
understanding of the transcendent order of being in the
thought of Plato and Aristotle.
In the passages of Homer, Pindar, and Hesiod, the seeds
of the opposition of truth and falsity— of "the tension
between true Being and the turgid stream of Becoming"70 are
sown through the metaphorical symbols of blindness, seeing,
and remembrance (true memory) . However, the transition from
myth and philosophy can only come about by the leap in
being, which become the new form called philosophy. Thus,
when philosophy:
begins to disengage itself from the myth...in the 
work of Hesiod inasmuch as in his Theoqonv the 
myth is submitted to a conscious intellectual 
operation, with the purpose of reshaping its 
symbols in such a manner that a "truth" about 
order with universal validity will emerge.71
Hesiod addresses a fundamental question that, until his
time, had been ignored in the pantheon of Greek myth: "The
gods are immortal, but they come into being; and how did the
first gods come into being?"72 The answer to this question
is a transitional rudiment of metaphysics which will come
about as a result of the leap in being and will become
69Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 133-134.
70Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 73.
71Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 126.
72Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 134.
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manifest in the metaphysical speculations of the Ionian and
Milesian philosophers and those who followed them in their
search for a generative principle (arche).
The leap in being "assumed the form of personal
existence of individual human beings under God"73, and this
manifested itself in philosophy, which is "a symbolic form
distinguished from myth and history by its reflective self-
consciousness.1,74 These elucidations of the human soul
(psyche), as well as the transcendent God, come about as a
result of the philosophical probing of the unseemliness of
representations. As philosophy begins to exert its
intellectual force and to penetrate the unseemly myths,
"there appears the experience of divine and human
universality as the motivating force."75 This can begin to
be detected in the thought of Xenophanes, where there is a
conscious movement toward the creation of symbolism for a
universal divinity— a god who:
is unborn, he did not come into being like the 
Hesiodian gods, he always stays in the same 
place...and from his unmoved position he sways 
all things through his mind (noou phreni). In 
brief: he already bears a remarkable resemblance
to the Aristotelian prime mover.76
73Voegelin, The World of the Polis, 169.
74Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 170. A good 
definition of reflective distance is offered by Paul 
Caringella in "Voegelin: Philosopher of Divine Presence," in
Eric Voeaelin/s Significance for the Modern Mind. 177.
75Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 178.
76Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 180-181.
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In pre-Socratic thought, the search for first 
principles culminated in two experiences of the 
transcendent: the Milesian transcendence into nature and
the Xenophantic universal transcendence. These two 
experiences have continued to exert their influences on 
human thought in the Western world even into the present.
This movement is exemplified in the Socratic attack 
against the sophistic misinterpretation of symbols, symbols 
which were developed by mystic philosophers for the 
expression of experiences of transcendence. The sophistic 
misinterpretation comes about because of an ignorance or 
denial of the experiential basis of the symbolizations and 
a separation of the symbols from that basis.77
As noted previously, from the time of Homer onward, 
various symbolizations and myths were created by the Greeks 
which, when eventually differentiated by the various pre- 
Socratic philosophers, led to the realization of the 
transcendent order of being. This realization, however, was 
rooted in two different experiences of transcendence. In 
his analysis of Xenophanes, Voegelin distinguishes between 
these two experiences of transcendence in pre-Socratic 
thought:
’’For an excellent discussion of Voegelin's treatment of 
Plato and Plato's attack on the Sophists, see Thomas J. 
Farrell, "Eric Voegelin on Plato and the Sophists”, in 
Communication and Loneroan: Common Ground for Forging the
New Age, ed. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup, (Kansas 
City, Missouri: Sheed & Ward, 1993), 108-136.
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leading to the respective symbols of an arche: 
the arche of "things" and the arche of a 
"universal divinity". In the first of these 
experiences nature in its infinite flow became 
transparent for an origin of the flow itself; in 
the second of these experiences the transcendence 
of the soul toward the realissimum was understood 
as the universal characteristic of all men. The 
two experiences were then interpreted as pointing 
toward the same transcendental reality, and the 
identity found its expression in the formula "the 
One is God".78
These two experiences of transcendence are the Beginning and 
the Beyond. Many of the Hellenic thinkers immediately 
preceding the Sophists held to this formula. There was, 
through the differentiating power of early Greek philosophy, 
a greater and greater recognition of the two experiences of 
transcendence as well as the knowledge of the transcendent 
order of divine being identified in the formula: the One is
God.
However, with the onslaught of sophistic teachings, 
there is a derailment from the two experiences of 
transcendence which had arisen through the recent 
differentiation of Hellenic symbols and myths and, more 
importantly, there is a derailment from the knowledge that 
there is a transcendent order of being identified as the One 
is God. How and why did this derailment take place? How 
did the meaning contained within the compactness of the 
Hellenic symbols get overlooked or misunderstood during the 
dominance of the Sophists in Hellenic thought?
78Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 234.
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The [sophistic] thinker operates on symbols that 
have been developed by mystic-philosophers for 
the expression of experiences of transcendence.
He proceeds by ignoring the experiential basis, 
separates the symbols from this basis as if they 
had a meaning independent of the experiences 
which they express, and with brilliant logic 
shows, what every philosopher knows, that they 
will lead to contradictions if they are 
misunderstood as propositions about objects in 
world-immanent experience.79
The Sophists make this mistake because they are not oriented
toward the truth of either of the experiences of the
transcendent order of being. "The polymathie, the much-
knowing [Sophist],...tries to become philosophical by
substituting empirical generality for the universality of
transcendence.1,80 They are blinded by their inability to
transcend the world of sense perception. And in their
blindness, they are able to speculate only on the visible
things of the world.
"The visionary philosopher, [on the other hand], since
he has gone beyond the realm of sense perception does not
speculate on the plurality of things as given by the
senses."81 He, instead, is able to transcend the
particularity of the senses to a discernment of the order of
the universal. As previously noted, the Sophists
misinterpreted the two symbols of archai: the arche of
things and the arche of a universal divinity, and in so
79Voegelin, The World of the Foils. 275.
80Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 281.
81Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 208.
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doing, they misinterpreted the identity of the 
transcendental reality identified in the expression: the
One is God, which these two archai pointed toward.
The first arche, the arche of things, is misinterpreted 
in that the Sophist substitutes "empirical generality for 
the universality of transcendence.1,82 In so doing, he has 
not found an origin or over-arching first principle of the 
things, but has merely described the commonalities which 
things happen to share. He has failed to understand the 
meaning of the arche of things and, instead, has only found 
a method of classifying things into similar categories.
The second arche, the arche of the universal divinity, 
was meant to symbolize the transcendence of the soul toward 
the realissimum (most real dimension of being), which was 
understood as the universal participatory nature of the 
human soul with the realissimum as characteristic of all 
men, but the Sophists misinterpreted this symbol, through 
ignorance of its experiential basis, by once again 
immanentizing the experience into object and declaring: Man
is the measure of all things.
Finally, the transcendental reality which both 
experiences had been pointing to, namely, the One is God, 
crumbled into nothingness under the Sophistic requirement 
that visibility is the criterion of existence.
82Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 281.
The many need gods with "shapes”. When the 
"shapes" of the gods are destroyed with social 
effectiveness, the many will not become mystics 
but agnostics. The enlightened empiricist...is 
an enlightened polytheist who is spiritually not 
strong enough for faith.83
The insensitiveness of the Sophists to the meaning of the
Hellenic symbolizations had the "result of destroying
philosophy— for philosophy by definition has its center in
the experience of transcendence.1,84
Upon the grave that they dug for philosophy, the
Sophists erected their artifices of rhetoric. The "mystic
philosopher had no information to tender; he [could] only
communicate the discovery which he had made in his own soul,
hoping that such communication would stir up parallel
discoveries in the souls of others."85 The much-knowing
encyclopedic Sophists had many wares to sell, and sell them
they did. The result being that "[t]eaching...became
information about things and training in skills; learning
[could not] be the intimate movement in which a slumbering
soul awakens and opens to a differentiated, mature soul."86
But in the midst of this despair, the intimate movement of
a slumbering soul did awaken, and the movement opened itself
to the differentiated, mature soul of Socrates, who tore
The World of the Polis. 239.
The World of the Polis, 275.
The World of the Polis. 283.
The World of the Polis. 283.
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down the rhetorical artifices of the Sophists and
resurrected Greek philosophy.
Although the problem of the symbolization inherent in
philosophical language is well treated in The World of the
Polis. as well as in his exegesis of Platonic thought,87 it
is in his treatment of Aristotle that Voegelin articulates
the implications most forcefully. In Plato and Aristotle.
Voegelin makes it quite clear that the shortcomings of
symbolization and myth, due to their compact nature, is not
limited merely to the pre-philosophical thought of poetic
and religious ideas and stories. The essence and foundation
of philosophy itself— -metaphysics— can be expressed only
with the use of symbolic forms, as well. Even though the
object of philosophy is to articulate the truths more
precisely and in less unseemly ways than poetic and
religious imagery, it too can express itself only through
symbolization, for words, too, are compacted symbolizations
which represent realities:
Being can be experienced either in its world- 
immanent articulation or through the "pathein" of 
the soul in openness toward its ground; and for 
expressing the relation between transcendental 
and immanent being we have no other means than 
the analogical use of terms derived from our 
experiences of immanent being. If in his 
interpretation of being a philosopher wants to 
account for the whole structure of being— he has
87See Voegelin's treatment of Plato's Seventh Letter in 
Plato and Aristotle. 17-20.
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not much choice. In one form or another..., he 
must "duplicate" being.88
Just as the religion of the Israelites could only be created
and sustained through the use of symbolizations and myths,
so too, it is the case with philosophy. And just as it was
the case with the earlier Israelite and Hellenic
symbolizations of transcendence, that they had to be
interpreted in the manner in which they were intended, that
is, in a symbolic rather than in a literal way, so it is
with philosophy, also, for:
[s]ince experiences of transcendence can be 
articulated only by means of language which has 
its original function in the world of sense 
experience, the symbols, both concepts and
propositions, which refer to the “terminus ad 
quern" of an experience of transcendence must be 
understood analogically, whether they be symbols 
of myth, of revelation, or of 
philosophy....[D]erailment occurs when the 
symbols are torn out of their experiential 
context and treated as if they were concepts 
referring to a datum of sense experience.89
It is with this reasoning that Voegelin makes the argument
that Plato, rather than Aristotle, is the better empiricist:
This elasticity of empirical description is lost 
on Aristotle's speculation on the "physis" of the 
polis... .Aristotle, who wants to find form at any 
cost, can find it only at the price of losing
88Voegelin, Order and History. Vol. Ill, Plato and 
Aristotle (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State
University Press, 1957), 275-276.
89Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 277.
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such parts of reality as do not fit the pattern 
of his evolving form.90
Voegelin further notes that these difficulties have their
origin in Aristotle's attempt to apply the ontological
categories which he had developed in Physics and Metaphysics
without clarifying their relationship to the order of human
existence.
The categories of form and matter had been 
originally constructed so as to fit definite 
types of entities, the organism, the artifact, 
and the purposive action....[These] are not 
adequate instruments for the theorization of 
order in society. Aristotle's attempt to use 
them nevertheless is a clear instance of the 
transformation of philosophical categories into 
"topoi", torn out of their context and used in 
speculation whether they fit the field of 
problems or not.91
Voegelin's observation that philosophy shares the same 
communication problems that exist in myths, poetry, and 
revelations is important. Although philosophy does attempt 
to communicate truth more precisely than these other modes 
of expressing meaning, and it even perhaps succeeds to a 
greater degree of clarity and precision, it too, in the end, 
can only paint us a picture or image of truth. At best, the 
advent of philosophy does not, and cannot, solve (in the 
sense of complete differentiation) the compactness of
90Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 317. For a more
comprehensive discussion on the elasticity of empirical 
description and the problems that have ensued from its anti- 
mythical formulations, see: Voegelin, "What is Nature?," 
Anamnesis. 71-88.
91Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 333-334.
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meaning within our symbolizations. It can only refine, and 
when all is said and done, all human communication and, 
therefore, all truth claims, must be performed through 
metaphor and analogy. This is why the "Studies in the 
History of Political Ideas" was ultimately abandoned in 
favor of Order and History. The theological and
philosophical significance of this discovery "lie in this 
very attempt at symbolic reinvigoration and spiritual 
renewal.,|92
The implications of this assertion for epistemology are
radical. How can we be said to know a part or a whole of
reality when we can represent or articulate only through
metaphor and analogy?
There is no autonomous, nonparadoxic language, 
ready to be used by man as a system of signs when 
he wants to refer to the paradoxic structures of 
reality and consciousness. Words and their 
meanings are just as much a part of the reality 
to which they refer as the being things are 
partners in the comprehending reality; language 
participates in the paradox of a quest that lets 
reality become luminous for its truth by pursuing 
truth as a thing intended.... From the analysis 
there emerges the complex of consciousness- 
reality-language as a something that receives its 
character as a unit through the pervasive 
presence of another something, called the paradox 
of intentionality and luminosity, of thing-ness 
and It-ness.93
^Morrissey, Consciousness and Transcendence; The
Theology of Eric Voegelin. 230.
93Voegelin, Order and History, vol. V, In Search of Order 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press,
1987), 17-18.
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It is clear from Voegelin7s conclusions that philosophy 
shares the same representational and communicative problems 
that exist in myths, poetry, and revelations.94 Indeed, 
some of the distinctions between poetry, revelations, and 
philosophy begin to disappear when we recognize that, in the 
final linguistic analysis, they are all forced to use 
symbols— metaphorical and mytho-poetic language, for there 
is no other kind of language. It follows, therefore, that 
any theory of knowledge which he might develop or discover 
will be other than propositional. This is indeed the case, 
as will become clear in the following chapter.
The Experience of Order in History
In the history of order, there have been two major 
understanding of order experienced by man. The first, the 
cosmological myth, holds that the order of society 
participates in the divine being that orders the cosmos. 
•'This recognition is communicated to members of society by 
cosmological symbolization, a process of the symbolization 
of [a] political order by means of cosmic analogies.1,95 The 
second major recognition of order is the discovery of 
transcendent being as the source of order in man and 
society, which is accomplished through a leap in being. The 
leap in being is a qualitative leap, a conversion which
^For a more in-depth analysis of Voegelin7s theory of
language, see Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin; Philosopher of 
History. 58-88, 61-66, 68-76, 122-25.
95Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 38.
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befalls a society so powerfully that "the converted 
community will experience itself as qualitatively different 
from all other societies that have not taken the leap."96 
It is a conversion toward the true source of order in which 
"the participation in being changes its structure when it 
becomes emphatically a partnership with God, while the 
participation in mundane being recedes to second rank."97 
How is this new participation in being, which is recognized 
in the leap in being, manifested? Whereas, in the 
cosmological myth, cosmic substance permeates the cosmos and 
manifests itself in the gods, the discovery of transcendent 
being leads to the realization of the historic form— the 
genesis of a people "as an event with a special meaning in 
history...."98 It is an experience of the present under 
God. It is "the entering of the soul into divine reality 
through the entering of divine reality into the soul...."99
The experience of the present under God brings about a 
retrospective interpretation of the past as having existed 
under that same God. This requires new symbols and new 
myths which must be created in order to communicate the new 
truth. These new symbols and myths, in turn, come together 
to form the new paradigmatic narrative, which is a symbolic
96Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 10.
"Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 10.
98Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 124.
"Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 130.
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form of existence that incorporates, clarifies, and expands 
the old truths which were transmitted by the old symbols and 
myths:
[A] historical present is created, radiating its 
form over a past that was not consciously 
historical in its own present.... [T] he past has 
become incorporated into a stream of events that 
has its center of meaning in the historical 
present.100
This new truth, as well as the re-interpretation of the
past, does not totally invalidate the old truths, but
rather, clarifies them through the process of
differentiation. The realization of transcendent being and
the retrospective interpretation of history, coupled with
the creation of new symbols and myths, form a new kind of
paradigmatic narrative through which man can find meaning
and define himself:
A society in existence under God is in historical 
form. From its present falls the ray of meaning 
over the past of mankind from which it has 
emerged; and the history written in this spirit 
is part of the symbolism by which society 
constitutes itself.10*
The meaning that is imparted through this historical, 
paradigmatic narrative calls man to see himself and his
society as chosen or set apart. Under a society in
existence under God, the lives of the spirit and intellect 
are vibrant in both the human and the Divine. Man and 
society are participants in the image of God. The human
100Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 128.
I01Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 128.
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creature's participation in the transcendent imparts both
meaning and purpose— it elevates man to a higher plane than
the things of the world. In short, it gives divine reason
and entelechy to human existence:
The "adam" that was created by God with the 
procreative response of "ad" and "adamah" 
continues to generate himself in the likeness of 
God. To the presently living the [generational] 
registers authenticate their being "adam" in the 
likeness of God— that is, the human medium that 
is supposed to co-operate in generating the order 
of being through procreative submission to the 
creative will of God. The divine creation of 
order is not finished with Man.102
A major problem with modernity is its failure to 
recognize divine reason and entelechy in human existence. 
Rather than look at the whole range of human experience, 
modernity tends to focus, through isolation and 
fragmentation, on parts of reality and replace them as the 
whole. What Voegelin calls for is a more comprehensive and 
open view of reality, one that keeps the metaphysical 
questions open.
But how are we to know that these knowledge claims of 
the past, which Voegelin reaffirms, are the case? How does 
this knowledge get discovered and how can we be said to know 
it? What is the evidence for such claims? Does the 
evidence support the claims? The answers to these questions 
will require an in-depth analysis of Voegelin's epistemology 
and his theory of the equivalence of symbolizations, and
102 Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 170-71.
60
they will be addressed in detail in later chapters of this
work. Let it suffice to state briefly at this point that:
When the "episteme" is ruined, men do not stop 
talking about politics; but they now must express 
themselves in the mode of doxa....In so far as 
under the concept of value-judgments was subsumed 
the whole body of classic and Christian 
metaphysics, and especially of philosophical 
anthropology, the attack could result in nothing 
less than a confession that a science of human 
and social order did not exist.103
This is the case because not only does the method of value-
free- judgments lead to a claim of values as being
subjective, and therefore relative, but the method also
leads to a relativistic view of facts themselves. What is
the basis for selection of facts to be studied? There are
infinite facts. What criteria are to be used in determining
relevance? Pushing the values out of science into the
position of unquestioned axioms or hypotheses cannot be
done.
Under the assumption, for instance, that the 
"state" was a value, political history and 
political science would be legitimated as 
"objective" in so far as they explored 
motivations, actions, and conditions that had a 
bearing on creation, preservation, and extinction 
of states. Obviously, the principle would lead 
to dubious results if the legitimating value was 
put at the discretion of the scientist. If 
science was defined as exploration of facts in 
relation to a value, there would be as many 
political histories and political sciences as 
there were scholars with different ideas about 
what was valuable. The facts that are treated as 
relevant because they have a bearing on the 
values of a progressivist will not be the 
relevant facts of a Marxist. Neither the most
103Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 12.
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scrupulous care in keeping the concrete work 
"value-free" nor the most conscientious 
observation of critical method in establishing 
facts and causal relations could prevent the 
sinking of historical and political sciences into 
a morass of relativism.104
Modern science leaves us in an epistemological quagmire. A
science of man cannot purposefully function without some
bearing from values, but following the principles of
positivism, there is no grounding for the values.
The notion that value-free science can be practiced, or
for that matter defined, is untenable. If science refuses
to decide on a value, and makes the claim that all facts are
equal, then there are no values left which can constitute
the object of science, because they become part of the
object itself. The abolition of the values as the
constituents of science lead "to a theoretically impossible
situation because the object of science has a 'constitution'
after all, that is, the essence toward which we are moving
in our search for truth."105 This problem can only be
solved with a science of essence, which Voegelin develops.
However, in the absence of a science of essence, the
necessary conclusion for science is that it has no meaning,
it requires values, for there is no other way to limit it
(define it) toward an objective or purpose. Otherwise, any
104Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 13.
105Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 21.
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and all facts or collection of facts, regardless of their
relationships, can be said to be science.106
This problem is exemplified in the thought of Max
Weber. For Weber, a value-free science meant the
exploration of causes and effects, "the construction of
ideal types that would permit distinguishing regularities of
institutions as well as deviations from them, and especially
the construction of typical causal relations."107 Such a
science could not tell him whether someone was a socialist
or a democrat, "but it could tell him what the consequences
would be if he tried to translate the values of his
preference into political practice.1,108 This formulation of
science led to the conclusion that science deals only with
the causality of action, not the principles themselves.
The new sense of theoretical relevance could 
express itself, therefore, only in the creation 
of the categories of "responsibility" and
"demonism" in politics. Weber recognized the
"values" for what they were, that is, as ordering 
ideas for political action, but he accorded them 
the status of "demonic" decisions beyond rational 
argument.109
What practical implications does this have?
It follows from this formulation that political 
principles and values cannot be formed by a science which
106For an excellent and in-depth analysis of this 
problem, see Leszek Kolakowski, Metaphysical Horror.
107Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 14.
108Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 14.
109Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 14.
does not extend to principles of order. "The teaching of a 
value-free science of politics in a university would be a 
senseless enterprise unless it were calculated to influence 
the values of the students by putting at their disposition 
an objective knowledge of political reality."110 This 
problem is clearly due to the plethora, theoretically 
limited only by the number of people who exist, of different 
values or sets of values held. It is clear that there is a 
plurality of conflicting values and each of them could be 
used to constitute an object of study. "The result would 
be...relativism, and political science would be degraded to 
an apology for the dubious fancies of political 
intellectuals, as at the time it was and as to a very 
considerable extent it still is."111 Weber recognized the 
problem. But how could it be solved? He attempted to solve 
it by recognizing values as historical expressions which are 
facts and causal factors in history. In short, he reduced 
them to unexplainable facts, rather than analyzing them for 
their potential meaning.
However, the ultimate problem was still not solved, 
because:
[t]he idea of a value-free science whose object 
would be constituted by "reference to a value" 
could be realized only under the condition that a 
scientist was willing to decide on a "value" for 
reference. If the scientist refused to decide on
110Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 16.
luVoegelin, The New Science of Politics. 17.
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a "value," if he treated all "values" as equal 
(as Max Weber did), if, moreover, he treated them 
as social facts among others— then there were no 
"values" left which could constitute the object 
of science, because they had become part of the 
object itself."112
So what is to be done? First of all, we should
recognize that science, and knowledge in general, is not to
be discovered in a vacuum. Humans have existed for
thousands of years. Throughout this time they have created
multitudes of symbols and myths which portray and
communicate insights of the ages. Science must do more than
merely describe bare, brute facts. It must move beyond a
mere literal observance and notation of facts, values,
symbols and myths, which are treated as literal facts to be
entered into a data set, and rather, seek out the meanings
and the relevances that they might contain.
...[W]hen political science [or any science] 
begins, it does not begin with a "tabula rasa" on
which it can inscribe its concepts; it will
inevitably start from the rich body of self­
interpretation of a society and proceed by
critical clarification of socially pre-existent 
symbols. When Aristotle wrote his Ethics and 
Politics. when he constructed his concepts of the 
polis, of the constitution, the citizen, the 
various forms of government, of justice, of
happiness, etc., he did not invent these terms 
and endow them with arbitrary meanings; he took 
rather the symbols which he found in his social 
environment, surveyed with care the variety of 
meanings which they had in common parlance, and
112Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 20-21.
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ordered and clarified these meanings by the 
criteria of his theory.113
So what is to be done in light of the problems with the 
positivistic approach to science? What is science and is 
science possible? Voegelin calls for a new science of 
politics, a science which is not restricted to any 
particular methodologies, but rather "is a search for truth 
concerning the nature of the various realms of being."114 
It requires an inquiry into the philosophical foundations of 
human views of reality and a search for the understanding of 
humanity's existence and place within reality. It then 
seeks to find the implications for, and the relationships 
to, ethics and politics.
In order to pursue such an inquiry, it is necessary to 
examine:
the unfolding of Greek metaphysics and the 
religious experiences of the philosophers who 
developed it, and a further study of medieval 
metaphysics had to establish the corresponding 
connection for the Christian case....And when all 
these preparatory studies [are] made, when 
critical concepts for treatment of the problems 
[are] formed, and the propositions [are] 
supported by the sources, the final task [will 
have to] be faced of searching for a 
theoretically intelligible order of history into
113Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 28. For 
another important discussion and critique of positivism and 
the elimination of reason, see: Thomas A. Spragens, Jr, The
Ironv of Liberal Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1981). Also see: Leszek Kolakowski, Metaphysical
Horror.
114Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 4.
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which these variegated phenomena [can] be 
organized.115
This was Voegelin's mission. He never lost sight of the 
mysterious and yet necessary Question116 of the Ground. His 
inquiry and pursuit of a ground for knowledge resulted in 
one of the greatest achievements of modern scholarship, and 
his findings lead to a radical reshaping of historical and 
philosophical thought, for they alter our understanding of 
man, society and the world.
The following chapters will elaborate and analyze the 
epistemological questions, answers, and implications that 
Voegelin reached in this mission. Specifically, they will 
investigate the questions of: the nature of man, the search
for an epistemological ground, the nature of the ground, how 
humans can have knowledge of the ground, the equivalence of 
symbolizations, and what implications these findings have 
for ethics and politics.
For Voegelin, these questions are not merely academic, 
they are matters of life and death. German social 
scientists were able to participate in the Nazi horror 
because the methodology, which was deficient, was a value- 
free scientism, which did not allow for any moral principles 
to help stop the evil that men did. What kind of science of
115Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 25-26.
116Indeed, the Question is a major recurring theme 
throughout Voegelin's works, see Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin: 
Philosopher of History. 38, 159-160, 215-216, 287.
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man is that?117 It is not a science of man at all. So why 
do we need a new science of man? Quite simply, without a 
proper science of man, one which considers the full 
dimensions of reality and humanity, including the spiritual 
and moral orders, we will continue to blow to and fro with 
the winds of relativism and impose artificial orders rather 
based on false views of who man is. And when the evil 
leviathan rears its head we will be helpless to act, other 
than to do as many German scientists did, which is nothing 
at all.
We need a new science of man in order to discern, 
analyze and, when need be, to help stop the atrocities and 
the evils which take place in our world. This is what 
Voegelin set out to do in his search for order and the 
search for the ground of that order and being. It might be 
objected that Voegelin's mission was a response to a 
grotesque form of political evil which could and would never 
again happen. This is a naive and dangerous position. A 
brief overview of contemporary political evil— American 
government radiation experiments on retarded children, 
Serbian ethnic cleansing, the Chinese cultural revolution, 
and the systematic execution of homeless street urchins in 
South America— will suffice to show that the promise never
117For a detailed and insightful analysis of the race 
idea in National Socialism and its impact on Voegelin's 
thought, see Thomas W. Heilke, Voegelin on the Idea of Race; 
An analysis of Modern European Racism. 106-154.
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again is a hollow statement that tolls the hollow rings of 
insincerity and untruth. Organized, political evil can and 
does happen, on a grand scale, across the globe, on any 
given day and any given night, and it is all too often a 
matter of life and death.
If positivism and the systems and theories that result 
from it are radically inadequate, what is adequate? Perhaps 
a new science of man. One which does more than merely 
record and categorize the facticity of the content of the 
human world. A science that considers the intrinsic value 
and dignity of every man, woman, and child. This is what 
Voegelin begins to discover in his search for a new science. 
In the classical science of man, which has been eclipsed and 
misinterpreted in modernity, he finds a movement in the 
historical field toward human recognition of the innate 
dignity and sacredness of each person. He, therefore, calls 
for a return to the holism of Saint Bonaventure, Plato, 
Aristotle, Saint Augustine, and Saint Thomas Aquinas, and a 
recovery of insights lost in waywardness.
CHAPTER THREE
AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF MYSTICISM:
THE LOVE OF SELF OR THE LOVE OF GOD
The "ignorance" of the true mystic is not 
unintelligence but superintelligence. Though 
contemplation sometimes seems to be a denial of 
speculative thought it is really its fulfillment.
All philosophy, all theology that is vitally 
aware of its place in the true order of things, 
aspires to enter the cloud around the mountaintop 
where man may hope to meet the Living God. All 
true learning should therefore be alive with the 
sense of its own limitations and with the 
instinct for a vital experience of reality which 
speculation alone cannot provide.118
Voegelin's epistemology does not deal with mundane 
knowledge of everyday sense-experience, but rather, the 
contemplative and erotic knowledge of the Divine. 
Therefore, before beginning a study of Voegelin's theory of 
knowledge, it is imperative that the distinction be made 
between luminal and intentional consciousness, between 
apperception and perception, and between the It-reality and 
the thing-reality. These distinctions are often made in
contemporary thought by the disciplinary designations of 
philosophy and science. However, because Voegelin claims to 
be recovering the science of the past, he argues against the 
contemporary distinction between science and philosophy in 
favor of noetic consciousness and intentional consciousness, 
which correspond respectively with the It-reality and thing- 
reality. Intentional consciousness corresponds to
m Thomas Merton, The Ascent to Truth (San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1952), 59.
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propositional knowledge which deals with thing-reality and 
noetic consciousness corresponds to noetic knowledge which 
deals with the apperception of first principles or the It- 
reality.
Noetic knowledge...is not abstract knowledge 
obtained by gathering cases of participation and 
examining them for general characteristics. 
Rather, it is concrete knowledge of participation 
in which a man's desire for knowledge is 
experienced as a movement toward the ground that 
is being moved by the ground. In this movement 
the divine ground of being is illuminated as the 
ground of man and world. With this sentence, the 
accent of our analysis shifts from reality to 
knowledge.119
Because Voegelin's epistemology deals with noetic 
consciousness, it cannot and should not be judged by the 
modern epistemological standards set forth through 
intentionalistic methods exemplified in Cartesian dualism or 
the Kantian dichotomy of things-in-themselves and things-in- 
the-mind, that attempts to explain how the latter is a 
mirror of the former. Instead, Voegelin is attempting to 
demonstrate that knowledge of the ultimate truths, which the 
Mystery unveils in theophanic experiences, are not thinkable 
in a subject-object dichotomy, much less speakable. "Man's 
existence in the In-Between of imperfection and perfection, 
time and timelessness, mortality and immortality is indeed 
not an object of sense perception; and the propositions of 
consciousness reflecting on its own structure of
U9Voegelin, Anamnesis. 183.
participation are indeed self-reflective."120 This is 
primarily a recognition that thought, which includes myth, 
revelation, and philosophy, articulates reality--the 
epistemological and ontological dimensions of reality arise 
simultaneously and cannot be severed except for analytical 
reasons. In truth, man cannot experience or know reality 
from an Archimedean point of view, because his 
epistemological status cannot be divorced from the reality 
of which he is part and which is part of him. "The truth of 
the quest is not a true doctrine resulting from an 
intentionalist investigation of objects, but a balanced 
state of existence, formed in reflective distance to the 
process of meditative wandering through the paradoxic 
manifold of tensions."121 Voegelin is attempting to 
demonstrate, albeit with difficulty because of the 
limitations of language and symbols, that reality itself is 
an unfractured whole, it is not dichotomized into reality 
and knowledge of reality.
This is a difficult idea to express, because our 
language, and therefore our philosophy, are constructed in 
such a way as to embody the dichotomized view of reality— a 
dichotomized view which neatly severs and defines reality
120Voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and 
Symbolization In History," in The Collected Works. Vol. 12, 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press,
1990), 121.
121Voegelin, In Search of Order. 100.
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into categorical pieces. The whole enterprise of Voegelin7s 
epistemology is to overcome this linguistic and 
philosophical bias and heal the fractured view of reality in 
order to catch a glimpse of the whole. This is a difficult 
task. It is made even more difficult by the fact that our 
language and our normal ways of thinking are structured 
temporally and spatially. Nevertheless, the whole [It!] 
"...has a dimension of meaning, neither spatial nor 
temporal, in the existential process of the quest for 
truth...."122 This leads to the question as to how this 
whole is to be symbolized and communicated?
What follows from this is that Voegelin7s mystical 
epistemology is not and cannot be an exact science, if by 
exact we mean exact certainty, precision and finality. 
How could it be, given these linguistic and categorical 
problems? Indeed, it is quite probable that the more 
dominant fractionalized, modern epistemological theories 
rose to their dominance because of the very fact that they 
do neatly fit the fractionalized linguistic and categorical 
biases, for then it would be much easier to create logically 
precise and simple epistemological theories. Something 
other than propositional, linguistic indices must be sought. 
Through the examination of past symbolizations in history, 
Voegelin discovered that this has been the case throughout 
philosophical history. This is why the symbolizations of
122Voegelin, In Search of Order. 13.
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history must be penetrated and experienced. This is the 
origin of Voegelin's theory of symbolizations and their 
equivalences.
Voegelin's theory of symbolization is not so neat, 
precise, and propositional as are most modern theories of 
knowledge. However, the truth of a theory or set of symbols 
is not to be determined merely by its precision and 
simplicity. It is to be determined by whether or not it is 
empirically the case, and Voegelin's epistemology is 
grounded in empirical reality. He looks around the world in 
which he lives and experiences and he discovers a historical 
field or record in which the human experiences of the 
Mystery of Being have been symbolized. He then rationally 
investigates this historical field in search of its meaning. 
While it is not easily propositionalized, it is, 
nevertheless, very much real and based in real human 
experience.
In this regard, Voegelin's method is widely 
empirical in the best sense. His is an 
empiricism in the original Greek version of it, 
not the positivist mode of objectivist perception 
that is available naively open to everyone, but 
the classical mode of personal appeal, of direct 
persuasion of those whose inner experience 
conforms to the symbols, images, and analogies 
left behind by a seeker of truth, to the virtuous 
who have been graced by the same experiences 
illuminated by these symbols and whose souls are 
ordered by the same reality they point to.123
123Morrissey, Consciousness and Transcendence:____ The
Theology of Eric Voegelin. 248.
Voegelin is concerned with the mystery of being'— the
cloud around the mountaintop. This is the major theme which
runs from the beginning to the end of his life's works, and
is most exemplified and culminated in his death-bed work
"Quod Deus Dicitur". His is a sacred, knightly quest for
more light, with the knowledge that, at least in this world
and this life, he can hope only to see as through a glass
darkly. He seeks the luminous ground which is the realm of
the mystical. In the end, he must, as we must also, concur
with the Angelic Doctor Saint Thomas Aquinas, who, after
having experienced his beatific vision, concludes that all
that he has written is but straw before the divine Mystery.
And yet, seeing as through a glass darkly, and recognizing
the fact that full understanding is not our lot in this
world, each person nevertheless experiences the restless,
erotic yearning of the soul for that which is higher, purer,
and more true; for each person, by nature, is the seeker of
meaning and its foundation. Each person, by nature, is on
a quest for truth and meaning. For:
God and man, world and society form a primordial 
community of being....It is a datum of experience 
in so far as it is known to man by virtue of his 
participation in the mystery of its being....It 
does not mean that man, more or less comfortably 
located in the landscape of being, can look 
around and take stock of what he sees as far as 
he can see it. Such a metaphor, or comparable 
variations on the theme of the limitations of 
human knowledge, would destroy the paradoxical 
character of the situation....[Man] is not a 
self-contained spectator. He is an actor, 
playing a part in the drama of being and, through
75
the brute fact of his existence, committed to
play it without knowing what it is.124
But how does a person know in what direction his or her 
search should be directed? Here, Voegelin turns to the 
symbolization of love, exemplified in the philosophies of 
such thinkers as Plato, Plotinus, Saint Augustine, and Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, but especially the philosophy of Saint 
Augustine. Noetic (luminal) consciousness is moved by a 
loving orientation toward the divine ground to explore 
reality in its all-encompassing form. It attempts to catch 
a glimpse of the whole of reality and to discern where and 
how the various parts relate and fit into it. It ponders 
the depths of the apeiron and the ecstatic heights of 
theophanic vision, as well as all that lies between. And in 
order to articulate what it finds, noetic consciousness 
requires creative symbols for its expression and attempts to 
point to or affirm that which is experiential, rather than 
to prove logical concepts. These creative symbols are 
throughout human history, from the cave paintings of the 
Neanderthals to the perfumed things in Plotinus, to the 
meditative poetry of Saint John of the Cross. It seeks 
differentiation of experience, symbolizations of that which 
is eternal and transcendent, as opposed to logically 
necessary delineations of concepts. Intentional
consciousness, on the other hand, explores objective
124Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 1.
76
reality— the world of things. It seeks to observe and 
describe objects of reality, by delineating and defining 
concepts with the greatest possible precision, clarity and 
conciseness.
The key lies in distinguishing the modes and 
scope of experience and in keeping in mind that 
experience is a transaction in consciousness. At 
the level of common sense, it is evident that 
human beings have experiences other than sensory 
perceptions, and it is equally evident that 
philosophers like Plato and Aristotle explored 
reality on the basis of experiences far removed 
from perception....[T]he primarily nonsensory 
modes of experience address dimensions of human 
existence superior in rank and worth to those 
sensory perception does: experiences of the
good, beautiful, and just, of love, friendship, 
and truth, of all human virtue and vice, and of 
divine reality.125
It is clear that Voegelin does not deny the reality and 
usefulness of intentional consciousness. But he does deny 
that the major thrust or theme of the major philosophical 
teachings and meanings of the past are dealing primarily 
with intentional consciousness. He argues that much of the 
greatest philosophical thought of the past has been 
reinterpreted through the intentionalistic methods 
(prejudices) of modern post-enlightenment philosophy, when 
in truth, the philosophical essence of what was written and 
handed down to us from classical thought was more often 
noetic, based in apperception as opposed to perception. In 
short, Voegelin argues that modern thought has imposed its
125Sandoz, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. vol. 12,
xx.
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own intentionalistic bias on luminal symbolizations which 
were intended to communicate to us noetically. We have 
misinterpreted and deformed the true meaning of classical 
philosophy and, therefore, lost the truth and the experience 
embodied in the symbolizations.
Platonic philosophy is a good example of this. Modern 
philosophical interpretations of Platonic thought tend to 
reduce his epistemology to a theory of ideas, when in truth, 
according to Voegelin, his theory of ideas is really a set 
of symbolizations which he created to embody his individual 
noetic experiences of reality in the metaxy. These 
symbolizations were constructed in order to reproduce, or at 
least to point in the direction, of the experiential truths 
in those human souls who might approach them with an 
openness to their meaning, which entails an apperceptive 
openness and recognition of both the divine and human 
aspects which they embody.
While it might seem that Voegelin is an historicist, 
who sees the unfolding story of the history of philosophy to 
be moving toward some eschatological end, it is important to 
note that he is not arguing in favor of historical 
progressivism. His philosophical inclinations are, rather 
toward an investigation into, and an analysis of, the 
Mystery of being in the process of revelation.126 In the
126For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of 
Voegelin's theory of revelation, see Eugene Webb, "Eric 
Voegelin's Theory of Revelation," in Eric Voegelin's Thought:
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first half of The Ecumenic Age. Voegelin presents his view
of history which "is not a story to be told from the
beginning to its happy end...[but] a mystery in process of
revelation.1,127 Whereas in Voegelin's earlier works it
appeared that history was moving linearly toward an ultimate
end or telos, in this work it becomes clear that no such
conclusion can be drawn from the empirical facts. Instead,
he argues that:
no answer...is the ultimate truth in whose 
possession mankind could live happily forever 
after, because no answer can abolish the 
historical process of consciousness from which it 
has emerged— however frequently and fervently 
this fallacy may be entertained by doctrinaire 
theologians, metaphysicians, and ideologists.
But precisely because every last answer is a 
penultimate in relation to the next last one in 
time, the historical field of consciousness 
becomes of absorbing interest; for it is his 
participation in the history of consciousness 
that confers on man's existential encounters with 
the reality of which he is a part the ultimacy of 
meaning which the penultimate answers, torn out 
of the complex experience-question-answer, do not 
have.128
In the final analysis, man the questioner can know only the 
Mystery of the Ground. Man cannot capture the Mystery with 
precision and propositional exactness. We can have no such
A Critical Appraisal, ed. Ellis Sandoz, 157-178. For a 
critical analysis of Voegelin's theory of revelation and his 
interpretation of Christianity, see Bruce Douglass, "A 
Diminished Gospel: A Critique of Voegelin's Interpretation
of Christianity," in Eric Voegelin's Search for Order in 
History, ed. Stephen A. McKnight, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1978), 139-155.
127Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age. 6.
128Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age. 75.
knowledge of an ultimate end toward which history marches. 
We can know no grand apocalyptic fruition of the unfolding 
of the Spirit of God poured out upon mankind. There are 
only individuals in given historical times, places, and 
cultures who are all groping for the answers to the 
mysteries and wonders of human life. The passage of time 
does not insure that men will get closer to the ground of 
being, reality is not a historically progressive 
enlightenment which will someday reach its fullness. It is, 
instead, an ongoing process of revelation which takes place 
on the individual, experiential human level and is 
incorporated and communicated through universal and 
institutional symbolizations.129 Specifically, knowledge is 
to be attained only through a mystical experience of the 
ground of being within an individual human person who comes 
in contact with the proper symbolizations and penetrates 
their meanings with an openness to their ground.
What is the nature of that within an individual that 
allows him to apperceive through his openness to the ground? 
It is:
the openness of man's existence toward the ground 
[which] is dependent on the something in man that 
can respond to a theophany and engage in the 
quest of the ground. This something in man, as
129For a comprehensive analysis of Voegelin's experience 
of order-disorder and the influence of process philosophy on 
his thought, see Paul G. Kuntz, "Voegelin's Experiences of 
Disorder Out of Order and Vision of Order Out of Disorder: 
A Philosophic Meditation on His Theory of Order-Disorder," in 
Eric Voegelin's Significance for the Modern Mind. 111-173.
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it is discovered on the occasion of the response,
Plato has symbolized as the "daimon" (Timaeus.
90a) , Aristotle as the "theion" (Nicomachean 
Ethics. 1177b28ff). This divinest part
(theiotaton) in the psyche is the human "nous" 
that can participate in the divine "Nous".130
And this something, this divinest part in the human psyche,
is moved by properly directed love. This love, when
properly directed, creates a heightened nature of man131,
which is exemplified in the Thomasic symbolization of the
f ides caritate format a (formation of the heart)132. The
possibility of the existence of this love is contained
within given theological and philosophical symbolizations,
and its realization is attained through the individual
human's penetration of these symbols. This is also
exemplified in Saint Augustine's doctrine of the relations
between faith and reason, which gives "formal expression to
a moral experience and for that reason refuses to separate
illumination of the mind from purification of the heart."133
The creation of these symbols or pathways, however,
oftentimes lends itself to misguided doctrinalizations and
130Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age. 237.
131For a more complete discussion of the mystically 
heightened consciousness, see: David Granfield, Heightened
Consciousness: The Mystical Difference (New York: Paulist
Press, 1991), 29-55.
132For another analysis of Voegelin's understanding of 
fides caritate formats, see: Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin:
Philosopher of History. 189, 212, 219-220, 262-264, 281-282.
133Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint 
Augustine (New York: Random House, 1960), 31.
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thus to losses of existential truth in the process of 
institutionalization. Love cannot be doctrinalized, 
required or institutionalized. It can only be symbolized as 
a possible, albeit appropriate, move or response. The move 
must be initiated and consummated by the individual and God. 
It follows, therefore, that institutionalized communitarian 
revelatory symbolizations, be they Traditions, Scriptures, 
myths, or philosophies, cannot be sufficiently created, nor 
adequately transmitted, nor adequately communicated, to 
bring about revelatory experiences solely by themselves. 
They can, at best, only point to the possibility that such 
an experience might be available and can be entered into. 
The love between the individual and God must exist before 
the revelation can take place.
Truth is not in the ascent to belief in a given set of 
doctrines, dogmas, propositions or myths. Truth is in the 
experiences, moved by love, that these symbolizations lead 
men and women toward, and it tends to be in the traditions 
of philosophic or religious meditations, especially those in 
the history of Christianity, since they are the symbolic 
vehicles which we live within and which we are exposed to in 
our symbolic tradition.134
134For an interesting analysis of Eastern religious 
meditation, specifically Buddahism, and how it fits with 
Voegelin's understanding of meditation, see Eugene Webb, 
"Eric Voegelin at the End of an Era: Differentiations of
Consciousness and the Search for the Universal," Unpublished 
paper presented at the Voegelin Centre Conference, University 
of Manchester, July 10, 1994, esp. 4-11.
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This being the case, it follows that reason and
revelation are intimately related, for they are both
symbolic vehicles designed to lead people to experiences of
the divine. This is, indeed, what Voegelin argues:
The life of reason, thus, is firmly rooted in a 
revelation....In a philosophical study, the 
philosopher's theophanies must be taken 
seriously....Who is this God who moves the 
philosophers in their search? What does he
reveal to them? And how is he related to the God 
who revealed himself to Israelites, Jews, and 
Christians?...[T]he God who appeared to the
philosophers, and who elicited from Parmenides 
the exclamation "Is!", was the same God who
revealed himself to Moses as the "I am who (or:
what) I am", as the God who is what he is in the 
concrete theophany to which man responds.135
Indeed, Voegelin enumerates ten classical components of
reason (nous), all of which include the revelatory element
in their definitions.136 According to Voegelin, the
dichotomization of faith and reason, as well as the creation
of the modern definition of metaphysics, has its roots in
the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas.
The term "Metaphysics," contracted from meta ta 
physica, did not appear until the high Middle 
Ages. It seems to have had a brief Arab 
prehistory and then was introduced into Western 
thought by Thomas, in the prooemium of his 
commentary to Aristotle's metaphysics, as a 
concept for a philosophical science founded on 
natural reason....Thomas defined "metaphysics" 
summarily as a science of primae causae, of
135Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age. 228-229.
136See Ellis Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of 
Politics," in Discourse (Montreal, Summer 1993), 6-7, and
Ellis Sandoz, The Voeaelinian Revolution (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 198,
214, 210-216.
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principia maxima universalia, and of substances 
quae sunt maxima a materia separatae....Thomas 
crystallized the misunderstanding into 
"metaphysics" and brought about the perversion of 
noetic exegesis by hardening its terms into a 
propositional science of principles, universals, 
and substances.137
Voegelin goes on to argue that this conception of
metaphysics has determined the further destinies of
metaphysics, namely the dichotomy between subject and object
which originates in Cartesianism. Voegelin rejects both of
these modern dichotomies.
For when noesis is put into the same basket as 
"metaphysics," we lose the reality of knowledge 
of the noetic experience and also the
differentiated material structure of the ratio, 
which means that we have no noetic science of 
order any more.138
Not only does Voegelin argue that the distinction 
between reason and revelation is misguided, and the modern 
notion of metaphysics is incorrect, he harkens us back to 
the realization that there is an equivalence of
symbolizations from various human cultures and histories, 
even though they take various and different forms. This is 
why he is able to move quite comfortably between thinkers 
from very varied backgrounds, cultures and times, who, on 
the surface, would appear quite different. And that is why 
Voegelin urges us to recover the knowledge of the past which 
was not perverted by modern derailments. This is
137Voegelin, Anamnesis. 193.
138Voegelin, Anamnesis, 194.
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exemplified throughout Voegelin's work, but especially in
the volumes of Order and History. Studies in the History
Political Ideas, and "Quod Deus Dicitur". In these works,
he searches for and finds the spiritual commonalities in the
various stories and meditations of philosophy and religion
which make every man and woman share in the universal
meaning and dignity of the term: humanity.139 The common
meanings are recognizable because they speak to everybody's
consciousness.
If the story is to evoke authoritatively the 
order of a social field, the word must be spoken 
with an authority recognizable as such by the men 
to whom the appeal is addressed; the appeal will 
have no authority of truth unless it speaks with 
an authority commonly present in everybody's 
consciousness, however inarticulate, deformed, or 
suppressed the consciousness in the concrete case 
may be....[T]he appeal will be no more than a 
private (idios) opinion unless the questioner 
finds in the course of his quest the word (logos) 
that indeed speaks what is common (xynon) to the
139Voegelin argues that the universalism of Christian 
revelation implicit in Saint Thomas Aquinas' declaration in 
Summa Theoloqiae (3, a. 8, 3) that Christ is the head of the 
corpus mysticum means that one has to recognize the presence 
of Christ in a Babylonian hymn, or a Taoist speculation, or 
a Platonic dialogue, as well as in the Gospels. See 
Voegelin, "Response to Professor Altizer," in The Collected 
Works. vol. 12, 294. This leads to an even more intriguing 
point, that is, that there is a recognition in Voegelin's 
thought toward the symbolization of a universal mankind. See 
Jurgen Gebhardt, "Toward the Process of Universal Mankind: 
The Formation of Voegelin's Philosophy of History," in Eric 
Voegelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal. 67-86. Also see
Gregor Sebba, "Eric Voegelin: From Enlightenment to
Universal Humanity," Southern Review 11 (1975), 918-925.
Also see Jurgen Gebhardt, "The Vocation of the Scholar," 
unpublished paper presented at the Voegelin Centre 
Conference, University of Manchester, July 10, 1994, 4, 14- 
15.
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order of man's existence as a partner in the 
comprehending reality....140
It is important to note that the story (symbolization) is an
appeal.141 This has very important implications for
Voegelin's theories of ethics and politics, as we shall see
later in this work. But at this point, we will continue our
current analysis of the fact that the story or myth is not
a propositional statement. "Truth has its reality in the
symbols engendered by the quest, and the quest has its
reality in the metaxy of divine-human movements and
countermovements."142 At best, the symbols are designed to
draw us or to point the way. Their truths are not to be
found through an analytical method, but in their existential
effects on our own experience.
Symbolizations and the Postulate of Balance 
It may seem that a treatment of how symbolizations are 
created and how they evolve and evoke experience is 
premature at this point in the investigation, considering 
the fact that the exegesis and analysis of Voegelin's 
epistemology has only begun. However, it must be noted with 
considerable attention that, for Voegelin, knowledge is 
learned and communicated through entering into
140Voegelin, In Search of Order. 26.
141For an excellent discussion of Voegelin's 
understanding of the narrative, see William M. Thompson, 
Christoloqv and Spirituality (New York: The Crossword
Publishing Company, 1991), 29-33.
142Voegelin, In Search of Order. 37.
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(experiencing) the symbolizations which we live within. It
follows, therefore, that the symbolizations cannot truly be
separated from our reality. They are part of reality's
makeup. Man's questing soul does not come into existence
nor search for his existential answers in a vacuum. Nor
does man exist in an imaginary world of his own making. The
human psyche is not a tabula rasa. Human beings are born
into a world already existing, and that world has certain
structures and characteristics, including its symbols, which
he or she neither chose nor created. Within this world,
there is a whole broad range of experience which man finds
himself within, in which he lives and moves and has his
being— in which he will experience existence. Voegelin
argues that this broad, experiential range of existence is
best symbolized by the metaxy, a symbol found in the thought
of Plato and Aristotle. The metaxy is the in-between143
character of existence— in-between life and death, as
symbolized by Plato in the Symposium and the Philebus.
Man experiences himself as tending beyond his 
human imperfection toward the perfection of the 
divine ground that moves him. The spiritual man, 
the "daimonios aner", as he is moved in his quest 
of the ground, moves somewhere between knowledge 
and ignorance ("metaxy sophias kai amathias").
143For a thorough analysis of Voegelin's understanding of 
the In-Between, see Dante Germino, "Eric Voegelin: The In-
Between of Human Life," in Contemporary Political 
Philosophies, ed. A. de Crespigny and K. Minogue (New York: 
Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1975), 100-119. Also see Greg Russell, 
"Eric Voegelin on the Truth of In-Between Life: A Meditation
on Existential Unrest," in Interpretation 16:3 (1989), 415- 
425.
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"The whole realm of the spiritual ("daimonion") 
is halfway indeed between ("metaxy") god and man" 
(Svmp. 202a). Thus, the in-between— the
"metaxy"--is not an empty space between the poles 
of the tension but the "realm of the spiritual"; 
it is the reality of "man's converse with the 
gods" (202-203), the mutual participation 
("methexis", "metalepsis") of human in divine, 
and divine in human, reality. The "metaxy" 
symbolizes the experience of the noetic guest as 
a transition of the psyche from mortality to 
immortality.144
It is within the metaxy that man has his being and his
experiences of reality. However, it should be emphasized
that the metaxy, too, is a symbolization. It is not meant
to be understood intentionally, as an object or structural
box in the pneumenal world.
The participatory (metaleptic) experiences of 
human beings in the In-Between (metaxy), which 
are the constitutive core of human reality, are 
transactions conducted within consciousness 
itself and not externally in time and space; 
hence Voegelin sometimes calls the realm in which 
they occur nonexistent reality (e.g., in Essay 3, 
"Immortality"), or the realm of spirit. Chief 
among such experiences are those of transcendent 
divine Being which are articulated in noesis— as, 
for instance, the ascent to the vision of Beauty 
in Plato's Symposium, or the "periagoge" of the 
whole man and the ascent to the vision of the 
Agathon in the Allegory of the Cave, in the 
Republic, or the revelatory experiences that the 
symbolisms of faith, grace, the summum Bonum, and 
the like, reference.145
The mystical nature of Voegelin's theory of knowledge 
is found in the experiences of transcendent divine Being,
144Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience", in
Anamnesis, 103.
145Sandoz, "Editor's Introduction," in The Collected 
Works. Vol. 12, xx.
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which are articulated in noesis. Voegelin argues that in
order to communicate the knowledge which is learned through
theophanic experiences, the experiencer must create stories
which will symbolize the insights.
Since the questioner's quest is accompanied by 
his consciousness of the event as a beginning in 
the personal, social, and historical dimensions 
of order, the questioner has to tell quite a 
story indeed. It is the story of his experience 
of disorder, of the resistance aroused in him by 
the observation of concrete cases, of his 
experience of being drawn into the search of true 
order by a command issuing from the It-reality, 
of his consciousness of ignorance and 
questioning, of his discovery of truth, and of 
the consequences of disorder unrestrained by 
regard for the order he has experienced and 
articulated.146
These stories can only be created through imagination, "in 
the sense that man can find the way from his participatory 
experiences of reality to its expression through
symbols."147 But what is the source of this imagination? Is
it in man or is it in the divine? The answer is that it is
in both:
Imagination, as a structure in the process of a 
reality that moves toward its reality, belongs 
both to human consciousness in its bodily 
location and to the reality that comprehends 
bodily located man as a partner in the community 
of being. There is no truth symbolized without 
man's imaginative power to find the symbols that 
will express his response to the appeal of
reality; but there is no truth to be symbolized 
without the comprehending It-reality in which 
such structures as man with his participatory 
consciousness, experiences of appeal and
146Voegelin, In Search of Order. 25.
147Voegelin, In Search of Order. 37.
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response, language, and imagination occur. 
Through the imaginative power of man the It- 
reality moves imaginatively toward its truth.148
Man participates in so far as he is able to recognize the
structure that is in his experience with the structure that
is in the It-reality. The storyteller must remember that he
is a partner with reality that comprehends bodily located
man in the community of being. He must abstain from the
temptation to view himself as the sole creator of truth, in
order not to pervert and deform the symbolizations which he
creates.
The symbols, thus, arise from the human response 
to the appeal of reality, and the response is 
burdened with its character as an event in the 
reality to which it responds.... The event, we may 
say, is imaginative in the sense that man can 
find the way from his participatory experience of 
reality to its expression through symbols.149
And how is it to be judged whether or not the symbolizations
have been deformed and their message perverted?
If the story is to communicate an authoritative truth,
then it must speak in a manner that is discernable to
individual human consciousnesses. The knowledge which both
the storyteller and the listener to the story understand can
best be categorized as an existential knowledge— a return to
the Socratic dictum of knowing one's self. For through
creative imagination, the storyteller embodies his or her
148Voegelin, In Search of Order. 38.
149Voegelin, In Search of Order. 37-38.
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experience in the symbolization and through the listener
entering into the symbolism, the experience is recreated.
he can remember his experience of movements and 
countermovements in the metaxy as the reality 
from which his assertive insights into true order 
have emerged, and he can express his remembrance 
through such reflective symbols as the tension of 
the metaxy, the poles of the tension, the things 
and their Beyond, thing-reality and It-reality, 
the human and divine, intentionality and 
luminosity, the paradox of consciousness-reality- 
language, and the complex of participation- 
assertion-self -assert ion. 150
The recreation of equivalent experience would seem to
be an adequate test for the soundness of symbolizations, but
how are we to judge their validity? It is through the
analysis of and repetition of equivalent symbolizations
within the historical field. A lack of originality is good
evidence that a symbolization has not derailed. In the
essay, "Equivalences of Experiences and Symbolization In
History", Voegelin articulates his objective standard for
testing the truth of symbolizations.
The validity can and must be tested by placing 
the propositions in the historical field of 
experiences and their symbolizations, i.e., in 
the time dimensions of existence itself. The 
validating question will have to be: Do we have
to ignore and eclipse a major part of the 
historical field in order to maintain the truth 
of the propositions, as the fundamentalist 
adherents of this or that ideological doctrine 
must do; or are the propositions recognizably 
equivalent with the symbols created by our 
predecessors in the search of truth about human 
existence? The test of truth, to put it
150Voegelin, In Search of Order. 40.
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pointedly, will be the lack of originality in the 
propositions.151
In isolation, this statement would seem to beg the 
question. Whatever is true is to be judged by how 
equivalent it is to that which has already been claimed to 
be true in the historical field. In short, that which is 
true must have already been claimed to be true. It is 
imperative, however, that this statement not be understood 
in isolation. In order to understand Voegelin's theory of 
the equivalences of experiences and symbolizations, it is 
necessary to place it in its proper context, which is 
Voegelin's theory of human nature.
15IVoegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and 
Symbolization in History," in The Collected Works, vol. 12, 
122 .
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONSTANCY OF HUMAN NATURE AND 
THE EQUIVALENCES OF EXPERIENCES AND 
SYMBOLIZATIONS: EXPERIENTIAL
TRUTH AND ECUMENICALISM
The question "What is man?" is one of the most 
important questions confronting any generation.
The whole political, social, and economic 
structure of a society is largely determined by 
its answer to this pressing question. Indeed, 
the conflict which we witness in the world today 
between totalitarianism and democracy is at 
bottom a conflict over the question "What is 
man?"...One day the psalmist looked up and 
noticed the vastness of the cosmic order. He 
noticed the infinite expanse of the solar system; 
he noticed the beautiful stars; he gazed at the 
moon with all its scintillating beauty, and he 
said in the midst of all of this, "What is man?"
He comes forth with an answer: "Thou hast made
him a little lower than the angels, and crowned 
him with glory and honor."152
The reproduction of experiential truth through 
symbolizations is intimately related to and dependent upon 
Voegelin's view of human nature, or his theory of 
consciousness, in which his epistemology operates, for it 
can reproduce experiences of reality only if humans share 
the same basic structure in the psyche. If the structure of 
human consciousness is not constant, then knowledge itself 
becomes relative153 from one individual consciousness to
152Martin Luther King, Jr., The Measure of a Man 
(Philadelphia: Fortess Press, 1988), 9.
153For another viewpoint on the problem of truth and 
relativism and the historical emergence of our understanding 
of truth, see Thomas Hollweck, "Truth and Relativity: On
the Historical Emergence of Truth," in The Philosophy of 
Order: Essays on History. Consciousness, and Politics, ed.
Peter J. Opitz and Gregor Sebba, (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta,
1981), 125-136.
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another, and symbols, including the written word, cease to
have any universal meaning or order.
Thus, a major part of Voegelin's epistemology is
dependent upon the argument that human nature is constant.
By constant is meant universally operational through the
various times, cultures, races, and sexes of human history.
In short, there is a universal commonality in humanity.154
The structure of the human psyche is the same in all
humankind. This conclusion is achieved by the argument that
human consciousnesses throughout history have experienced
leaps in being, from untruth to truth of existence, through
the infusion of divine being— through a recognition of a
reality made up of human-divine and divine-human
participation.
For human nature is constant in spite of its 
unfolding, in the history of mankind, from 
compact to differentiated order: the discernible
stages of increasing truth of existence are not 
caused by "changes in the nature of man" that 
would disrupt the unity of mankind and dissolve 
it into a series of different species. The very 
idea of a history of mankind presupposes that 
constancy of nature; and the reality of that 
constancy is attested beyond a doubt by the 
experiences of the leap in being, by the 
experience of a transition from untruth to truth 
of existence in which the same man is the "old 
man" before, and the "new man" after, he has
suffered the infusion of divine being.155
154Voegelin's formulation of the universality of mankind 
is comprehensively discussed and analyzed by Juergen 
Gebhardt, "Toward the Process of Universal Mankind: The
Formation of Voegelin's Philosophy of History," in Eric 
Voegelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal. 67-86.
155Voegelin, The World of the Polis. 5.
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In short, man experiences himself as a participant in a
divine mystery. He is moved. He is moved by divine Love
from the untruth of his existence apart from God to the
truth of his existence grounded in divine being.
The structure of the human psyche is such that it seeks
a ground, a foundation upon which to base itself and its
thought. It seeks knowledge through questioning and, at the
same time, questions the knowledge which its seeking finds.
At its core human nature, therefore, is the 
openness of the questioning knowledge and the 
knowing question about the ground. Through this 
openness, beyond all contents, images, and 
models, order flows from the ground of being into 
man's being. I have spoken of questioning 
knowledge and knowing questions in order to 
characterize the experience that I have called 
noetic, for it is not the experience of some 
thing, but the experience of questioning rising 
from the knowledge that man's being has not its 
ground in itself. The knowledge that being is 
not grounded in itself implies the question of 
origin, and in this question being is revealed as 
coming-to-be, albeit not as a coming-to-be in the 
world of existing things but a coming-to-be from 
the ground of being.156
It is this core nature of man which leads us to the
necessity of theodicy. Because by the very structure of our
existence we question, and the most basic questions which we
must ask are the questions of Leibniz: "why is there
something rather than nothing[?],...and...why do they exist
as they do and not otherwise[?]1,157 We exist. And from
156Voegelin, Anamnesis. 86.
157See Voegelin, Order and History. Vol. V, In Search of 
Order (Baton Rouge, 1987), 79-81. Voegelin asserts that the 
Mystery of God has been answered by Leibniz: God is the
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this recognition we must apply the questions to ourselves. 
'•Whatever man may be, he knows himself a part of being."158 
It is a stark reality which no man, woman nor child can 
deny. We are thrown into a world as conscious beings 
without any innate knowledge as to why or how. The fact of 
our conscious existence urges (draws) us to seek the answers 
to the questions of why?, which are in essence a searching 
quest for a ground.
But in what context do human beings perform this 
search? Voegelin finds his answer in the Platonic notion of 
the metaxy. All human beings exist within what Plato termed 
the metaxy, which Voegelin translates, the in-between. It 
is not a thing or a place, but a structure or tension of 
consciousness159. The metaxic structure of human existence 
is existence in tension within and between the polarities of 
life and death, being and nothingness, immortality and 
mortality, knowledge and ignorance, good and evil. These 
polarities cannot be overcome. Nor can we have one without
sufficient reason for a human mind in quest of a causal 
explanation of things. The "grand mystere" has become the 
"grand principe." The noetic analysis and its recognition of 
the mysteries of reality has been replaced by conceptualized, 
systematized, metaphysics.
158Voegelin, Israel and Revelation. 3.
159For an in-depth overview and analysis of Voegelin's 
understanding of human existence in tensional reality, see 
John H. Hallowell, "Existence in Tension: Man in Search of
His Humanity," in Eric Voegelin's Search for Order in 
History, ed. Stephen A. McKnight (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1978), 101-126.
the other. They are part of the existential structure 
within which man has his being. "...[T]he story of the 
quest can be a true story only if the questioner 
participates existentially in the comprehending story told 
by the It through its creative epiphany of structure."160 
Human beings exist and interact all across the existential 
structure. It is, therefore, corporeal individual men—-not 
consciousness changed new creations, who existentially exist 
within its hierarchical totality— within and across its 
entire range. And the complex symbolizations which humans 
create and live within must "express the poles of tensions 
experienced in reality as well as the tensions 
themselves.1,161
The pathway to spiritual health is to be found by the 
individual person who is open to the whole realm of being, 
and its polarized tensional structure, and who understands 
philosophy for what it is, namely, the practice of dying. 
In his essays "Reason: The Classic Experience" and "Quod
Deus Dicitur", Voegelin further elucidates his theory of 
human consciousness162 and theory of knowledge which began
160Voegelin, In Search of Order. 27.
161Voegelin, In Search of Order. 92.
152For a discussion of the centrality of Voegelin's 
theory of consciousness and the role of faith and reason see 
Ernest L. Fortin and Glenn Hughes, "The Strauss-Voegelin 
Correspondence: Two Reflections and Two Comments," in The
Review of Politics (Notre Dame, Indiana, Spring 1994), 345- 
352, 354-357.
in Order and History. In these mature works, Voegelin not
only describes the metaxy and the participation of the human
and the divine, he goes on to diagnose the sources of
spiritual health and spiritual disease in man. In "Reason:
The Classic Experience", Voegelin defines what he believes
to be the nature of man. Man "is an unfinished being,
moving from the imperfection of death in this life to the
perfection of life in death."163 With this view of human
nature, Voegelin presents us with the foundation of human
knowledge and the source of truth and falsehood in "Quod
Deus Dicitur", his last work, which was composed on his
deathbed. Here, he makes the connection between man's
realization of his own ignorance and man's existence in the
in-between and draws out its implications— implications
which lead us to the mystical knowledge of the divine ground
or tetragrammaton, and leave us to communicate the
experiential symbolizations through dream-like metaphors of
a Plotinus' perfumed things:
Let us speak of it in this way, first invoking 
God himself, not in spoken words, but stretching 
ourselves out with our soul into prayer to him, 
able in this way to pray alone to him alone.
and [t]he "mental prayer" (das mentale Gebet) of Goethe:
...The mental prayer which encompasses and 
excludes all religions and which only in a few 
God-favored men permeates their whole way of 
life, develops in most men only as a flaming, 
enrapturing feeling of the moment; once this has
163Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," in The
Collected Works, vol. 12, 279.
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vanished, man, returned to himself, unsatisfied, 
unoccupied, at once falls back into the most 
interminable boredom.164
If a person raises his consciousness openly toward the
emanating love of the divine ground, then he will move
healthily toward the perfecting mystical experience and
knowledge of God. If he closes himself off from the divine
ground, then he will adversely affect the rational structure
of his psyche and move toward spiritual disease. His view
of reality will be deformed in that it will only encompass
the lower rungs of the hierarchy of being or it will replace
the higher rungs of the hierarchy of being with imaginary
phantasms, but by taking either of these paths, he will
become spiritually diseased.
The disease affects both the passions and Reason, 
but is caused neither by the one nor the other; 
it originates in the questioning unrest, the 
"agnoia", and in man's freedom to actualize the 
meaning of humanity potentially contained in the 
unrest or to botch the meaning....In the modern 
Western history of unrest,... from the Hobbesian 
"fear of death" to Heidegger's "Angst", the 
tonality has shifted from joyful participation in 
a theophany to the "agnoia ptoiodes", to the 
hostile alienation from a reality that rather 
hides than reveals itself.165
164Eric Voegelin, "Quod Deus Dicitur", in The Collected 
Works. Vol. 12, 393. The Plotinus quote is from: Plotinus.
trans. H.A. Armstrong, Vol V, Loeb's Classics, 1984. The 
Goethe quote is from: Goethe, "Altere Perser," in West-
Ostlicher Divan. Noten und Abhandlunoen. Leipzig, 1912, p. 
142.
165Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," in The
Collected Works. Vol. 12, 277.
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This disease exhibits itself quite clearly in a thinker like 
Sartre who "feels 'condemned to be free' and thrashes around 
in the creation of substitute meanings from the meaning he 
has missed...."166 Such a man is irrational and spiritually 
diseased.
By an act of imagination man can shrink himself 
to a self that is "condemned to be free." To 
this shrunken or contracted self, as we shall 
call it, God is dead, the past is dead, the 
present is the flight from the self's non- 
essential facticity toward being what it is not, 
the future is the field of possibles among which 
the self must choose its project of being beyond 
mere facticity, and freedom is the necessity of 
making a choice that will determine the self's 
own being. The freedom of the contracted self is 
the self's damnation not to be able to be free.
The contraction of his humanity to a self 
imprisoned in its selfhood is the characteristic 
of so-called modern man.167
In opposition to this view of reality is the rational
man, a healthy man who realizes that his existence is in
tension between life and death. Such a man:
...experiences himself as tending beyond his 
human imperfection toward the perfection of the 
divine ground that moves him. The spiritual man, 
the "daimonios aner", as he is moved in his quest 
of the ground, moves somewhere between knowledge 
and ignorance....In the language of Socrates in 
the Phaedo. right philosophizing is the practice 
of death (melete thanatou) that will let the 
psyche, in death, arrive at its divine, immortal, 
and wise status in truth (alethos, 81a) ; in 
Aristotle's language, noetic philosophizing is
166Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," 278.
167Voegelin, "The Eclipse of Reality", in The Collected 
Works. vol. 28, 111.
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the practice of immortalizing (athanatizein,
Nicomachean Ethics 1177b33) .168
In the words of Aristotle, "such a life, however, is more 
than merely human; it cannot be lived by man qua man but 
only by virtue of the divine (theion) that is in him."169 
If the individual refuses to apperceive this reality and he 
denies the divine within himself, then he has no ground for 
his being or his knowledge, and he is left only with the 
vertigo and the angst produced by his disorientation and his 
condemnation to be free. He is groundless.
Compounding this problem is the fact that "one cannot 
prove reality by a syllogism; one can only point to it and 
invite the doubter to look."170 It is in this spirit that 
Voegelin relates Plato's distinction in The Republic between 
the falsehood in words and the falsehood in the soul.171 
Mystical knowledge, gained by human-divine participation, 
cannot be understood in the profane philosophical categories 
of men who deny the divine within themselves. The spiritual 
disease takes the form of a blindness which they possess 
because of their refusal to apperceive. Because they do not 
apperceive the spiritual reality of human existence, they
168Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," 279.
169Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," 279.
170Voegelin, "Quod Deus Dicitur", 388.
171Plato, Republic, in Plato: Collected Dialogues, ed.
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985), 629.
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are forced to reduce the works of Plato, Aristotle, 
Anaximander, Plotinus, Goethe, Saint Paul, and Saint Thomas 
Aquinas into their components and to view the components as 
merely so many propositions about the reality that they 
think that they know.
It is clear from the bracketed quotes at the end of
"Quod Deus Dicitur", which Voegelin intended to comment on
before he died, that he viewed the essence and spirit of 
these thinkers to be mystical symbolizations about man's 
personal communion with God, written in the forms of 
metaphors, dreamlike language, and prayers. He moves from 
"the All-enfolding 'divine' of Anaximander and how it is 
[to] be spoken of according to Aristotle"172 to the prayers 
in Plotinus and Plato, which can only be spoken of in 
dreamlike metaphors, to the mental prayer of Goethe, to 
"[t]he manifestation of the equivalent Christian experience 
and expression of the 'divine': (a) [t]he 'pleroma' and
'theotes' in Col. 2:9: For in him the whole fullness
(pleroma) of divine reality (theotes) dwells bodily[,]1,173 
which he couples with "[t]he 'tetragrammatic' name of the 
'divine' in Thomas['] Summa Theolooiae.1,174
Voegelin believed that the selection of these six 
quotations was significant to his entire theory of
172Voegelin, "Quod Deus Dicitur," 392.
173Voegelin, "Quod Deus Dicitur," 393-394.
174Voegelin, "Quod Deus Dicitur," 394.
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knowledge, considering the urgency with which he must have 
struggled to have them included when he was on the brink of 
death. This is intimated in the last sentence he wrote 
before he died, which was about the Platonic epekeina, the 
process of dying to this world and the embracing of the 
possibility of "fulfillment in a state beyond this 
world...."175 The last death-bed statement reads: "In
these Hesiodian symbolizations we recognize the first 
intimations of the comprehending (periechon) Beyond that 
ultimately becomes the 'epekeina' of Plato."176 It is my 
contention that this statement is referring back to 
Voegelin's definition and discussion of philosophy itself as 
a mystical exercise which encompasses the practice of dying, 
the eros of the transcendent Agathon, and the love of the
Wisdom that in its fullness is only God's. Half of the
authors of the meditations offered in "Quod Deus Dicitur" 
are also analyzed in the discussion on eros and thanatos as 
key aspects of philosophy in "On Debate and Existence." 
Voegelin is connecting the discussions in this final 
reference which he offers.
The six quotations are from Aristotle, Plotinus, Plato,
Goethe, the Letter of Saint Paul to the Colossians, and
175Voegelin, "On Debate and Existence", in The Collected
Works. vol. 12, 41.
176Voegelin, "Quod Deus Dicitur," 392.
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Saint Thomas Aquinas. All embrace Voegelin's understanding
of Plato's epekeina. It is an understanding that:
...we find ourselves referred back to nothing 
more formidable than the experiences of 
finiteness and creatureliness in our existence, 
of being creatures of a day as the poets call 
man, of being bound to die....[I]f we survey this 
list of experiences, we shall better understand 
why for Plato (who had a sharper sensitiveness 
for the problems of existence than either 
Aristotle or Thomas) philosophy could be, under 
one of its aspects, the practice of dying; under 
another aspect, the eros of the transcendent 
Agathon; under still another aspect (that leads 
us back to the formulations of Aristotle and 
Aquinas) the love of the Wisdom that in its 
fullness is only God's....Moreover, we can 
understand how philosophy, once it had, thanks to 
Plato, developed its symbolism and become a going 
concern, could gain something like an autonomous 
life of construction and demonstration, 
apparently independent of the originally 
motivating experiences, how it could grow into an 
enterprise that would have to become unconvincing 
when, due to historical circumstances, the reader 
did no longer share the philosopher's
understanding of existence.177
In the last scholarly act performed by Voegelin so
shortly before he died, he embraces those thinkers who he
considered to be the great mystic philosophers, and in so
doing, lets himself be known in all the sobriety and clarity
of a man who lives by the dictum: Know Thyself. For:
Human existence, it appears, is not opaque to 
itself, but illuminated by intellect (Aquinas) or 
nous (Aristotle). This intellect is as much part 
of human existence as it is the instrument of its 
interpretation.... [O]ntologically speaking, human 
existence has noetic structure. The intellect
discovers itself, furthermore, as a force
transcending its own existence; by virtue of the 
intellect, existence not only is not opaque, but
177Voegelin, "On Debate and Existence," 41-42.
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actually reaches out beyond itself in various 
directions in search of knowledge....Aristotle's 
etiological demonstration arrives ultimately at 
the eternal, immaterial prima causa as the origin 
of existent things.178
If we now turn to the experiences that motivate this
construction, we begin to recognize the full meaning of
Leibniz' questions: Why is there something, why not
nothing? and Why is something as it is, and not different?
We are led to the conclusion that;
[N]o answer to these questions will be capable of 
verification or falsification, the philosopher 
will be less interested in this or that symbolism 
pretending to furnish the "true" answer than in 
the questions themselves. For the questions 
arise authentically when reason is applied to the 
experiential confrontation of man with existent 
things in this world; and it is the questions 
that the philosopher must keep alive in order to 
guard the truth of his own existence as well as 
that of his fellowmen against the construction of 
a Second Reality which disregards this 
fundamental structure of existence and pretends 
that the questions are illegitimate or 
illusionary.179
The questions are fundamental to human thought. "[M]an 
discovers himself as being not a world unto himself, but an 
existent among others..."180 Existence is not self­
generated. The ground of existence is not to be found in 
existent things. The Ground must be beyond the field of 
existent things. This is the fundamental truth of 
existence: "it is the awareness of the fundamental
178Voegelin, "On Debate and Existence," 42-43.
179Voegelin, "On Debate and Existence," 43.
180Voegelin, "On Debate and Existence," 47.
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structure of existence together with the willingness to 
accept it as the condicio humana. Correspondingly we shall 
define untruth of existence as a revolt against the condicio 
humana and the attempt to overlay its reality by the 
construction of a Second Reality."181 The willingness to 
accept the condicio humana requires properly directed love. 
It requires love of the ground— the God beyond the gods.
Love and Death
The roles of love (eros) and death (thanatos) in 
Voegelin's epistemology are the necessary cornerstones to 
mystical knowledge, for they are the two most important 
orienting forces in the human soul. This is clear from the 
six selections chosen in "Quod Deus Dicitur". Death to the 
love of self (selfish love) is necessary for love to bring 
about union between God and man and a formation of the 
heart. This is quite clear in the two cities of Saint 
Augustine. The role of love cannot be overly emphasized in 
its importance for Voegelin's epistemology. Indeed, it is 
the most powerful aspect of mysticism, for it is in the 
movements and countermovements of love that human and divine 
communion take place. It is the "stretching ourselves out 
with our soul into prayer to him...."182 Mystical knowledge 
is no less than the experience experienced within the 
participant in his countermoving response to the attraction
181Voegelin, "On Debate and Existence," 49.
182Voegelin, "Quod Deus Dicitur," 393.
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of the divine ground. It is the experiential consequence of
the human prayer answering the appeal in the soul which has
been moved by the divine ground. Indeed, these six
selections use the language of prayer in their descriptions
of their experiential truths about God. It is dreamlike and
metaphorical, and the experience which it captures and
communicates can only be sustained for short periods of
time. These prayers can lead us to the recognition of our
own experience of the movement of the ground, but if we are
to make a countermovement, we too must move; that is,
lovingly respond to the divine love through our own prayer.
We must choose the noetic quest, as illustrated in
Voegelin's analysis of Saint Anselm's Prosloaion.
In the second part of his work, in Proslpgipn,
XIV, he acknowledges that the God found by the 
truth of reason is not yet the God whom the 
seeker has experienced as present in the 
formation and re-formation of his existence. He 
prays to God: "Speak to my desirous soul what
you are, other than what it has seen, that it may 
clearly see what it desires."... The noetic 
quest of Anselm thus assumes the form of a prayer 
for an understanding of the symbols of faith 
through the human intellect. Behind the quest, 
and behind the "fides" the quest is supposed to 
understand, there now becomes visible the true 
source of the Anselmian effort in the living 
desire of the soul to move toward the divine 
light. The divine reality lets the light of its 
perfection fall into the soul; the illumination 
of the soul arouses the awareness of man's 
existence as a state of imperfection; and this 
awareness provokes the human movement in response 
to the divine appeal. The illumination, as St. 
Augustine names this experience, has for Anselm 
indeed the character of an appeal, and even of a 
counsel and promise. For in order to express the 
experience of illumination he quotes John 6:24:
"Ask, and you will receive, that your joy may be
107
full." The Johannine words of the Christ, and of 
the Spirit that counsels in his name, words meant 
to be understood in their context, express the 
divine movement to which Anselm responds with the 
joyful countermovement of his quest (XXVI).183
The love or movement in man can, in the Thomasic and
Augustinian sense, become misdirected. It is misdirected
when the individual turns his love toward himself rather
than toward God. The man who turns his love toward God will
experience a theophany, and the man who turns his love
toward himself will experience an egophany. Egophanies are
based in hubris (pride or the love of self) rather than love
of God. The pseudo-philosopher has a vision or an insight
and takes credit for it. The experience pierces his
intellect but not his heart, for his heart is hardened to
the divine call in which the vision is grounded.
Theophanies, on the other hand, are based in love
(agape). They are formations of the heart (fides caritate
formata) in which the vision of the philosopher is dependent
upon a two-way, communion of the human and divine, and is
recognized as such. It is experienced and understood
through love. In the theophany, the love is not love of
self, the truth (vision) is shared by an openness on both
sides— the human and the divine— based in love between man
and the Mystery-— the metaphysical ground. Ample
symbolizations of this Loving relationship exist throughout
human history. One of the most eloquent examples of this
183Voegelin, "Quod Deus Dicitur," 383-384.
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shared Love is captured, quite beautifully, in the ecstatic 
rapture of the union with God, in the poetry of Saint John 
of the Cross.
Upon a gloomy night,
With all my cares to loving ardours flushed,
(O venture of delight!)
With nobody in sight
I went abroad when all my house was hushed.
In safety, in disguise,
In darkness up the secret stair I crept,
(0 happy enterprise!)
Concealed from other eyes
When all my house at length in silence slept.
Upon that lucky night 
In secrecy, inscrutable to sight,
I went without discerning 
And with no other light
Except for that which in my heart was burning.
It lit and led me through
More certain than the light of noonday clear 
To where One waited near 
Whose presence well I knew,
There where no other presence might appear.
Oh night that was my guide!
Oh darkness dearer than the morning's pride,
Oh night that joined the lover 
To the beloved bride
Transfiguring them each into the other....184 
For the person who experiences the mystical vision, the 
union of man and God is intimately and selflessly (selfless 
love) more certain and real than the light of noonday clear.
Saints Augustine's and Paul's visions followed the 
breaking down of the ego and an opening up toward love of
184St. John of the Cross, "Songs of the Soul in Rapture 
at Having Arrived at the Height of Perfection, Which is Union 
With God by the Road of Spiritual Negation," in St. John of 
the Cross: Poems. trans. Roy Campbell (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England, 1960), p. 27.
Other, as well. This is beautifully expressed in Saint 
Bonaventure's interpretation of Saint Augustine and his 
agreement with the doctrine of illumination: "Strange,
then, is the blindness of the intellect which does not 
consider that which it sees before all others and without 
which it can recognize nothing."185 This is the major theme 
of the Confessions. It is only in selflessness, a 
forgetting or turning away from the self, due to a greater 
love of the Other, that enlightenment is to be found. This 
turning around, or periagoge, is conversion. In its 
absence, we are left with the egophanic megalomania of a 
Nietzsche186 or a Sartre— a libidinous egoism that reaches 
its consummation in a disgust and contempt for all other 
egos that leads to the justification for a will to power or 
a conclusion that hell is other people, as well as other 
forms of human hubris and elitism. They are left with no 
basis for order, save their own deformed consciousnesses, 
because they refuse to open their hearts and to apperceive; 
to apperceive and to discern the divine Mystery and order 
that is already present in the world and the cosmos. And so 
it follows that they must create and impose order. Indeed,
185Saint Bona venture The Journey of the Mind to God. 
Trans. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., ed. Stephen F.
Brown (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 1993),
29.
186For a discussion of Nietzsche as a pneumapath, see 
Michael Franz, Eric Voegelin and the Politics of Spiritual
Revolt:____ The Roots of Modern Ideology (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 12, 94.
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this is the underlying epistemological critique which 
Voegelin uses in his analysis of National Socialism and the 
revolutionary theories of Karl Marx.187 The epistemological 
debate hinges on the age-old question as to whether 
knowledge and order can be discerned from reality or whether 
it cannot. If it cannot, then order must be created and 
imposed on the world by a consciousness which has no ground, 
which means that it must be, by necessity, arbitrary. If it 
can be discerned from reality, then knowledge and order is 
real, and it permeates our experience. In short, if 
knowledge is unattainable and order must be created, then 
the image-making of the poets in Plato's Republic is the 
best for which we can hope. If knowledge is attainable and 
order can be discerned, then the vision of the Good can 
order our lives and our communities.
The truth of the Mystery is retained, considered, and 
incorporated in the thought of those who have experienced 
and recognized theophanic experiences. It gets lost or 
deformed by those who are imprisoned by egophonies. The 
egophanic thinker severs the divine aspect of being, and 
they are left with only themselves and their own creations 
to take their place. At this point the connection between
187For a more in-depth analysis of the refusal to 
apperceive and its consequences, see Voegelin, The New 
Science of Politics. 78-80. For a related discussion of Marx 
and his disdain for ontology and epistemology, see David 
Levy, Realism: An Essay in Interpretation and Social Reality
(Manchester, Great Britain: Carcanet New Press, 1981), 84-
86.
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Voegelin's quest and his resistance to untruth becomes most
clear. He has searched out the epistemological roots of the
horrific social and political human creations of the modern
era. In the end, he concurs with Saint Augustine's
discovery and analysis of the two loves in Citv of God— -the
love of self and the love of God.
Although Voegelin's interpretation of the effects of
egophanic events and spiritual derailments becomes quite
clear through an overview of his analysis of the thought of
such thinkers as Hobbes, Marx, Sartre and Hegel, the most
significant and illustrative example for its spiritual birth
and influence in modernity is to be found in his analysis of
Martin Luther's doctrine of sola fides (faith alone).
Although the major orientation of mystical ascent in
Voegelin's analysis is based in the love between the human
and divine, it is only in his unpublished "Studies in the
History of Political Ideas" that he most fully and clearly
defines the nature of the loving relationship that
culminates in the fides caritate formata and the amicitia
between man and God and how it has been lost. For example,
Voegelin points out that Luther:
insists that in justification "there is no work 
of the law, no love.".. .Luther, it appears, 
considered the love of God a work of the law; his 
attack on the good works thus, would be at bottom 
a circuitous attack on the "fides caritate 
formata". [For] if our faith is formed by love,
then God would take into consideration our 
works....The conclusion of Von der Freiheit was
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the doctrine: "Faith is for God, love for the
neighbor.1,188
While on the surface it might appear that Luther's
ideas are little different than Saint Augustine's
distinction between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena,
Voegelin argues that Luther misunderstands Saint Augustine
and constructs a radically different understanding of man
and his relationship with God. Voegelin rightly points out
that for Saint Augustine, the Church is representative of
the civitas Dei but is not identical with it, for only part
of its membership belongs to the city of God, while the
remnant belongs to the civitas terrena.
The point is that ultimate salvation and 
damnation are known to God alone; there are no 
empirical criteria for distinguishing between the 
saved and the damned souls; the nucleus of the 
civitas Dei is "invisible". When Luther uses the 
Augustinian terms he reverts to something like 
their Tyconian meaning. The Augustinian idea of 
the Church is destroyed through the principle of 
righteousness "sola fide"; Christianity becomes a 
matter of purchase of a book and of its usage 
according to Luther's interpretation; if you 
follow the directions and trust in God you are 
saved, otherwise you are not.189
Luther has reached a radical conclusion which leads to a
radical reconstitution of Christianity for those who will
follow after him. The very meaning of Christian Love has
been altered and distorted, and the modern path toward
188Voegelin, "Studies in the History of Political Ideas,"
MS pp. 1152-53.
189Voegelin, "Studies in the History of Political Ideas,"
MS p. 1164.
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spiritual disintegration is paved. Before Luther's attack,
Christian Love was embodied in the symbolization of Saint
Thomas Aquinas' formulation of fides caritate formata (faith
formed by love). This
...target of Luther's attack is one of the most 
subtle achievements in the scholastic culture of 
spiritual life. We shall describe the doctrine 
of "fides caritate formata” according to the form 
which it has received in St. Thomas' Contra 
Gentiles. St. Thomas puts the essence of faith 
in the "amicitia”, the friendship between God and 
man. True faith has an intellectual component 
insofar as the loving, voluntary adherence to God 
is impossible without intellectual apprehension 
of the beatific vision as the "summum bonum”, as 
the end toward which the life of man is oriented; 
intellectual apprehension, however, needs 
completion through the volitional adherence of 
love "for by means of his will man as-it-were 
rests in what he has apprehended by intellect."
(St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles. Ch. 116.190
The key point is that the relationship between man and God
is grounded in amicitia (love, friendship), which by
definition, is mutual. It cannot and is not forced through
a unilateral act on either side. "Faith formed by love,
thus, is the reality of loving orientation of existence
toward God."191 The political implications of Martin
Luther's two major new doctrines; sola fides and the
priesthood of all believers, are serious. The order of
Sacred Tradition and Sacred institutions is destroyed,
because the experiences embodied in their symbolizations are
190Voegelin, "Studies in the History of Political Ideas,"
MS p. 1142.
191Voegelin, "Studies in the History of Political Ideas,"
MS p. 1143.
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abandoned. The hierarchical symbolization of community is
also destroyed because every man and woman is his or her own
priest and own interpreter of religious truth. The old
communal order is destroyed, man becomes a radical
individual, and we descend to the level of the war of all
against all, which finds its ultimate manifestation in the
war of man against God.
The development of these experiences of Johannine 
Christianity (which, it is my impression, were 
closest to St. Thomas) into the doctrine of 
"fides caritate formata", and the amplification 
of this doctrinal nucleus into a grandiose, 
systematic philosophy of man and society, are the 
medieval climax of the interpretation of 
Christianity with the body of a historical 
civilization. Here perhaps we touch the 
historical "raison d'etre" of the West, and 
certainly we touch the empirical standard by 
which the further course of Western intellectual 
history must be measured. This further course, 
as we shall see, has as its main theme the 
disintegration of the doctrinal nucleus of the 
"amicitia" between God and man. In the 
nineteenth century, in Comte and Marx, this 
process of disintegration reaches its formal end 
in the doctrinal counter-formulation of the 
revolt against God as the basis for the world- 
immanent order of society; the dogma of human 
self-salvation, in hermetical closure against 
transcendental reality, marks an end of Western 
civilizational history beyond which, at the 
moment, nothing is visible but the bleakness of 
imprisonment in human nature without Grace....The 
doctrine of "sola fide" is the first deliberate 
attack on the doctrine of "amicitia". It has 
become socially effective, with revolutionary 
consequences for the whole of Western 
civilization, insofar as it started the process 
of spiritual disintegration of which, in our 
time, we witness the consequences on an 
eschatological scale.192
192Voegelin, "Studies in the History of Political Ideas,"
MS pp. 1144-1145.
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Voegelin argues that Martin Luther's theological 
formulations and teachings have come to determine much of 
Western civilization's modern crisis by: (1) attacking and
destroying the nucleus of Christian spiritual culture 
through his attack on the doctrine of fides caritate 
formata, by making faith become "a unilateral act of trust 
in an externalized revelation codified in Scripture.1,193 He 
argues that "through this metamorphosis, faith lost the 
trembling intimacy of a formation of man under the touch of 
Grace, precariously in danger of being forfeited through the 
temptations of optimistic confidence and pride of 
righteousness.1,194 It (faith) instead became "an empirical 
consciousness of justification through faith, that did not 
affect the substance of man."195 (2) Luther "had his heavy
share in destroying Western intellectual culture through his 
attack on Aristotelian scholasticism and the devil's work of 
learning in general"196 through his disavowal of the harlot 
reason. (3) Luther has contributed to the destruction of 
the balance of human existence.
193Voegelin, "Studies in the History of Political Ideas," 
MS p. 1167.
194Voegelin, "Studies in the History of Political Ideas," 
MS p. 1167.
195Voegelin, "Studies in the History of Political Ideas,"
MS p. 1167.
196Voegelin, "Studies in the History of Political Ideas,"
MS p. 1167.
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In conclusion, Voegelin rejects Luther's doctrine of 
faith alone because it kills the two-way love between God 
and man (amicitia) and teaches that it is only one-way, 
actually determined by the law of God rather than the love 
of God. Grace has been reduced. It is purely of God. 
There is none of the divine in man left to respond. Man has 
no part to play in his own salvation. It was not long 
before the further assertion was made that God has no part 
to play in human-created secular political regimes, and 
soon, we ceased to be nations under God. We are now well on 
the way to a spiritual derailment in modernity which is, in 
effect, a deformed view of human reality which embodies a 
distorted view of human nature. After Luther, you must take 
sides between reason or faith, and never the two shall meet.
Voegelin's analysis of mysticism and his affirmation of 
the amicitia between God and man and his conclusion that 
both are destroyed by misunderstandings of human-divine love 
lead us to a struggle between the Dark Ages and the 
Enlightenment. But which is which? The terms become 
misnomers for one another. The spiritual light which shines 
between the divine and the human in medieval thought is 
dimmed by the eclipse which occurs with worldly reason 
(propositional philosophy) and the other-worldly faith of 
the Enlightenment. The mystery of man's relationship to 
God— the mystical meanings of the symbolizations of 
Christianity are discarded in favor of doctrines about God
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and covenants with God. Friendship between God and man is
replaced with doctrines of sola fide and the priesthood of
all believers. Redemption becomes a contract in which man
agrees or disagrees. The world is de-mystified and
therefore, disenchanted.
Compounding the problems brought about by the doctrine
of sola fide and the loss of amicitia between man and God
is, according to Voegelin, the Thomistic division between
faith and reason. In truth, Luther is able to attack the
harlot reason only because of Saint Thomas7 movement toward
the modern division between faith and reason. Before Saint
Thomas, faith and reason were not radically separated as
they are in modern philosophy.
...[T]he medieval tension between Faith and 
Reason derives from the origins of these symbols 
in the two different ethnic cultures of Israel 
and Hellas, that in the consciousness of 
Israelite prophets and Hellenic philosophers the 
differentiating experience of the divine Beyond 
was respectively focused on the revelatory appeal 
and the human guest, and that the two types of 
consciousness had to face new problems when the 
political events of the Ecumenic Age cut them 
loose from their moorings in the ethnic cultures 
and forced their confrontation under the 
multicivilizational conditions of an ecumenic 
empire.197
This tension is especially brought to the forefront and 
intensified in the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas. This 
is especially apparent in his analysis of knowledge, where 
he differentiates between natural knowledge (philosophy) and
197Voegelin, "The Beginning and the Beyond," in The 
Collected Works, vol. 28, 211.
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supernatural knowledge (theology). Although Saint Thomas 
believes that "Truth...is properly and primarily in the 
divine intellect[, ] "198 and that the source of all truth is 
in the divine, he nevertheless holds to a division between 
the paths of faith and reason. There are two ways (paths) 
to truth, one through reason and the other through 
revelation. The source of both is God, but they are two 
distinct paths. They do not intersect with one another 
except in their point of origin in which they are grounded. 
It is extremely important to note here that Saint Thomas is 
not asserting a doctrine of two truths. The truths of 
revelation and the truths of reason are one. He is quite 
clear on this point in order to argue against and overcome 
what he believes to be the heresy of the doctrine of two 
truths in the Islamic philosophy of Averroes.
Voegelin contends that this dichotomization of faith 
and reason, religion and philosophy, and Theology and 
metaphysics, is misguided and is the beginning of the 
derailment into modernity and derailed modern philosophy. 
In this respect, Voegelin is much more Augustinian than 
Thomistic.
The dichotomies of Faith and Reason, Religion and 
Philosophy, Theology and Metaphysics can no 
longer be used as ultimate terms of reference 
when we have to deal with experiences of divine 
reality with their rich diversification in the 
ethnic cultures of antiquity, with their
198Saint Thomas Aquinas, Truth. Vol. I, Trans. Robert W. 
Mulligan, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), 17.
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interpretation in the cultures of the ecumenic 
empires, with the transition of consciousness 
from the truth of the intracosmic gods to the 
truth of the divine Beyond, and with the 
contemporary expansion of the horizon to the 
global ecumene. We can no longer ignore that the 
symbols of "Faith" express the responsive quest 
of man just as much as the revelatory appeal, and 
that the symbols of "Philosophy" express the 
revelatory appeal just as much as the responsive 
quest.199
From Voegelin's understanding, reason and revelation are not 
distinct paths to God, they are one path. Reason and 
revelation are the same.
The movement in modernity to the radical 
dichotomizations of faith and reason, theology and 
metaphysics, and philosophy and religion is only a small 
step to move from a disenchanted world to the conclusion 
that the world and man is merely something in nature. God, 
if he exists at all, is something outside the earthly realm. 
The sciences, both natural and social (ethics, law, 
politics), move accordingly. From a purely rationalistic 
perspective, God has little or no place in either, and 
ethics, law, and political order become arbitrary human 
creations (positive). Rationalism, or the belief or faith 
in unaided human reason as the path to knowledge, reigns. 
Perhaps even worse, the spirit of human commonality and 
dignity as an underlying basis for ethics, law and politics 
is lost.
199Voegelin, "The Beginning and the Beyond," 210-211.
So where does Voegelin turn for ultimate terms of 
reference when we have to deal with experiences of divine 
reality? He returns to the meditational and prayer-like 
(mystical) philosophies of Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, 
Saint Paul, Plato and Plotinus in order to recover the 
symbolizations which are lost with the modern dichotomies. 
The terms and their meanings which he recovers are dream­
like metaphorical symbols and myths designed to light the 
path toward mystical illumination, not the cold and detached 
philosophies grounded in unaided human reason which is 
planted in Thomistic philosophy and finds its fruitions in 
its own self-destruction. This is quite aptly illustrated 
in Thomas A. Spragens, Jr.'s The Irony of Liberal Reason, in 
which the author contends that "[t ]he 'ironic flaw' of 
liberalism has been the incapacity of its deepest 
assumptions--ontological, epistemological, and 
anthropological— to sustain its finest aspirations and 
ideals."200 The rationalistic conception of man is flawed. 
Our capacity to know reality and communicate to one another 
is more than a set of propositional statements. This is not 
to say that Voegelin's epistemology is airtightly logical 
and certain. Indeed, it is quite straightforwardly 
recognizant of the fact that it does not nor cannot give us 
absolute and full knowledge. It is dependent upon
2°°Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. The Ironv of Liberal Reason
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 5.
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symbolizations which deal with the ineffable, and is, 
therefore, easily attacked by those who demand propositional 
discourse or those who have closed themselves off from 
apperception.
Voegelin's mystical epistemology does not prove. It 
borrows heavily from the Augustinian formulation of divine 
illumination. It can only "point out" to the listener and 
admonish: Look and see is it not the case? If the listener
is open to the possibility, then it might be that he or she 
will experience a fides caritate formata. "...It is well to 
note that divine illumination, far from relieving man of the 
necessity of having an intellect of his own, rather takes it 
for granted....[A] light which illumines is one thing, the 
thing which that light illumines is another: the eyes are
not the sun."201 The individual has a part to play in the 
process.
In the classic experience of noetic existence man 
is free either to engage in the action of 
"immortalizing" by following the pull of the 
divine nous, or to choose death by following the 
counterpull of the passions. The psyche of man 
is the battleground between the forces of life 
and death. Life is not given; the God of the 
Laws can only offer it through the revelation of 
his presence; life to be gained requires the 
cooperation of man.202
The ethical and epistemological implications of this
analysis are of radical importance. Every human being is
201Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine.
79.
202Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience", 281.
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responsible. We cannot shrug our responsibility to know the
truth by claiming ignorance or environmental upbringing.
"God does not take the place of our intellect....Augustine
says that the divine light shines for all men, whether
sinners or saints; that it is present in every man who comes
into this world, and that it is never absent from us even if
we neglect to turn to it."203 If men and women will choose
to apperceive that which is before them, then it can bring
about a religious, ethical, and political renewal that could
lessen the pain and suffering in our world. But for such a
change of heart (fides caritate formata) to take place, an
ecumenical movement must come about.
Quod Deus dicitur— "That Which is called God"— is 
the title of Voegelin's final meditation. The 
Latin construction is revealing: Voegelin wants
us to look beyond the symbol "Deus" to the 
"Quod," or the reality which the symbol 
represents. He invites us to experience the 
presence of the "That Which" in our souls. That 
this reality is not only real, but to an infinite 
degree the most real reality, Voegelin
experiences beyond a shadow of a doubt. This 
divine reality, furthermore, bursts upon the 
scene or wells up in the consciousness of every 
single human being who ever has been or ever will 
be. It is both the starting point and the 
destination of every symbolization be it 
mythical, philosophical, revelatory, or mystical.
There is no separate special God of Jews, 
Christians, or pagans, no God of reason distinct 
from revelation, no God of dogma as distinct from 
the God of the Quest. The "That Which" (is
203Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. 
79-80.
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called God) is what every "fides" seeks and what 
every rational noetic exegesis expounds.204
It is clear from Voegelin's own analysis of knowledge that
his theory is not new. Indeed, it does not even harken back
to one particular thinker, it harkens back to multitudes—
Saint Paul, Plotinus, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas,
Plato, and many others. This is much of his point and his
evidence. The fact that he has shown that his own theory is
historically common in the philosophical tradition is
evidence of its preponderance in the human understanding of
knowledge. Its lack of originality and its affinity with
the insights and knowledge of thousands of years of
philosophical inquiry lend credence to its truth value.
Previous chapters (Chapter One and Chapter Two) have
dealt with the deformations of humans, society and their
understanding of reality. The current chapter has outlined
Voegelin's recovery of mystical knowledge and its potential
therapeutic effects on individual human beings. The next
chapter will critically compare his epistemology with its
modern and medieval competitors.
204Dante Germino, "Leo Strauss versus Eric Voegelin on 
Faith and Political Philosophy," (as yet unpublished) , 16-17.
CHAPTER FIVE
MYSTICAL EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT 
OF MODERN, ANCIENT, AND CHRISTIAN 
THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
Just how does Eric Voegelin's mystical epistemology 
fare when considered against the plethora of epistemological 
theories postulated in the course of philosophical history? 
In order to determine its merit, brief sketches of six of 
the most prominent modern theories of knowledge will be 
offered, followed by the main points of Christian and 
hellenic theories of knowledge which influenced Voegelin, 
followed by an analysis of how Voegelin's theory of 
knowledge concurs and differs from them. Just as Voegelin's 
interpretation of philosophy is based, to a very large 
measure, on a return to classical thought and an emphasis on 
recovery of the classical meaning of philosophy, so, too, is 
his theory of knowledge. He did not believe that he was 
creating a new theory of knowledge, but that he was 
recovering a way of knowing (theory of knowledge) from the 
past. This is clear from his exegesis and analysis of the 
writings of the classical philosophers, the Church Fathers, 
Sacred Scriptures, and the many other sources which helped 
to formulate his understanding of order and history. This 
has been demonstrated and analyzed in earlier chapters of 
this work, and will be touched upon again at the end of this 
chapter.
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What will be demonstrated in this chapter is the 
similarity and affinity that Voegelin's theory has with 
classical thought, and the stark contrast that the modern 
theories of knowledge have with both Voegelin's theory and 
the mystical spirit of the theories of knowledge of the 
past, in general. Modern epistemological theories are a 
radical break from the epistemological theories of earlier 
periods. This radical break is, to a great degree, 
responsible for much, if not most, of the crisis and 
disorder of modernity to which Voegelin is responding. This 
radical break with classicism has its birth in the 
dichotomization of faith and reason in Saint Thomas' 
philosophy and in the philosophical meditations of Rene 
Descartes, especially in his method of radical doubt and the 
ensuing dichotomy between subject and object.
For analytical purposes, this brief analysis will begin 
with Descartes' epistemology. After having done so, we will 
turn to analyses of other philosophers for representative 
examples of the various theories of knowledge which pervade 
the Modern Age: John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume,
Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrick Hegel. We will 
then turn to the philosophy of the Ancients and the pre- 
Cartesian Christians.
The most striking and important parts of Descartes' 
philosophy is his faith in, and insistence upon, a rigorous 
new method of logic. Descartes is firmly insistent upon the
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need for clarity and distinctness in the formation of our 
ideas and with the logic that we use to examine them. He 
believes that the logic of classical philosophy, or at least 
Scholastic logic, is didactic. He argues that rather than 
attempting to discover truth, it instead merely "'teaches 
how to make the things which we know understood by others or 
even to repeat, without forming any judgment on them, many 
words respecting those things which we do not know.'"205 
What is needed is a "logic which teaches us how best to 
direct our reason in order to discover those truths of which 
we are ignorant."206 Accordingly, Descartes argues for a 
method based in radical doubt (doubting everything that can 
be doubted). To follow a recent textbook's account, this 
was done in order to ascertain the "pure remainder of 
certain truth [in order to begin] the process of 
constructing an indubitable system of knowledge. The result 
is a type of rationalism (or mentalism) in which the only 
certainties are discovered by the mind through self-evident 
insight or reason."207
^Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy Vol 
IV, (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1985), 71. Father
Copleston takes this quote from: Descartes, P.P.. "Prefatory
Letter; A.T.. IX B, 13-14.
206Copleston, A History of Philosophy. Vol. IV, 71.
207Louis P. Pojman, Philosophy: The Quest for Truth
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993),
98.
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Descartes' famous argument— Cogito, ergo sum— is the
foundation for the dominant modern epistemological theories.
Consciousness becomes the starting point for knowledge and
we become imprisoned in our minds. The very fact of the
cogito being asserted as the foundation for all human
knowledge necessitates the subject-object dichotomy, based
in the mind/body (thought/being) dualism, and in so doing,
leaves modern epistemology in a perpetual quandary as to how
the dichotomy can be reconciled. The Cartesian separation
of subject from object sets the stage for debate for most,
if not all, of the ensuing epistemological theories
developed since Descartes' Meditations. As the following
examples illustrate, these modern epistemological theories
range from absolute idealism on the one hand, to radical
empiricism on the other.
It is widely accepted that John Locke's epistemology is
"the first systematic assault on Cartesian rationalism, the
view that reason alone guarantees knowledge."208 Locke
contends that if our knowledge claims are to make any sense,
then they must be derived from the world. In An Essav
Concerning Human Understanding, he rejects the Cartesian
notion that humans have innate ideas because:
(1) there is not good deductive argument 
establishing the existence of such entities, (2) 
children and idiots do not seem to possess them, 
and (3) an empirical way of knowing, which seems
208Pojman, Philosophy: The Quest for Truth. 104.
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far more reasonable, has no place for such 
entities.209
He does, however, argue that we have intuitive knowledge of 
our own existence and that the existence of God can be 
demonstrated by reason, but he argues that this knowledge is 
not founded in any a priori knowledge but rather is founded 
in the very nature of consciousness itself.
According to Locke, the human mind is a tabula rasa, at 
birth, that is devoid of any characteristics until it 
receives sense perceptions. All human knowledge is grounded 
in sense perceptions, upon which the powers of the mind 
operate, developing simple ideas, complex ideas, and 
abstractions. Whereas the rationalists sought absolute 
certainty in their quest for knowledge and truth, Locke held 
more to the notion that, "apart from the knowledge of the 
self, most of what we know we know in degrees of certainty 
derived from inductive generalizations."210 Thus, the 
modern empiricist theory of knowledge was born.
In opposition to this view of reality and knowledge, 
George Berkeley, an Anglican Bishop and philosopher, argues 
for philosophical idealism, that is, that only ideas exist, 
and therefore, that only ideas can be known. Berkeley 
attempts to reconcile his Christian faith in God with modern 
science by proving that even though matter does not exist,
209Pojman, Philosophy: The Quest for Truth. 104.
210Pojman, Philosophy: The Quest for Truth. 104.
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the natural laws of science, being God's laws, still govern 
a universe that is made up of ideas. According to Berkeley, 
" [t]o be is to be perceived— to be is to be an idea in a 
mind— and hence matter existing apart from the mind does not 
exist....It agrees with Locke that all ideas originate in 
sense perception, [but] proceeds to show that all we ever 
experience is ideas."211 From these assertions, it follows 
that the only reality that exists are perceivers and 
perceptions. From this idea, Berkeley postulates that there 
must be a Divine mind who perceives us and causes our 
existence as ideas in his mind.
Although Locke and Berkeley differ tremendously in 
their overall assessment of knowledge and reality, they both 
agree that knowledge is grounded in sense perception. 
Similarly, the epistemological theories of David Hume are 
also based in sense perception. However, Hume moves us much 
further away from the possibility of absolute certainty of
knowledge towards the skeptical view that humans can have
only relative knowledge. Hume holds that we can only have 
certainty of analytic truths (relations of ideas), examples 
being, propositions in the field of mathematics and in 
tautologies.
With regard to synthetic truths ('matters of
fact,'), we, at best, can have a high degree of
probability. But even the notion of probability 
is dubious and leads to a certain skepticism, 
because the notion of cause and effect upon which
211Pojman, Philosophy: The Quest for Truth. 116.
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experiential knowledge is based is itself not an
impression but an idea.212
The skeptical arguments of David Hume had a tremendous 
impact on one of modern philosophy's most famous and 
influential thinker, Immanuel Kant. Kant credited Hume for 
"awakening him from his dogmatic slumbers.1,213 Kant 
accepted Hume's contention that all human knowledge begins 
with experience. However, he did not agree with Hume that 
all of our knowledge arises from experience. Kant believed 
that the rationalists had a sound and valid insight "that 
there is something determinate in the mind that causes us to 
know what we know.1,214 Kant argues that the human mind is 
categorical in its structure. The mind is structured and 
empowered in such a manner that it imposes interpretative 
categories on our experience, such that we do not simply 
experience the world through sense perception, as the 
empiricists postulate, but we interpret it through the 
categorical structure of the mind. Furthermore, the various 
categorical constituents that make up this structure of the 
human mind include synthetic a priori knowledge, such as 
time, spatiality, causality, and the moral law.
Perhaps most important for our present analysis, Kant 
held that there are ultimately two facets of reality, the
212Pojman, Philosophy: The Quest for Truth. 126.
213See Pojman, Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, pp. 134-
135, for a good discussion on Hume's influence on Kant.
214Pojman, Philosophy: The Quest for Truth. 135.
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noumenal, which corresponds to the thing-in-itself (Ding an 
sich) , and the phenomenal, which corresponds to the thing in 
the mind. This, once again, leads back to the ultimate 
foundational question which arose in Cartesianism over the 
division between the subject and the object. It is here 
that Kant makes a very problematic epistemological 
assertion, which is that there is a noumenal reality and a 
phenomenal reality. Quite similarly to Descartes, Kant 
traps us in an epistemological quagmire, for he asserts that 
the human mind can know only the phenomenal reality. Yet he 
insists on postulating something outside of the human mind, 
namely, a noumenal reality. The quandary results in the 
idea that we cannot know the noumenal reality. So on what 
is its assertion based? The radical division between 
subject and object is as clear in Kant's philosophy as it is 
in Descartes'. Just as in Descartes' thought, the human 
mind is trapped in its own subjectivity. To assert that 
anything is existent outside of the mind is extremely 
problematic. We are ever closer to a necessary conclusion 
of solipsism. All of these thinkers, preceding Hegel, have 
serious problems with the dichotomy. Hegel's synthetic 
movement is a strong movement toward a solution to the 
quandary.
The spell of this epistemological quagmire spread 
throughout Continental philosophy until the advent of 
Hegel's systematic philosophical system. Hegel recognized
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the inherent problem in the postulation of two foundational 
theories of reality and knowledge and proposed a unified, 
holistic solution to the problem. Recognizing that there 
can be only one foundational principle for reality and 
knowledge, Hegel postulated that the one we must look to is 
the one within which our minds and our thoughts operate. 
Kant's fatal mistake was in his assertion that there exists 
a noumenal world, of which a mind can have no knowledge. 
Hegel rightly points out that such an assertion is 
nonsensical. Why postulate it? If we have no knowledge of 
such a reality, why should we believe that it exists? Hegel 
answers that we should not. Humans live, think, and know in 
a phenomenal reality.
According to Hegel, all human thought is phenomenal. 
We cannot get out of our minds because our minds and their 
contents are all that we can know that there is. There is 
nothing outside of minds and their contents to which the 
human can get. The attempt to escape the subjectivity of 
the spirit, without recognition of objectivity being a 
product of it, according to Hegel, was the great mistake of 
modern philosophy. There is nowhere to which to escape, for 
reality is in the idea and the idea only. The notion of an 
object of thought, of the objectivity within the mind, is 
just that, an idea. Hegel held that what is rational is
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real and what is real is rational. From this he deduced, 
therefore, that everything that exists is knowable.215
A key component of Hegel's philosophy, and more 
specifically of his theory of knowledge, is his logic. He 
contends that within any given idea there is an indwelling 
tendency to go out of itself. The one-sidedness and 
limitation of the idea leads to its own negation, the
antithesis. It follows, therefore, that contradiction and 
polarity are contained within all ideas. Contradiction is 
not simply a problem in logic, it is a positive, natural 
force of reason which brings about understanding through the 
dialectic. Thus the thesis generates its opposite, the 
antithesis. The dialectical method takes two opposed or 
contradictory ideas, the thesis and the antithesis, and, 
through reason, fits them together into a higher level of 
understanding, a higher idea, called the synthesis. The 
opposition of the thesis and the antithesis makes the
synthesis stronger and more complete than either the thesis 
or the antithesis was before the synthesis. Yet, the
synthesis, by being a proposition, becomes a new thesis and
gives rise to a new antithesis and synthesis. The dialectic 
process continues until, eventually, through moving always
2l5For a good discussion of Hegel's idealism and 
phenomenology, see Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy; History 
and Problems (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983),
310-325.
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higher in our understanding, we theoretically reach the 
absolute idea.
Hegel's theory of knowledge is idealistic, yet it 
accommodates and incorporates the idea of objectivity. 
Thought and its objects are one and the same, and they are 
always located in the subject, the mind. The dichotomy 
between subjectivity and objectivity is dissolved in his 
dialectic, and in so doing, the dichotomy between two 
realities and the problem of a schizophrenic foundation for 
human knowledge is solved.
Is Hegel's theory of knowledge true? Does it concur 
with human experience? In the end, Voegelin concluded that 
it was incomplete. Voegelin holds that human experience is 
more complex and convoluted than Hegel's precise system 
accounts for.
While at a glance it might seem that Voegelin's 
epistemology is completely different than Hegel's, 
Voegelin's epistemology is actually heavily influenced by 
Hegel's. There are strong similarities in their recognition 
of the polar nature of reality and knowledge. Both 
recognize that the exclusive embracing of one pole or the 
other in order to bring about stasis is misguided and 
irrational. Both also seek a unified vision of the whole of 
reality. Neither is content with piece-meal views of 
reality. Both seek to glimpse (know) the whole of reality, 
and they are both convinced from their studies of philosophy
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and history that there is a mystical element to reality and 
knowledge which must be accounted for in any valid and sound 
epistemological theory.
These points of agreement between the two thinkers are 
significant and important. Their importance, however, can 
easily be overstated. There are very important differences 
between Voegelin's and Hegel's epistemologies that make 
their ultimate conclusions stand in stark contrast with one 
another. From Voegelin's perspective, Hegel was too 
trusting in the power of the idea to capture the truth of 
reality. Hegel seems to place an almost absolute faith in 
the power of ideas and reason to capture every facet, every 
nook and cranny, of reality.
In tracing Voegelin's thought, it is quite evident from 
his abandonment of "Studies in the History of Political 
Ideas" that Voegelin believed that the notion that ideas 
could capture and explain the whole of reality was terribly 
misguided, incorrect, and ultimately, distorting. From his 
study and recovery of philosophy and history, Voegelin 
discovered something remarkable that Hegel had failed to 
see. He discovered a philosophical tradition of 
experiential symbolizations, made up of symbols and myths, 
which did not so much capture and define reality in perfect 
clarity and distinctness, but which attempted to point to 
truths about reality and human experience which are 
ultimately ineffable, and, therefore, not capturable in
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clear and distinct ideations. Voegelin realized that the 
unseemliness of symbols was unseemly, not because they had 
not been thought out clearly, but because they were designed 
to lead men and women to glimpses or visions of ineffable 
experiences. The ineffable cannot be captured, so it 
follows that it cannot be clearly and distinctly defined.216 
This is the major epistemological difference between 
Voegelin and Hegel, and Hegel's lack of recognition of the 
ineffability of some knowledge is a radical break from past 
philosophical meditations similar to Descartes'. Hegel 
dismisses unseemly symbolizations as merely being ideas that 
have not been given enough thought, not enough clarity and 
distinctness in definition. This belief is what leads Hegel 
to the conclusion that knowledge can be absolute. The power 
of human reason to manipulate ideas is infinite.
Voegelin disagrees. In recognizing an ineffable 
element in human experience and knowledge, Voegelin further 
recognizes that there is, ultimately, a limit past which no 
human can go. Voegelin recognizes that the idea (a clear 
and distinct definition) cannot embody the full range of 
human experience and human knowledge. The Question, which 
is the source of the pull that calls men and women to seek 
and find illumination, is ultimately answerable only by the 
Mystery, which illuminates ineffably. With faith in search
216This is clearly discussed at length in Voegelin, Order 
and History. Vol. V, In Search of Order. Indeed, it is a 
major theme of the work.
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of understanding (fides quaerens intellectum), humans can 
catch glimpses of it, they can create symbolizations in an 
attempt to communicate that the Question and the Mystery are 
before us, but they cannot quench the human yearning for 
absolute knowledge. Humans must live in the faithful 
tension between the two. This is the insight of most of the 
great philosophers and theologians of Western civilization. 
As Gilson aptly points out in his analysis of Saint 
Augustine: "Let us remember first of all that Augustine's 
metaphors, however expressive they may be, are still 
metaphors. If we examine his language carefully, we shall 
see that he has a sense of mystery and that he is 
consciously trying to find words for the 
ineffable.... Fundamentally, we say that there is direct 
contact between God and the mind and that we have no means 
of representing it adequately."217 Voegelin not only
concurs, he sees evidence of the same in Plato, Plotinus, 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, and Saint Paul. Voegelin contends 
that truth, all truth, is discovered in the divine light 
which is constantly before us and beckons us through faith. 
It does not come about through unaided human or "natural" 
reason. There is no such thing. The very structure of the 
human psyche, the nous, can function only within reality, 
and that reality is permeated by the divine nous. This is
217Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine.
81.
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why the distinction between faith and reason makes no sense 
to Voegelin. Human thought is grounded in divinity. It is 
possible only within that context, whether we recognize it 
or not. If we do recognize it, we can move closer to truth. 
If we do not recognize it, we are damned to distortions of 
reality and deformations of our own knowledge.
Voegelin recognizes the important contributions of 
noesis from Greek philosophy, and he also recognizes 
elements of the pneumatic in Greek thought, but he 
recognizes that the pneumatic experience of Christianity is 
more fully differentiated than it is in Greek philosophy. 
The pneumatic differentiation, in many ways, is a more rich 
and more full differentiation of human experience and 
knowledge. He is especially intrigued by the experience of 
faith, hope, and love, which he thinks is already present in 
Heraclitus. He contends that the general structure of the 
Hellenic and Judaic-Christian visions have the following in 
common:
What Plato and the Christian visionaries have in 
common is the experience of existential reality 
that has to be expressed by a complex of symbols, 
by the complex "visionary revelation"-"struggle"- 
» salvation."218
There is an even more important commonality. Voegelin
contends that:
Plato's act of transcendence is truly an 
intracosmic fides guaerens intellectum; and when
218Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," in 
The Collected Works. Vol. 12, 366.
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the noetic understanding, the intellectus, is 
achieved, the emerging image is the standard of 
truth, for the time being, in the historical 
process of the cognitio fidei.219
Even though both Hellenic and Judaic-Christian thought
contain noetic and pneumatic experience, Hellenic thought
tends to be more noetic than pneumatic, and Judaic-Christian
thought tends to be more pneumatic than noetic. It has been
clearly demonstrated throughout this work how this is the
case with Hellenic thought, but let us turn to an analysis
of Saint Augustine's philosophy to demonstrate how the bias
seems to be reversed in Christian thought, and how the
pneumatic elements of Christianity are, in some very
important ways which enrich human understanding and
knowledge, more fully differentiated knowledge than noetic
knowledge would be in its absence.
Voegelin contends that Saint Augustine's "tale of two
cities"220 is a tale of the individual human written large.
In his analysis of Enarrationes in Psalmos. Saint Augustine
lets the historical symbols of the Exodus and Babylon
express the movement of the soul when it is drawn, by the
love of God, toward God.
He begins to leave who begins to love.
Many the leaving who know it not,
219Voegelin, "The Beginning and the Beyond," in The 
Collected Works, vol. 28, 220.
220Voegelin, "Immortality: Experience and Symbol," in
The Collected Works, vol. 12, 78.
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for the feet of those leaving are affections of the
heart: and yet, they are leaving Babylon.221
Voegelin agrees with Saint Augustine, as well as Saint
Thomas, that the tension of faith toward God is not only a
Christian privilege, but a trait of human nature. The
universality of faith as the means toward mystical,
experiential knowledge is explicitly stated by Saint Thomas'
philosophy in his asking, according to Voegelin:
. ..whether Christ be the head of all men" (ST 
III.8.2), and [he] answers unequivocally that he 
is the head of all men, indeed, and that 
consequently the mystical body of the church 
consists of all men who have, and will have, 
existed from the beginning of the world to its 
end. Philosophically, the proposition implies 
that Christ is both the "historical Christ,” with 
a "pre-" and "post-" in time, and the divine 
timelessness, omnipresent in the flow of history, 
with neither a "pre-" nor a "post-."...[Tjhe 
symbolism of incarnation would express the 
experience, with a date in history, of God 
reaching into man and revealing him as the 
Presence that is the flow of presence from the 
beginning of the world to its end. History is 
Christ written large.222
Voegelin goes on to argue that this is also strongly
embodied in the Chalcedonian Council's formulation of the
doctrine concerning the union of the two natures in the one
person of Christ.
This embodiment of the two realities of man is also
captured by Saint Thomas in his assertion that man is
between angel and animal, "reaching up to the former at the
221Voegelin, "Immortality: Experience and Symbol," 78.
222Voegelin, "Immortality: Experience and Symbol," 78.
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summit of his intellectual powers, and down to the latter in 
respect of his perishable body. It is in this very precise 
sense that man is a 'microcosm,' a whole universe in little, 
'for in him everything else in the world is, in some way, 
represented.' 1,223 What is being appealed to here is the 
fact that the pneumatic experience is a universally human 
phenomenon. According to Gilson, and it would seem that 
Voegelin would concur, the advent of Christianity, with its 
greater differentiation of the pneumatic, brought about a 
higher understanding and a higher mystical differentiation 
of truth.
And this "something" was the Cistercian mysticism 
which inspired that of the Victorines, and, as 
history will doubtless one day reveal, came down 
in uninterrupted succession to Pascal: "To know
God, and yet nothing of our wretched state, 
breeds pride: to realize our misery and know
nothing of God is mere despair: but if we come
to the knowledge of Jesus Christ we find our true 
equilibrium, for there we find both human misery 
and God....Thus have we arrived at the heart of 
the problem of Christian philosophy...."Wisdom 
lies in knowing God and knowing oneself. From 
knowledge of self we rise to knowledge of 
God."224
223Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy. 
A.H.C. Downs, Trans. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1936), 219.
224Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy. 227-228. 
Also see Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 78-80. In 
this passage, Voegelin brings together the amicitia of Saint 
Thomas, grace and its effects on the nature of man, Saint 
Augustine's amor Dei and amor sui, and Saint Thomas' fides 
caritate formata. He analyzes the conditio humana that was 
brought by Christianity and the resultant doxa of the modern 
revolt against the maximum differentiation of Christianity.
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This realization was intimated, if not compactly contained, 
within the Socratic dictum: know thyself. It is brought to
its fruition in the symbolizations of Christianity.
Voegelin7s symbolization of "apperception" is
equivalent to Saint Augustine7s symbolization of divine 
illumination. Man knows through his participation with the 
divine. In "Response to Professor Altizer's 'A New History 
and a New but Ancient God?7", Voegelin clearly points out 
that his formulation of the experiential symbol of divine 
reality does not go beyond the orbit of Christianity and the 
God of the Creed. He is careful to make it clear that they 
are the same God. He is generalizing the "Anselmian fides 
quaerens intellectum so as to include every fides, not only 
the Christian, in the quest for understanding by reason. 
Even this expansion of the fides, however, to all of the 
experiences of divine reality in which history constitutes 
itself, cannot be said to go beyond Christianity."225
Voegelin is not going beyond Christianity, nor is he 
ignoring or discarding the mystery of it. He is attempting 
to recover the mystery of faith which he believes is lost by 
the dichotomization of faith and reason, and its ensuing 
movement toward rationalistic, dogmatic theology. He is 
arguing that the pre-Thomistic Christian formulations and 
symbolizations of truth and human experience of the divine
225Voegelin, "Response to Professor Altizer7s 'A New 
History and a New but Ancient God?7," in The Collected Works. 
Vol. 12, 294.
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did a better job of portraying the mysterious and mystical 
nature of human-divine participation (divine illumination) 
than what preceded Christian thought in Hellenic philosophy, 
as well as what followed Christian thought after Saint 
Thomas Aquinas.
The movement away from the classical Christian 
conception of the mystery of faith, exemplified in Saint 
Anselm's fides quaerens intellectual (faith seeking 
understanding), Saint Augustine's cognitio fidei (cognition 
through faith), and Saint Bonaventure's celebration of the 
Pasche, towards a more nominalist and fideist conception of 
Christianity in the high Middle Ages, is a cultural, 
spiritual, and epistemological disaster. The mystical 
movement of the Mystery, and the human experience of awe 
which it produces, is replaced by clear and precise 
scholastic delineations of doctrines and dogmas which are so 
specific that men can sit for months on end debating how 
many angels can stand on the head of a pin. The movement 
from mystical symbolizations towards an emphasis on dogma 
and true belief leads to propositional theology which 
ultimately must lead to debates over religious opinion. The 
problem is that much of the meaning and truth of the 
religious symbolizations cannot be captured in doctrines and 
dogmas, that is why the symbolizations were created in the 
first place. Voegelin thinks that this movement toward 
doctrinalization, toward replacing the mystery of the
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symbols with propositional doctrines, is a derailment which
lowers the level of truth to the level of doxa.
Once truth has degenerated to the level of true 
doctrine, the return from orthodoxy to "the 
mystery" is a process that appears to require as 
many centuries of effort as have gone into the 
destruction of intellectual and spiritual 
culture.226
Yet this is what Voegelin calls for; a return to the
mystery. And he finds it in the recovery of the pre-
Thomistic Christianity of Saint Augustine, Saint Anselm, and
Saint Bonaventure.
The key component in this recovery is the meaning and
role of faith. Whereas post-Thomistic Christian philosophy
moves more and more in the direction of a radical break
between faith and reason, pre-Thomistic Christian philosophy
is built upon the recognition that all genuine understanding
and knowledge requires faith. This was true in Plato's and
Aristotle's philosophies, where Voegelin argues that:
the cognitio Dei through faith is not a cognitive 
act in which an object is given, but a cognitive, 
spiritual passion of the soul. In the passion of 
faith the ground of being is experienced, and 
that means the ground of all being, including 
immanent form.227
This is true in pre-Thomistic Christian philosophy, as well.
The real spiritual (pneumatic) difference between Hellenic
philosophy and Christian philosophy is in the fact that
226Voegelin, "Response to Professor Altizer's 'A New
History and a New but Ancient God?", 295.
227Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 275.
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Hellenic philosophy did not have the symbol of fides
caritate formata and the amicitia between man and God.
This is the Hellenic position, in contrast with 
the Christian experience of the amicitia between 
God and man. The Aristotelian position does not 
allow for a forma supernatural is, for the 
heightening of the immanent nature of man through 
supernaturally forming love of God.228
It is clear from this brief overview of ^epistemology 
that, while Voegelin does have some interesting, yet minor 
commonalities with the moderns, his epistemology is clearly 
more in line with the Ancients and early Christians. In the 
final analysis, it is difficult to speak of Voegelin's 
epistemology, for such sounds as if it were something he 
constructed. It is more appropriate to speak of it as a 
recovery and renewal of the hellenic and early Christian 
theories of knowledge, albeit a critical synthesis of the 
various insights of the various thinkers that he uses to 
reach it. This synthesis attempts to analyze and digest the 
many forms that the various symbolizations of faith in 
search of understanding (fides quaerens intellectum) take, 
in order to present to us a theory of knowledge and a path 
to understanding that we too can experience, even though we 
live in what Voegelin considers to be a derailed and 
distorted modern world. The ethical, spiritual, and 
religious implications of this discovery and synthesis are 
of considerable importance, for they open the door, not only
228Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 364.
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for a recovery of lost knowledge and meaning, but also for
a recovery from the sickness unto death which we suffer in
the modern world.
Voegelin's new science has much in common with the
common sense philosophy of William James. Indeed, Voegelin
acknowledges his indebtedness to James in the first chapter
of Ueber die Form des amerikanischen Geistes.229 Voegelin
modified and adapted James' radical empiricism in forming
his own critical method of radical empiricism. "James
clearly extends his radical empiricism not only to the
connections that form relationships within phenomenal
experience, but also to 'ordinary religious experience.'"230
James argues that religious experiences evidence a
continuity "with a wider self from which saving experiences
flow in."231 The key essence of James' radical empiricism,
and the important epistemological component that Voegelin
adopts, is that:
...relationship aspects of reality experienced 
are every bit as authentic as things experienced.
229The analysis of James' writings is thematic in the 
first chapter of Voegelin, Ueber die Form des amerikanischen 
Geistes. esp. 41-52. For a relevant discussion of Voegelin's 
analysis, see Ellis Sandoz, The Voeqelinian Revolution: A
Biographical Introduction. 171-177.
“‘’Sandoz, The Voeqelinian Revolution. 173. Cf. James, 
Essavs in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe. II. 
250-51, 291; I, 23, 44, 52; II, 38-40, 299. Cf. Voegelin, 
Ueber die Form des amerikanischen Geistes. 43, 48.
^Sandoz, The Voeqelinian Revolution. 173. Cf. James, 
Essavs in Radical Empiricism [and] A Pluralistic Universe. 
II, 308-309.
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Thus he insists that, 'To be radical, an 
empiricism must neither admit into its 
constructions any element that is not directly 
experienced, nor exclude from them any element 
that is directly experienced. For such a
philosophy, the relations that connect 
experiences must themselves be experienced 
relations, and any kind of relation experienced 
must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in 
the system.1,232
James' insistence that his radical empiricism must not 
exclude from itself any element that is directly experienced 
has important religious significance. Human history is
bursting forth with evidence of directly experienced
religious intuitions, from the cave paintings of the 
Neanderthals to the poetry and symbolizations of the Saints, 
to the visions of modern day mystics. James argues that 
although the belief in the human soul has been badly 
tattered by Humian and Kantian criticisms, some one will 
someday find a pragmatic significance to the term (soul) and 
reenter it into the philosophic discourse.
As Ellis Sandoz points out in The Voeqelinian
Revolution, that champion appears in the thought of Eric 
Voegelin, especially in his theory of consciousness.233 
Voegelin's theory of consciousness, coupled with the 
constancy of human nature within the metaxy, solves the 
problem of solipsism by arguing that:
232Sandoz, The Voeqelinian Revolution. 175. Cf. James,
Essavs in Radical Empiricism [and] A Pluralistic Universe. I, 
42.
^See Sandoz, The Voeqelinian Revolution. 176-177.
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'a truth concerning the reality of man found by 
one man concretely does, indeed, apply to every 
man. The faith in this premise, however, is not 
engendered by an additional experience...but by 
the primordial experience of reality as endowed 
with the constancy and lastingness of structure 
that we symbolize as the Cosmos. The trust in 
the Cosmos and its depth is the source of the 
premises...that we accept as the context of 
meaning for our concrete engagement in the search 
for truth.'234
The pragmatic philosophy of William James and his 
radical empiricism had a considerable influence on 
Voegelin's thought. This is apparent from his early 
writings all the way through to his later writings. Both 
James and Voegelin recognize that there is something which 
underlies the subject-object dichotomy. There is pure human 
experience, which is experienced by people in the everyday 
world. This experience is not somehow less than what is 
propositionally studied in the academy by high-minded 
intellectuals. Indeed, it is a most basic part of human 
existence. To understand man is to understand what man 
experiences and how he understands what he experiences. The 
radical empiricism of both James and Voegelin is just such 
an attempt. The pragmatic implications of this radical 
empiricism on ethics and politics remains to be seen.
234Sandoz, The Voeqelinian Revolution. 177-178. Cf. 
Voegelin, Anamnesis. 7, 52, 55-58, 286, 353. Quotation from 
"Equivalences of Experience," 234.
CHAPTER SIX
THE NOETIC SCIENCE OF MAN:
A PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCE OF POLITICS
Political science is suffering from a difficulty 
that originates in its very nature as a science 
of man in historical existence. For man does not 
wait for science to have his life explained to 
him, and when the theorist approaches social 
reality he finds the field pre-empted by what may 
be called the self-interpretation of society.
Human society is not merely a fact, or an event, 
in the external world to be studied by an 
observer of life as a natural phenomenon. Though 
it has externality as one of its components, it 
is as a whole a little world, a cosmion, 
illuminated with meaning from within by the human 
beings who continuously create and bear it as the 
mode and condition of their self 
realization....The self-illumination of society 
through symbols is an integral part of social 
reality, and one may even say its essential part, 
for through such symbolization the members of a 
society experience it as more than an accident or 
a convenience; they experience it as of their 
human essence.235
The starting point of political science is not a tabula 
rasa, it starts from "the rich body of self-interpretation 
of a society and proceeds by critical clarification of 
socially pre-existent symbols."236 Voegelin recovers the 
sciences of ethics and politics from the works of Aristotle, 
specifically, Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. These works 
"comprise the cornerstones of political science...."237 
Voegelin argues that Aristotle did not construct his ethical
^Voegelin, The Science of Politics. 27.
236Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 28.
237Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics," in 
Discourse, Summer 1993, St. Lawrence Institute, Montreal, 
Quebec, 3.
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and political conceptions out of his own invention, but 
rather took the "symbols which he found in his social 
environment, surveyed with care the variety of meanings 
which they had in common parlance, and ordered and clarified 
these meanings by the criteria of his theory."238 In short, 
the terms used in political science do and should originate 
from the social cosmion. This means that some of the old 
symbols will be retained, some dropped, and some new ones 
added; but all will be critically examined and analyzed in 
an effort to establish a clarified science of politics.
Previous discussion, especially the material covered in 
Chapter Two, has examined and analyzed the problems of the 
modern positivist school of political science. The question 
before us now is how do we recover the science of politics 
that has been eclipsed by positivism's modern predominance. 
How and where do we find the most comprehensive knowledge of 
political reality? Voegelin returns to the classical 
political and philosophical works in order to recover and 
clarify the language of philosophical science. As has been 
well noted by Ellis Sandoz in "The Philosophical Science of 
Politics," the first and most basic step involves the 
clarification of the meaning of philosophy, experience, and 
reason. This is done by recovering their meanings from 
classical philosophy, especially Aristotelian philosophy.
^Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 28. Cf.
Aristotle, Politics 1280a 7 ff.
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As has been noted previously, modern political science,
and its investigations into political reality, has become
overly narrow and eclipsing of the greater political reality
through its insistence upon methodologies which can be
applied only to a narrow band of questions, The whole of
political reality is contracted and obscured by the myopia
of questions which can be posed and methods which can be
employed. But the recovery of a science of man necessitates
a comprehensive view of human reality.
The most comprehensive knowledge of political 
reality is [to be] attained primarily through a 
philosophical investigation, not through one 
narrowly modeled on the supposed "methodology" of 
the natural sciences. This means that in 
contradistinction to the prevailing paradigm of 
American political science, there need be no 
preoccupation with phenomena, no naturalistic 
reduction, no restriction of "reason" to 
inferential reasoning, no juxtaposing of 
"traditional" and "behavioral" schools, no 
dogmatic postulation of assumptions of doctrine, 
no specious fact-value dichotomy, and no systems 
of political thought.239
This is not to say that these things be ignored, but it is
to say that they not be allowed to eclipse, reduce, and
usurp the entire field of political inquiry and science. If
political science is to be relevant to human existence, it
must go beyond historicism and reductionism. It must
address the fundamental issues and questions of human
experience and existence.
^Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics," 4.
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"In raising these questions, again the Aristotelian
procedure of examining symbols as they occur in reality will
be followed. 1,240 The first symbol to examine is the meaning
of philosophy itself.
Philosophy is literally the love of wisdom, and 
it is not commensurate with the systematic 
possession of knowledge: only God is wise.
Philosophy denotes, on the existential side, an 
erotic tension to the Ground of reality (being, 
ousia), a passion of the mind (nous) which 
mediates the distance between the seeking knower 
(zetein) and the reality sought and known. What 
is sought and appropriated as "known" is only a 
fragment of the truth that Is; the insights 
gained are partial and provisional, but they are 
within these limits nonetheless validated to the 
exhaustion of rationality and evidence.241
The articulation of this knowledge is the work of the
scientist or philosopher. The symbols and propositions
which this science articulate are the
...more or less adequate expressions or 
representations of experienced reality; it is 
plain to the investigator that: (1) the reality
experienced outruns propositional statements and 
can never be exhaustively expressed; and (2) 
alternative formulations are acceptable. The 
primary test of the validity of statements is 
just this adequacy— that is, their conformity 
with the facts, or more broadly, with the 
contents of experience....Truth, therefore, lies 
at the level of experience, not at the level of 
the ideational construct or the propositions 
which articulate the experience.242
This leads to the meaning of the second term in our 
recovery of the classical meaning of political science—
240Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 34.
^Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics," 4.
M2Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics," 4-5.
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experience. Current positivist conceptions of experience 
limit its meaning to that which is produced by sensory 
perception (ideations) and our reflections on their 
regularities. But in the Aristotelian science, as well as 
in Voegelin's new science of politics, the realm of 
experience is radically expanded to include the entire range 
of the social field, the entire range of human experience. 
This is an epistemological revolution. With the partial 
exceptions of Georg W. F. Hegel's and William James' 
philosophies, modern philosophy, especially positivist 
philosophy, has concentrated almost exclusively on the 
senses.
The fundamental insight of Voegelin's epistemology and 
his understanding of experience, and that which separates 
his philosophical insights from that of his modern peers, is 
his recognition that the essence of philosophical 
investigation is not to be found at the level of symbolic or 
analytical propositions, but in their existential content. 
This is
the experiential foundation of the science of 
politics, and the very source of scientific 
objectivity, [it] is man's pre-scientific 
participation in all of the realms from the 
somatic and simply sentient to moral, aesthetic 
and mystical levels of experience. This 
existential participation is the means whereby 
man attunes himself with reality and gains the 
primordial grip on the whole of being which is 
the foundation of all knowledge.243
M3Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics," 5.
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This full range of human experience is captured in the
symbolization of the metaxy, and the scale of man's knowing
"runs from the simple sentient awareness through reflective
intensity of the modalities of reasoning to the brilliance
of intuitive illumination.1,244 The Voegelinian recovery of
the meaning of experience necessarily leads to the recovery
of the meaning of reason, "for reason in science is the
counterpart of experience."245
The classical meaning of reason has been covered in
depth in previous analyses in this work. However, in order
to illustrate its importance to the current discussion, a
brief overview is in order. Reason is
the Nous meditatively discovered in antiquity by 
the mystic philosophers, differentiated in the 
Classical period by Plato and Aristotle, and now 
further differentiated in the thought of 
Voegelin. In its widest perspective it is, in 
its several dimensions, concretely discovered to 
be the First Principle common to being, man, and 
science....Reason is the principle of science, 
because it is a principle of both reality and 
consciousness; and, in the analysis of the 
Classical experience, reason is shown to be the 
highest principle common to man and divine Being.
It determines the form of the inquiry as the 
structure of man's participation in the metaxy of 
existence as that inquiry explores the tension 
toward the divine Ground of reality.246
What is perhaps most striking about Voegelin's understanding
of reason is his observation that the existential experience
^Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics," 5. 
^Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics," 6.
^Sandoz, The Voeqelinian Revolution. 210-211.
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of reason has tended to be discovered in the human's 
resistance to disorder and untruth. This is exemplified in 
Socrates' resistance to the untruth of the Sophists, for 
example. One of its greatest symbolizations is in Plato's 
Allegory of the Cave.
Noetic reason is the loving ascent of man's psyche in 
response to the truth of the vision which the man released 
from the shackles of doxa experiences. "Reason is the 
'something' in man that experiences shame in the recognition 
of his ignorance or that resists through as-yet-unclear 
motives the deformation of his own existence and that of 
other men by destructive forces in the social field."247 
The discovery of reason (Nous) is the discovery of a divine 
Ground and the fact that men participate in and with it.
The meaning of three terms: philosophy, experience,
and reason, and the way that they interact with one another, 
is the philosophical science of politics. Science is "the 
knowledge of reality attained by the rational faculty in man 
through its self-reflective search of experience for truth 
throughout all the realms of being as this transaction 
occurs in the concrete consciousness of individual men."248 
Experience is the empirical foundation of any scientific 
undertaking, and this includes political science.
^Sandoz, The Voeqelinian Revolution. 211.
^Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics," 6.
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Aristotle's statement near the end of the 
Nicomachean Ethics has permanent validity in this 
respect: "So we must examine the conclusions we
have reached so far by applying them to the 
actual facts of life: if they are in harmony
with the facts we must accept them, and if they 
clash we must assume that they are mere words" 
(1179a20-23) .249
The meaning of this quote from Aristotle is well captured in 
what is perhaps the most practical and useful tool for an 
analysis of a science of man. Voegelin operationalizes his 
understanding of the noetic science of man into a more 
practical application for a study of human affairs, which 
includes political science, in his diagram of the peri ta 
anthropina. The diagram and its explanation is reproduced 
in order to illustrate the educational, diagnostic, and 
therapeutic functions of Voegelin's thought to a science of 
human affairs.
Figure 1
PERSON SOCIETY HISTORY
Divine Nous
Psyche-Noetic
Psyche-Passions
Animal Nature
Vegetative Nature
Inorganic Nature
Apeiron-Depth
^Sandoz, "The Philosophical Science of Politics," 6.
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The diagram's explanation and corollaries of the 
principles of reason, both diagnostic and therapeutic, are 
stated below.
The left vertical column lists the levels in 
the hierarchy of being from the Nous to the 
Apeiron. Man participates in all of them; his 
nature is an epitome of the hierarchy of being.
The arrow pointing down indicates the order of 
formation from the top down. The arrow pointing 
up indicates the order of foundation from the 
bottom up.
The top horizontal column lists the 
dimensions of man's existence as a person in 
society and history. The arrow pointing to the 
right indicates the order of foundation.
Principle of Completeness: A philosophy
peri ta anthropina must cover the grid determined 
by the two coordinates. No part of the grid must 
be hypostatized into an autonomous entity, 
neglecting the context.
Principle of formation and foundation: The
order of formation and foundation must not be 
inverted or otherwise distorted, as for instance 
by its transformation into a causality working 
from the top or the bottom. Specifically, all 
constructions of phenomena on a higher level as 
epiphenomena of processes on a lower one, the so- 
called reductionist fallacies, are excluded as 
false. This rule, however, does not affect the 
conditioning causality which is the very essence 
of foundation. Neither are inversions of the 
order of foundation in the horizontal column 
permitted. Specifically, all "philosophies of 
history" which hypostatize society or history as 
an absolute, eclipsing personal existence and its 
meaning, are excluded as false.
Principle of metaxy reality: The reality
determined by the coordinates is the In-Between 
reality, intelligible as such by the 
consciousness of Nous and Apeiron as its limiting 
poles. All "eristic phantasies" which try to 
convert the limits of the metaxy, be it the 
noetic height or the apeirontic depth, into a 
phenomenon within the metaxy are to be excluded 
as false. This rule does not affect genuine 
eschatological or apocalyptic symbolisms which 
imaginatively express the experience of a 
movement within reality toward a Beyond of the
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metaxy, such as the experiences of mortality and
immortality.250
This diagram is not only a useful tool in the diagnosis 
or discernment of derailed and deformed human orders and 
systems, it is also a guide for what one should look for in 
a healthy political or ethical order or system.251 If a 
political structure hypostatizes a part of the whole as if 
it were the whole, something is very wrong and distorted. 
Men in such "systems'9 are alienated from themselves, their 
society, and their world by eclipsed realities which create 
unhealthy persons. If an ethical or political order does 
not account for the entire range of human experience and 
existence, then it is incomplete and does not meet the 
scientific standards of a science of man. It is, in one 
degree or another, an eclipsed reality.
Any and all political orders which are "fit 
habitation [s] for human beings"252 will meet the 
requirements set forth in Voegelin's philosophic science of 
politics. With all of this having been said, it is
250Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience," in The
Collected Works, vol. 12, 289-291.
251For a comprehensive analysis of Voegelin's science of 
human affairs, its relationship to process philosophy, and 
the relationship of his thought and the thought of Santayana, 
see Paul Grimley Kuntz, "Voegelin's Experiences of Disorder 
Out of Order and Vision of Order Out of Disorder: A
Philosophic Meditation on His Theory of Order-Disorder," 111- 
173.
^Ellis Sandoz, A Government of Laws: Political Theory.
Religion and the American Founding (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1990), 1.
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imperative to note that Voegelin's understanding of a 
philosophical science of politics is not to be understood in 
the same scientific manner in which we would speak of the 
natural sciences, lest we misrepresent Voegelin's political 
insights.
In "What is Political Reality?," Voegelin makes it
clear that the axiomatization of mathematics and physics
cannot be applied to political science. Mathematics and
physics presupposes nonderived propositions, fundamental
principles, that themselves are not of the reality that the
science investigates. Aristotle recognized this and
accordingly divided science into the theoretical and the
practical. Voegelin concurs. Political science is a
practical science. The relation between political science
to its object cannot be separated.
The absence of such a body of propositions 
follows essentially from the special relation 
between science and reality in the field of 
politics.... If we now continue to ask why such a 
body of propositions does not and cannot exist—  
what is the special character of the relation 
between science and reality that inhibits such a 
body of propositions— we could answer, in the 
first approximation: The core of political
science is a noetic interpretation of man, 
society, and history that appears with the claim 
of critical knowledge of order vis-a-vis the 
order of that society in which, respectively, it 
occurs. Political science in the sense of noetic 
knowledge of order finds itself in the peculiar 
situation, other than the sciences examining the 
phenomena of the external world, in that the 
intended object, "political reality," is itself
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structured by a knowledge that aims at that 
object.253
So how can political science properly be said to be a
science at all?
The tension in political reality, which 
historically produces the phenomenon of the 
noetic interpretation, is not a thing about which 
objective propositions could be formed. Rather, 
it must be traced back to its origin in the 
consciousness of men who desire true knowledge of 
order.254
The process of tracing back political reality requires the 
investigation into man's entire social field, which goes far 
"beyond the [mere] ratio."255 Man's experience of reality 
is formed within an already existent social field, which 
includes the political. In order to understand what 
political reality is, we must understand the entire social 
field. This is why Voegelin spends much of his work on the 
noetic and pneumatic aspects of experiential knowledge. By 
examining and investigating classical and mediaeval 
philosophy, especially the experience of faith, hope, and 
love, Voegelin discovers the meaning of the cognitio 
rationis, cognitiones f idei, amor is, et spei.256 Out of a 
comprehensive complex of knowledge,
^Voegelin, "What is Political Reality?: Science and
Reality," in Anamnesisf 143-144.
254Voegelin, "The Consciousness of the Ground," in 
Anamnesis. 147.
255Voegelin, "The Tensions in the Reality of Knowledge,"
in Anamnesis. 184.
“‘’Voegelin, "The Tensions," 184.
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the classical noesis differentiates the 
consciousness of the ground by way of love of 
God, of being moved by grace of the ground to the 
point of feeling compelled to "turn around" from 
being lost in the world toward inclination to the 
ground, of experiences of the shadow-like 
character of worldly existence, of the world as a 
prison and foreign land, of experiences of light 
shining in darkness, of being-led on the right 
way, and so on.257
This is the whole of which politics is a part. Politics
operates within it. "Plato characterized the whole of this
knowledge in the three symbols of eros, dike, and thanatos:
the searching and knowing love for the ground, the right
order of life, and death as the widest of all perspectives
in which the art of measure, the techne metretike, must
weigh the rightness of action."258
The problem for politics that arises from this insight
is that:
the noetic experience arises late in history so 
that, wherever it happens, it runs into the non- 
noetic knowledge of social order. The non-noetic 
interpretations remain the form of society's 
self-interpretation even after the rise of 
noesis, and there are no societies whose self- 
interpretation is exclusively noetic.259
Whereas classic noesis found itself in opposition to
sophism, today's noetic resistance is against the dogmatisms
and ideologies of the modern world. The present task of
noetic science is to "lift into the light of consciousness
^Voegelin, "The Tensions," 184.
258Voegelin, "The Tensions," 184.
259Voegelin, "The Tensions," 185.
the material structure of ratio contained in the reality of
the knowledge of participation. Where there is no active
participation, there can be no rational consciousness that
could be differentiated."260
In the present state of the discipline, with 
ideological dogmatism dominating the contemporary 
thought of Western societies, [our symbols] no 
longer express the reality of knowledge but the 
rebellion against it....The access to 
consciousness as man's center of order is blocked 
massively by the ideologies of Positivism, 
Marxism, historicism, scientism, behaviorism, 
also by means of psychologizing and 
sociologizing, by world-intentionalistic 
methodologies and phenomenologies....The non- 
noetic thought about order of the kind that 
rebellion produces offers no point of contact to 
the noesis."261
The only solution to the problem is a "turning— away~a«d—  
turning around...[, it is] the sine qua non for finding the 
way from rebellion to reality; the periagoge must in any 
case be performed. 1,262 Otherwise, we will continue to 
thrash around in our own distorted creations and rebel 
against the true reality which we refuse to apperceive.
The therapy to political recovery is found in classic 
noesis and mysticism. "... [A]ny attempt to bring ratio once 
again into the luminosity of consciousness in the struggle 
against dogmatism"263 requires it. The roles of noesis and
260Voegelin, "The Tensions," 187.
261Voegelin, "The Tensions," 187.
262Voegelin, "The Tensions," 188.
263Voegelin, "The Tensions," 192.
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mysticism in ordering human life must be restored. This 
means that we must go beyond propositional metaphysics to 
the reality of knowledge of the noetic experience. This 
means that:
the insight into the knowledge of the Ineffable 
is most important for the understanding of a 
large class of phenomena of order. Tolerance, 
understood as balance between the areas of 
silence and symbolic expressions...is one of the 
phenomena of this class."264
All of this having being said, the tending of the
spiritual aspects of man's existence is a necessary
condition for a science of politics, but it is not a
sufficient one. Man is not only spiritual, he is also
- -Gor-pcreal. .
Human consciousness is not a free-floating 
something but always the concrete consciousness 
of concrete persons. The consciousness of the 
existential tension toward the ground, therefore, 
while constituting the specific human nature that 
distinguishes man from other beings, is not the 
whole of his nature, for consciousness is always 
concretely founded in man's bodily existence, 
through which he belongs to all levels of being, 
his synthetic nature.266
Human corporeality compels society to provide material 
care and the control of the passions, which in turn, 
requires that existence be under the form of organized 
rulership. "The organization of society through
representatives charged with care for the social order
264Voegelin, "The Tensions," 198.
265Voegelin, "The Concrete Consciousness," in Anamnesis.
2 0 0 .
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within and for defense against external dangers is the 
conditio sine qua non of society to such an extent that the 
investigation and description of the various pragmatic 
organizations is a main part of political science."266
However, a theory of politics must account for both 
corporeality and spirituality in man. Therefore, in "The 
Concrete Consciousness," Voegelin clarifies his theory of 
politics and his interpretation of its order by offering a 
series of corollaries, briefly summarized as follows:
(1) A theory of politics must cover the problem 
of the order of man's entire existence.
(2) The concrete consciousness of concrete man is 
the only consciousness given in our experience.
(3) The social fields of concrete consciousness
societies, even
though the ideologists of power like to assume 
that social organization exhausts all political 
reality.
(4) In addition to the organized societies 
typified, there are the civilizations or 
cultures, which are doubtlessly identifiable as 
social fields.
(5)The ecumene is a social field of consciousness 
that belongs to the structure of political 
reality.
(6) Careful distinction must be made between the 
ecumene as a field of contemporaneous cultured 
humanity and humanity in the sense of the 
universal field of history.
(7) Universal humanity is a symbol rather than a 
field of potential organization. Further, it is 
not a framework of a process of power, for it 
embraces all men of the past, present and the 
future.
(8) History is a field of interpretation. The 
origin of the symbol in the knowledge of 
essential humanity determines the material 
principle of the interpretation.
(9) In the optimum luminosity of consciousness 
man experiences himself both as existing in time
266Voegelin, "The Concrete Consciousness," 200.
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and as participating in the eternity of the 
ground. The tension toward the eternity of the 
ground therefore belongs to the structure of the 
universal field.267
These are concrete corollaries for showing the implications
of the concreteness of consciousness for the structure of
political reality and the interpretation of its order.
These are corollaries for a practical science.
The realm of man is not an object of empirical 
perception but a function of the participating 
consciousness. If we posit the existential 
tension toward the ground as the center of man's 
order, the realm of man comprises "objectively" 
all phenomena of human order that originate in 
the reality of knowledge of participation.268
A major aspect in the phenomena of human order is the
corporeality of man and all the material consequences that
that entails. The nature of man is synthetic. Therefore,
the realm of man is synthetic. Using Aristotle's analysis,
the realms of human nature are the "human-psychic, animalic,
vegetative, and inanimate being."269 The higher rungs in
the realm are dependent upon the lower ones. The relations
are not reversible.
Based on this Aristotelian model, Voegelin concludes
his investigation of "What Is Political Reality?" by
recalling his assertion that there are no axiomatic
267Voegelin, "The Concrete Consciousness," 200-205.
268Voegelin, "About the Functions of Noesis," in
Anamnesis. 207-208.
269Voegelin, "About the Function," 209.
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propositions in political science and arguing that the
"propositions" of political science are:
common-sense insights into correct modes of 
action concerning man's existence in society, 
from insights concerning the organization of 
government, to insights into the requirements of 
domestic and foreign policy, finance and military 
policy, down to concrete decisions.270
Common sense is:
the habit of judgment and conduct of a man formed 
by ratio: one could say, the habit of an
Aristotelian spoudaios minus the luminosity of 
his knowledge of the ratio as the source of his 
rational judgment and conduct. Common sense is a 
ciTrilizational habit that presupposes noetic 
experience, without the man of this habit having 
himself a differentiated knowledge of noesis.271
Voegelin's discussion of common sense makes it clear as to
"why there can be no 'theory of politics' in the sense of
principles rising above the propositions of an 'empirical'
science of politics. 1,272 Aristotle's Politics is a
commonsense study of politics and history. This is why he
identifies political knowledge with phronesis (practical
knowledge). Phronesis is the operational knowledge
necessary to work within a political order. It alone,
however, while necessary for the good political order, is
not sufficient to discern or guide in the proper directions.
That is why it is imperative to note that commonsense
insights are no "propositions" beyond which there could be
270Voegelin, "About the Functions," 210.
^Voegelin, "About the Function," 212. 
^Voegelin, "About the Function," 212.
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found principles. "If we go beyond the commonsense level we
get to the insights into order of consciousness, by which
commonsense insights receive their direction. 1,273 It
follows, therefore, that the most fundamental task for
political science is to understand the order of
consciousness. For it is human consciousness which must be
accounted for when devising or changing a political order.
Since it is the order of consciousness that gives
direction to commonsense, it is important now to consider
Voegelin's mature theory of consciousness. His mature
theory of consciousness is intimated in his 1978
introduction to Anamnesis. "Remembrance of Things Past."
It reaches its full fruition in "Quod Deus Dicitur" and the
final volume of Order and History; In Search of Order.274
A brief overview of Voegelin's mature theory of
consciousness follows.
In "Remembrance of Things Past," Voegelin asserts that
there must be a reality in which human beings with a
consciousness occur. He argues that:
by virtue of their consciousness these human 
beings are quite conscious of being parts of a 
comprehensive reality and express their awareness 
by the symbols of birth and death, of a cosmic 
whole structured by realms of being, of a world 
of external objects and of the presence of divine 
reality in the cosmos, of mortality and 
immortality, of creation into the cosmic order
^Voegelin, "About the Function," 211.
^For a more thorough discussion, see Paul Caringella, 
"Voegelin: Philosopher of Divine Presence," 174-206.
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and of salvation from its disorder, of descent 
into the depth of the psyche and the meditative 
ascent toward its beyond. Within this rich field 
of reality-consciousness, finally, there occur 
the processes of wondering, questing, and
seeking, of being moved and drawn into the search 
by a consciousness of ignorance, which, in order 
to be sensed as ignorance, requires an 
apprehension of something worth to be known; of 
an appeal to which man can lovingly respond or 
not so lovingly deny himself; of the joy of 
finding and the despair of having lost the 
direction; of the advance of truth from the
compact to differentiated experiences and 
symbols; and of the great breakthroughs of 
insight through visions of the prophetic, the
philosophic, and the Christian-apostolic type.275
The recognition of this comprehensive structure of
consciousness raises a fundamental epistemological question.
Following his empirical science, Voegelin has to ask if
these experiences have been experienced by concrete persons.
"If the abstract statements about the structure of
consciousness were to be accepted as true, they had first to
be recognized as true in the concrete. 1,276 If this were the
case, then the experiences would be symbolized and
engendered in the language of consciousness. This requires
a process of verification. "The process of verification had
to penetrate, therefore, through the engendered symbols to
the engendering experience; and the truth of the experience
had to be ascertained by a responsive experience that could
^Voegelin, "Remembrance of Things Past,” in Anamnesis,
1 1 .
^Voegelin, "Remembrance," 11.
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verify or falsify the engendering experience. 1,277 It 
follows therefore, that in order to have the experience, the 
experience must be entered into, which is done by entering 
into the content of the experiential symbols. This is what 
Voegelin refers to as the luminosity of consciousness. The 
process of reality lets its truth emerge into the luminosity 
of consciousness and its process affects what one is 
attracted to. This is why Voegelin finds himself 
"confronted with the question of why [he] was attracted by 
'larger horizons' and repelled, if not nauseated, by 
restrictive deformations. 1,278 In his life-long quest, he 
ultimately came to the realization that truth or falsehood 
could not be determined on the level of ideas. He had to 
examine his own consciousness through an "anamnetic 
exploration in order to discover its constitution by his own 
experiences of reality, if he wanted to be critically aware 
of what he was doing."279
The results of these anamnetic exercises constitute 
Voegelin's mature theory of consciousness. They include a 
critical re-evaluation of the common language of philosophy, 
being, theology, religion, myth, reason, and revelation. 
They are most explicitly put forth in the last part of
^Voegelin, "Remembrance," 11. 
^Voegelin, "Remembrance," 12. 
^^oegelin, "Remembrance," 12-13.
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Voegelin's works: "Quod Deus Dicitur," "The Beginning and
the Beyond," and In Search of Order, to which we now turn.
In "The Beginning and the Beyond," Voegelin opens his
essay with the statement:
Divine reality is being revealed to man in two 
fundamental modes of experience: in the
experience of divine creativity in the cosmos; 
and in the experience of divine ordering presence 
in the soul. The two modes are always structures 
in man's consciousness of divine reality, but 
they are not always conscious in the form of 
reflected knowledge."280
The language used to symbolize these experiences cannot 
be separated from the experiences themselves. "The 
experience and the language of truth belong together as 
parts of a process that derives its sacrality from the flux 
of divine presence in it."281 This is true throughout the 
millennia according to Voegelin, who returns to the 
Hesiodian verse "on the 'things' that are, that will be, and 
that were before"282 and then traces the same linguistic 
insights throughout history.
It is in the last part of In Search of Order, however, 
that Voegelin most fully develops his mature theory of 
language.283 He begins by analyzing tensional symbols, such
280Voegelin, "The Beginning and the Beyond," 173.
281Voegelin, "The Beginning," 184.
282Voegelin, In Search of Order. 85.
283For a discussion of Voegelin's theory of language, see 
Glenn Hughes, Mystery and Myth in the Philosophy of Eric 
Voegelin. 4-6, 35-37, 91. Also see Gregor Sebba, "Prelude 
and Variations on the Theme of Eric Voegelin," in Eric
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as: Being-Becoming, Eternity-Time, and Paradigm-Eikon, and
then points out that they "would lose their meaning if the 
complexes were fragmented and their parts hypostatized into 
intentionist entities. He then points out that these dyadic 
complexes are not "things" but rather, are "the expressive 
constants in the movements of noetic consciousness, as well 
as the problem of the relations among these complexes in the 
comprehending structure of consciousness.1,284 Ontological 
linguistic indices are tensional terms. They are part of 
the paradoxical "complex of consciousness-reality- 
language. "285
The complex symbols express the poles of tensions 
experienced as well as the tensions themselves. Indeed, 
each contains the meaning of the other within it, which is 
a paradox. This is what Hegel realized and attempted to 
overcome in his science of logic. He "tried to master the 
problem by inventing a language that would out-comprehend 
the comprehending paradox."286 Plato did not, although he, 
too, recognized the problem.
Voeaelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal. 16, 20-21, 29.
Also see William C. Havard, Jr., "Notes on Voegelin's 
Contributions to Political Theory," in Eric Voegelin's 
Thought: A Critical Appraisal. 87-89, 100.
284Voegelin, In Search of Order. 92.
285Voegelin, In Search of Order. 92.
286Voegelin, In Search of Order. 93.
172
In wrestling with the difficulties of symbolism
inherent in language, Voegelin discerns three levels of
meaning. On the first level,
the symbols expressing the poles of tensional 
experiences do not only radiate their luminosity, 
but also carry the intentionalist mode of 
reference and can, therefore, induce the 
misconception of the poles as "being things," a 
misconception that causes their later deformation 
into "metaphysical" entities.287
In order to avert this misconception, the thinker must
recognize that the poles appear in complexes of symbols and
that it validly expresses the generating tension. If the
thinker recognizes this, then he will move to a second level
of meaning, which will stress "the residing of the truth in
the tensional complex rather than in the poles taken
singly."288 They will appear as "constants" in the thinking
of the thinker. However, the problem of meaning does not
disappear because:
the supposed "constants" turn out to be not 
altogether constant....The "constants" appear to 
point beyond themselves toward a super-constant 
governing the intelligible relations among the 
constants as well as the intelligible advances of 
experience and symbolization in the process of 
reality.289
This leads to a third level of language, which reflectively 
distances the structure of tensions and poles. Voegelin 
argues that Plato "tried to resolve this problem through the
287Voegelin, In Search of Order. 94.
288Voegelin, In Search of Order. 94.
289Voegelin, In Search of Order. 94.
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symbolism of the Cosmos, or the to pan, 'or whatever it
prefers to be called.'”290
The Cosmos is monogenes, which Voegelin renders
oneness, in the sense of an experienced oneness of
existential tension. "The Cosmos as the monogenes is not a
'thing' but the visible (aisthetos) god generated in the
image (eikon) of the intelligible (noetos) god, the
intelligible god not being the Demiourgos but the noetic
paradigm (92C) .1,291 The idea was so difficult to symbolize
that Plato coined a new term: monosis, in order to make it
the image of the divine paradigm.
The noetic analysis of the paradox conducted 
within the fides of the divine Cosmos was 
obscured when the fides of cosmic order itself 
was shaken by a state of alienation induced by 
the disordering effect of the events which let 
the cosmos become a synonym for the orbis 
terrarum to be conquered, and when the 
experiential emphasis shifted toward the divinity 
that, by its grace, would save man from a "world" 
which had become a synonym for disordered 
existence....The wandering of the symbol 
monogenes from the Cosmos to the Christ reveals 
the movement of experiential emphasis from the 
God who creates the order of the Cosmos to the 
God who saves [it] from its disorder.292
Voegelin holds that Plato understood the mystery of the
Beyond and its Parousia as experiences of divine, formative
presence which are events in the metaxy of existence. What
is revealed in this mystery is that "when the paradox of
290Voegelin, In Search of Order. 94.
291Voegelin, In Search of Order. 95.
292Voegelin, In Search of Order. 96.
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thing-reality and It-reality that governs the complex of 
consciousness-reality-language has become sufficiently 
differentiated, the divine force ordering the oneness of 
tensional existence reveals itself as One.”293 The problem 
that arises in this revelation is how to symbolize it. 
According to Voegelin, this is what is going on in the 
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic successors who found it 
necessary to create the symbol of a tetragrammatic God 
beyond the personal God. "Voegelin's 'History,' his story 
of faith, is a philosopher's history. It becomes clearer 
and clearer that it is a history of visions and of 
theophanies, of the language of the gods and of the one god, 
which grows by the imaginative elaboration of these 
visions.”294
But the Mystery resists being captured in symbols and 
persists. "The noetic thinker, who is conscious of this 
persistence, knows that even the fides of the One God does 
not put an end to his quest for the truly One in a reality 
that has to tell a story of tension and movement."295 The 
noetic thinker is forever on a quest. The very nature of 
existence, the response to the love of the ground, requires 
it. It is achieved through meditative procedure, responding
293Voegelin, In Search of Order. 97.
294Car ingel la, "Voegelin: Philosopher of Divine
Presence," 193.
295Voegelin, In Search of Order. 98.
175
to the love of the ground, that the noetic thinker seeks his
answers, and the answers are never final.
The truth of the quest is not a true doctrine 
resulting from an intentionalist investigation of 
objects, but a balanced state of existence, 
formed in reflective distance to the process of 
meditative wandering through the paradoxic 
manifold of tensions....The symbolized experience 
of the Beginning, then, would point further to 
the comprehending symbolism of a Beyond, the 
epekeina, of the cosmic reality in which the 
quest for the truth of its order is an 
event....The event of the quest is the "place" at 
which the bodily located consciousness of man 
experiences itself both in its thingly existence, 
i.e., as moving in the thingly tensions of order- 
disorder, and in its visionary existence, as a 
movement toward an unflawed order beyond the 
order that is flawed by the disorder of 
thingness....This means that the quest for truth 
is ultimately penultimate. In the quest, reality 
is experienced as the mysterious movement of an 
It-reality through thing-reality toward a Beyond 
of things.296
The problem that arises from this realization is that 
the questioner must tell the "story of his struggle for the 
unflawed order from his position in the flawed order of 
thingly existence; and he can tell it, therefore, only in 
the flawed language that speaks of non-things in the mode of 
things."297 The divine that is found is not an "object". 
The quest has no object, it "is an event in tensional 
reality that raises the experienced tensions in the
296Voegelin, In Search of Order. 100-102.
297Voegelin, In Search of Order. 102.
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consciousness. 1,298 The wandering quest through the tensions
does not arrive at an ultimate place of rest.
The fides of the Cosmos becomes transparent for a 
drama of the Beyond enacted, through the 
tensional process of the Cosmos, from a demiurgic 
Beginning to a salvational End. No "principles," 
or "absolutes," or "doctrines" can be extracted 
from this tensional complex; the quest for truth, 
as an event of participation in the process, can 
do no more than explore the structures in the 
divine mystery of the complex reality and, 
through the analysis of the experienced responses 
to the tensional pulls, arrive at some clarity 
about its own function in the drama in which it 
participates....Moreover, the paradoxic tension 
in the revelation of formative reality is 
experienced as ultimate in the sense that 
intelligibly it cannot be out-experienced or out- 
symbolized by further experiences of reality.
This experienced ultimacy of the tension becomes 
luminous in the symbol "divine. "299
What, then, is the character of the experience of
Transcendence? It is ultimate, ineffable, and never at
rest. The man in the quest will not find peace. The
unfolding of the Mystery is forever an unfinished story.
The Archimedean point to view reality 
"objectively" that is nowhere to be found is 
matched by the pure experience-symbol that is 
equally inaccessible in the ineluctably 
participatory and particular reality of even the 
most sensitive and acute explorers of noetic and 
pneumatic truth.300
Man must live within the tension between the Question and
its divine answer: Mystery.
298Voegelin, In Search of Order. 103.
299Voegelin, In Search of Order. 106-107.
300Sandoz, "Introduction," In Search of Order. 7.
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In the earlier part of this chapter, an examination of 
Voegelin's views on "What Is Political Reality" was 
undertaken. After much discussion over the role of the 
practical aspects of political science, it was discovered 
that Voegelin holds that the common sense insights of 
practical science are necessary but not sufficient for a 
science of politics. He argues that common sense insights 
require a theory of consciousness in order to give direction 
to practical matters. Accordingly, the last part of this 
chapter has dealt with Voegelin's mature understanding of 
human consciousness and its participation in the human- 
divine encounter, in order to discern the guiding principle 
of a practical science.
It clearly follows from Voegelin's arguments that any 
theory of politics must account for the full range of human 
consciousness. This is most easily gauged and analyzed with 
the use of Voegelin's diagram of the peri ta anthropina from 
"Reason: The Classic Experience," which magnificently
symbolizes the full range of the metaxic structure of human 
existence. This diagram easily illustrates our analysis of 
the various political systems and theories that exist in the 
world today, many of which Voegelin criticizes harshly based 
on his understanding of human consciousness and how these 
systems fall short of accounting for man's full range of 
experience.
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So let us now turn to the practical political
implications of Voegelin7s thought and see what the
consequences of Voegelin7s mature understanding of human
consciousness for a human anthropology and a political order
might be. It is intimated in a letter from Voegelin to
Ellis Sandoz in which he states: "From my first contact
with such works as the Cloud of Unknowing, to my more recent
understanding of the mystical problem.. .the great issue [has
been]: not to stop at what may be called classical
mysticism, but to restore the problem of the Metaxy for
society and history."301
How is this to be done? It is to be done by creating
and nurturing a political community which:
offers the opportunity for full actualization of 
human nature. The fully actualized man is the 
spoudaios, the mature man, who has developed his 
dianoetic excellences and whose life is oriented 
by his noetic self....This is the decisive issue 
in a philosophy of politics[.]...A theory of 
consciousness which shies away from ontology, and 
in particular from a theory of the nature of man, 
is empty; it is a parlour game in which one can 
indulge as long as the surrounding society 
contains enough Christian substances to make at 
least the worst sort of good consciences socially 
ineffective; but even under such favourable 
conditions...this nihilistic theory of conscience 
contributes to the intellectual and moral 
confusion which paves the way for the best of all 
consciences, viz., that of the totalitarian 
killers. All men are equal, to be sure, or they 
would not be individuals of the same species; but 
sometimes it is forgotten that the point in which
301Sandoz, "Introduction," In Search of Order. 12. Cf. 
Eric Voegelin to Ellis Sandoz, December 30, 1971, in Eric
Voegelin Papers, Hoover Institution Library, Stanford 
University, Box 27.10.
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they most certainly are equal is their capacity 
for evil. Enough of that evil is rampant; and 
this is no time to pat the viciously ignorant on 
the back for being "sincere," or abiding by their 
"conscience." This is a time for the philosopher 
to be aware of his authority, and to assert it, 
even if that brings him into conflict with an 
environment infested by dubious ideologies and 
political theologies— so that the word of Marcus 
Aurelius will apply to him: "The philosopher—
the priest and servant of the gods. "302
302Voegelin, "The Oxford Political Philosophers," in The 
Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 3, No. 11 (April 1953), 114.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF VOEGELIN'S MYSTICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
[A] 11 of us are threatened in our humanity, if 
not in our physical existence, by the massive 
social force of activist dreamers who want to 
liberate us from our imperfections by locking us 
up in the perfect prison of their phantasy.3”
What could cause the malignant demise of reality and the
warping of the perceptions of reality which we experience in
modernity? It is "the refusal to apperceive reality,...[it
is] the pathological core in the structure of consciousness
that enables the dreamer to ignore rational argument against
his construction."304 It is based in a false understanding
of human consciousness, which most commonly takes the form
of a constricted and reduced view of who man is, denying the
metaxic structure of his consciousness.
The malignancy of the magic of the extremes, which
creates magical deformations of the truth of reality, is
caused by man's refusal to apperceive, which warps his
consciousness. A true understanding of and accounting for
human consciousness is lacking. The three structures of
consciousness— intentionality, mystery, and the balance of
consciousness are askew in the diseased consciousness. This
creates an imbalance that is caused by the misinterpretation
that one, or a few, of the poles in tensional reality is the
303Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme: A
Meditation", in The Collected Works, vol. 12, 315.
3G4Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," 323.
180
181
whole of reality, which eclipses the other pole. The magic
of the extreme is the magic brought about by an exclusive
adherence to one of the poles as ultimate reality.
Why does this happen? Why does man refuse to
apperceive in fullness, and instead, divert his attention to
one or the other poles within the tension of the metaxy?
The answer is to be found in Aristotle's golden mean, Saint
Thomas' fides caritate formata, Saint Augustine's cognitio
fidei, Saint Bonaventure's pasche, and Plato's properly
directed eros. They understand that the order of the soul
is dependent upon:
the loving quest of truth in response to the 
divine drawing from the Beyond; the divine-human 
movement and counter movement of love is the 
source of man's knowledge concerning his 
existence in truth; and since it is the source of 
truth, is has to become the noetic center from 
which the philosopher can explore the ambiguities 
of the counteracting force of deformation.. . .305
Both the exploration and the articulation of truth is
contained in the vision. The nature of the vision is
captured and exemplified at least as far back as Plato in
the Athenian Stranger's treatment of his keenness, which has
grown historically in his existence, from a dim view in his
youth to a sharper image in his old age. The truth of the
vision is derived from the philosopher's humble and faithful
recognition and acceptance of divine-human participation.
The truth of this reality becomes luminous through the
305Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," 333.
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symbols of the vision, linguistic indices which are not 
informative, but evocative. "Their meaning can be said to 
be understood only if they have evoked in the listener or 
reader the corresponding movement of participatory 
consciousness."306 This insight into the truth of reality 
is exemplified in Plato's Laws, "as the unfinished struggle 
for the truth— a struggle not to be observed from the 
outside, but to be conducted within the historical process 
by the men who are granted, by the unknown divinity, the 
grace of the vision and who respond with its 
articulation. "307
The derailment from the acceptance and response of the 
true vision of true reality, and its ensuing deformation of 
consciousness, is due to the hypostatic contraction of the 
tensional poles. The resistance to its untruth is 
exemplified in Plato's struggle for the truth against the 
Sophists and the Eleatics. The Sophists eclipse the reality 
of the divine aspect of reality and adhere to the human 
pole, concluding that man is the measure. The Eleatics, on 
the other hand, embrace the belief that the many is the one, 
and thus "on the level of intentionality,... suffer 
from the same defect as the constructions of Sophistic 
extremists."308 In both cases, the magic of the extremes
305Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," 344.
307Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," 348.
308Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," 354.
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arises out of one or another hypostatized poles. The 
balance of the tensional balance of existence and experience 
is lost.
The deformative visions that Plato observed in the 
Sophists and the Eleatics have continued to manifest 
themselves throughout history and into the present. "The 
man who abandons God as his partner in the divine-human 
metaxy...' is abandoned by God to his solitary existence 
(eremos)', with all the consequences of personal and social 
disorder (Laws 716a-b). 1,309 It is here that Voegelin's work 
can best be characterized as a meditation on human 
intellectual and spiritual disease and its cure. "[T]o be 
abandoned by God means to be abandoned by the Nous, by 
'Reason'. The withdrawal into existential solitude entails 
a state of anoia, of 'unreason'."310
The state of anoia is a deformative disease of the 
human soul. It can be observed, quite readily, in the works 
of Hegel, Hobbes, Nietzsche, and Sartre. Its political 
manifestations are clearly present in the tenants of Marxism 
and National Socialism. There is only one cure, and that is 
in the acceptance of the grace of the vision--the turning 
around (periagoge) of the individual toward the divine 
attraction and the embracing of Its truth. The individual's 
soul must freely respond to the divine attraction (Love) and
309Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," 355.
310Voegelin, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme," 355.
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submit to death— death to his mortality and death to second 
realities. In so doing, he will become transformed, through 
a fides caritate formata, and the magic of the vision will 
illuminate his consciousness as a reality participating 
within the divine ground, and the magic of the extreme, with 
its inflated, contracted self (false theory of 
consciousness) and its warped second realities will be no 
more.
What are the practical ethical and political 
implications of this recognition of the need for spiritual 
transformation and how are they to be institutionally 
incorporated into the community? As has been noted 
previously, the realms of reality must be allowed to perform 
their mediative roles in the construction of our social 
fields. They are not to be separated out into distinct and 
autonomous realms of existence as if they were the whole of 
reality. Voegelin makes this clear as early as 1957 in his 
analysis of Plato's Laws. In Plato and Aristotle. Voegelin 
contends that Platonic thought has ripened to its fruition 
in the teachings of the Athenian Stranger, which are found 
in the Laws. Whereas the younger Plato of the Republic 
"appeared as the leader of his People; [in whom] his own 
divine reality was to guide them toward their 
regeneration"311, the elder Plato realized that the lack of
311Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 227.
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spiritual strength of the vast majority of the people
required something less:
The people cannot stand the naked reality; their 
existential potency is so low that they can look 
at it only through the veil of his prooemia... .He 
has withdrawn the direct existential appeal; his 
own person is blotted out; an 'Athenian 
Stranger,' 'a man who has knowledge of these 
things,' develops a plan and the motivations for 
theocratic institutions that will be bearable to 
men as they are. All that is left of the 
Republic is its spirit; the divine sermon recedes 
into the place of the heroic counsel; and of the 
spirit there will live in the institutions no 
more than is possible.312
The elder Plato, in the character of the Athenian 
Stranger, has come to the realization that the divine 
paradigm, which is written by God the Divine Playwright 
(Nous), can only be transmitted and communicated crudely, 
and to a limited degree, in the world. The role of the 
philosopher is to discern the divine paradigm (eikon), in as 
much as a person is capable of doing so, and after doing so, 
to become the human playwright and create the human play 
(eikon) which is to be incorporated into the human polis 
through institutions. Voegelin elucidates the need of 
institutions analogically, by comparing "the evolution from 
the Sermon on the Mount to the function of the 
institutionalized Church"313 to the evolution from the 
earlier Platonic thought in the Republic to the later 
Platonic thought of the Laws:
312Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 227.
313Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 226.
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The counsels of the Sermon originate in the 
spirit of eschatological heroism....While the 
counsels of the Sermon cannot become rules of 
social conduct in the world as it is, they are 
nevertheless the substance of Christian 
doctrine.... Since the Sermon is unbearable in its 
purity, the Church infuses as much of its 
substance as men are capable of absorbing while 
living in the world; the mediation of the stark 
reality of Jesus to the level of human 
expediency, with a minimum loss of substance, is 
one of the functions of the Church.314
Just as the early Christian community found that it had to
live in the world, the elder Plato came to the realization
that the community that he had had a vision of in the
Agathon, namely the one envisioned in the Republic, had to
live in the world, too. The ideal community, apperceived in
the Agathon, must be symbolized and mythologized into the
institutions of the community of men in the world. But it
cannot be realized fully in the earthly community.
The dominant symbol in the Laws. the journey of the
three old men on the Summer solstice (a symbol of the
beginning and end) to the cave of Zeus, is the path to God
(Nous), which the Athenian Stranger (Socrates) obviously
knows, since he is on it. The question that arises in the
course of the story is how this path is to be communicated
to others, especially the young? In other words, how can
the path be incorporated into the polis? How are the
members of the community to be educated? Plato's answer is
that it can be accomplished through a theocratic state,
314Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 226.
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which will carefully model and monitor (write and direct)
the play which the members of the community will act in:
The field of the play is the soul of man, in 
which feelings, apprehensions, and logismos pull 
in different directions. The play is played by 
the gods in whose hands man is the paignion.
Man, however, is not an automaton; he himself, in 
so far as he 'is one,' has a part in the play; he 
has to play the role which is assigned to him of 
supporting the pull of the golden cord and 
resisting the drawings of the lessor cords. Then 
the field is enlarged to the polis. The nomos 
becomes the pull of the golden cord; the play 
becomes the ritual "sacrifice, song and dance" of 
the citizenry....This play, then, is serious 
because it is ultimately directed by God, "the 
most serious." Man's part in it is equally 
serious because in this serious play he attunes 
himself to the divine direction.
The play is enacted by every man in his personal life, as
well as the life of the community, by celebrating the rites
of the polis in conformity to the nomoi. Furthermore,
children will be trained and educated, through the various
symbols and rites of the community, to associate pleasure
with what is good. Furthermore, the "child's soul must
never learn to feel pleasure contrary to the law; it must
learn to take pleasure and pain in the same things as the
old men who set the [community] standards."316 In short,
they are habituated to be attracted to the Good and repelled
from that which is not good. The community is saved from
corruption by keeping the communal rites from being
corrupted under the priestly supervision of the elders.
315Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 235.
316Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 262.
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"The play of the polis is serious because its measure 
is God."317 However, the play is only an image (eikon). In 
the dogmatic structure of the community, most men do not 
discern that they are sons of God. "From the vision of the 
Agathon man has fallen to the acceptance of a creed."318 
The creed which he creates has three dogmasj; the belief 
that gods exist, the belief that they take care of man, and 
the belief that they cannot be appeased by sacrifice or 
prayer. If any of these dogmas are broken, then the 
Nocturnal Council, a spiritual court which meets between 
dusk and dawn, will pass judgement on the transgressors. 
This is necessary in order to keep the souls attuned to the 
nomoi.
Therefore, the Nocturnal Council is made up of elders 
who have been educated to the realization that the virtues 
converge in the Nous, which governs them all. This creates 
a government which rules by laws rather than a government 
that rules by men. They must understand the things of 
divinity, which are contained in two fundamental doctrines. 
"The first is the doctrine that the soul is the oldest of 
all created things...[,] the second is the doctrine that the 
order in the movements of the stars reveals the nous as 
their governing principle."319
317Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 263.
318Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 263.
319Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 267.
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For Plato, the creation and sustenance of the polis is 
the salvation of the polis. Men will be guided to live 
their lives, in so far as they are capable, in this 
carefully constructed community. Plato, even in his old 
age, cannot imagine salvation outside of the polis. Healthy 
people require healthy communities. This view of the 
political order is in stark contrast to Saint Augustine's 
city of man (Babylon), in which the purpose of the polis is 
to keep the peace. Although Voegelin agrees on many points 
of Augustinian philosophy, especially the symbolization of 
Divine Illumination, he parts with Saint Augustine on this 
point and agrees more with Plato.
All this having been said, Voegelin recognizes that 
politics is not something created out of nothing in the mind 
of the philosopher. Politics, and the symbols and 
institutions which it embodies, originate from the social 
field in which they exist. A political science does not 
create a political order. The political order surfaces from 
the bottom up. Political science is a corrective to the 
deformative ills of political reality. Through its 
determination of what political reality is and its guidance 
from a correct understanding of human consciousness, it is 
in the position to correct political malformations. The 
standard for determining these questions and answers is 
found in the recognition that the full range of human 
consciousness must be accounted for. Voegelin offers such
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a standard in his diagram of the movement of being320 in the 
appendix to "Reason: The Classic Experience." As can be
seen by the diagram, political reality must account for the 
entire range of human consciousness, not merely particular, 
hypostatized, parts. As will become apparent from the 
following analysis, the basis for judging whether a 
political order is in need of correction is discernable by 
the application of Voegelin's theory of the movement of 
being, symbolized in the diagram in figure 1.
Implicit within this theoretical diagram is the 
postulate of balance. There is no admonition more important 
for Voegelin in all of his philosophy than the postulate of 
balance. It is ever present in his work. It permeates 
every level of his thought, from metaphysics, to 
epistemology, to ethics, philosophy of religion, and 
political philosophy. It is the guiding principle that 
protects the human psyche from being reduced to the level of 
a mere animal on the one extreme, and being raised up to the 
megamaniacal level of a god, on the other. It is the golden 
mean that protects us from the magic of the extreme. It is 
based in common sense, rather than on theoretical 
presuppositions about reality. It is experientially based, 
rather than theoretically based, and it must be possessed by 
those who govern. "'Common sense is a compact type of 
rationality,.. .The civilized homo politicus does not need to
320See Figure 1, 150.
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be a philosopher, but he must have common sense.'" (A, 352- 
53) .m  The civilized homo politicus is the spoudaios, "the 
mature man, who has developed his dianoetic excellences and 
whose life is oriented by his noetic self."322
Voegelin's greatest contribution is the attempt to 
return philosophy to a genuine view of reality— to bring 
about a renaissance in human life and culture by diagnosing 
the ills of the modern world with its deformations and 
second realities and then offering a cure. Voegelin argues 
for a return to a holistic view of ourselves, our society, 
our world, and our God, as opposed to the plethora of views 
of second realities which concentrate only on parts of 
reality; eclipsing the rest of reality and thereby denying 
the whole in favor of some preferred part or parts.
Voegelin, just as Plato before him, diagnosed the 
ethical and political ills of his day. Through his 
diagnoses, corrective measures follow. As can be seen from 
the diagram which illustrates the proper study of human 
affairs, a science of human affairs must incorporate the 
entire range of human existence and human experience; 
vertically, from the experience of the Divine Nous to the 
Apeirontic Depth, and horizontally, from the individual 
person to history. As has been demonstrated earlier in this 
work in Voegelin's critique of positivism, the modern
321Sandoz, The Voecfelinian Revolution. 164.
322Voegelin, "The Oxford Political Philosophers," 114.
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"scientific" theories of human affairs (social sciences) are
based on a false understanding of who man is. Each has its
own specific set of gnostic eclipses, but they all share in
the commonality of having only partial explanations of who
man is and what reality is, which ultimately lead to
deformations of individuals, societies, and governments. So
let us now turn to a brief practical application of
Voegelin7s peri ta anthropina (study of human affairs), his
"new science of politics," on some of the major modern
theories of human affairs, specifically: Marxism, National
Socialism, and Liberalism, in order to diagnose the
particular eclipsed realities of each in order to discern
the appropriate corrective measures (therapies) needed in
order to create habitations fit for human existence.
The first theory of human affairs to be analyzed is
Marxism, and the appropriate question to ask is what is man
according to Marxism and what does such a view of human
nature do to him? In order to answer these questions, it is
necessary to investigate Marx7 view of nature, itself.
Nature is in a state of becoming, and in the 
course of its development it has brought forth 
man: "Man is directly a being of nature."...This
being, which is itself nature, also stands over 
against nature and assists it in its development 
by human labor...."Nature as it develops in human 
history...as it develops through industry... is 
true anthropological nature." In the process of 
creating nature, however, man at the same time 
also creates himself to the fullness of his 
being; therefore, "all of so-called world history
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is nothing but the production of man by human 
labor. "323
This leads Marx to the conclusion that the search by man for 
his origin leads to an infinite regress, which is actually 
"a product of abstraction."324 Finally, Marx answers that 
if the questioner (of origins) will give up his abstraction, 
then he will give up his question along with it. In effect, 
Marx "breaks off the debate by declaring that 'for socialist 
man'— that is, for the man who has accepted Marx's construct 
of the process of being and history— such a question 
'becomes a practical impossibility.'...When 'socialist man' 
speaks, man has to be silent."325
From an analysis of Thesis VI of the Theses on 
Feuerbach of 1845, Ellis Sandoz, in A Government of Laws, 
points out that what follows from Marx' theory of man is 
that:
man becomes a nodal point gathering in the sum 
total of social relationships. That means both 
man generically and each human being, since for 
Marx, individual essence has no reality apart 
from social life. Man is an "ensemble of social 
relationships," no more and no less....Man— each 
man— is totally dissolved by Marx into the class 
structure of the society. He has no being apart 
from his social being.325
323Voegelin, Science. Politics and Gnosticism 
(Washington: Regnery Gateway, Inc., 1968), 23-25.
324Voegelin, Science, 24-25.
325Voegelin, Science. 25-26.
326Sandoz, A Government of Laws. 15.
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The Marxist view of human nature is a denial of integral 
parts of the metaxic structure of human existence and 
experience. Entire parts of human reality are eclipsed; 
both the Divine Nous and the sacredness of the person as 
individual. "...A truthful understanding or interpretation 
of reality is the very definition of science[, ] "327 and 
Marxism misses the mark.
As if this understanding of man was not misled enough, 
Marx goes on to argue that a new man and a new world can be 
brought into existence, if only we can recognize and realize 
the need to abandon belief in God and religion. "Hatred of 
divine being is the mark of the radical modern, and 
specifically of Marxian revolt."328 The hatred of divine 
being is a refusal to seek for and to apperceive the ground 
of being. "Marx was spiritually diseased and...the most 
glaring symptom of his disease [is]...his fear of critical 
concepts and of philosophy in general."329 Marx, in
addressing the fundamental metaphysical question: "what is
the origin and source of being?[,]...prohibits the asking of 
the question."330 This is:
327Sandoz, A Government of Laws. 15-16.
328Sandoz, A Government of Laws. 16.
329Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, ed. John 
H. Hallowell, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University
Press, 1975), 259.
330Sandoz, A Government of Laws. 17.
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the core of the modern radical revolt in its 
ontological and epistemological aspects.... Dogma 
supplants reason and science, only so the murder 
of God can be sustained and the Socialist 
Superman— the paradigmatic New Man— can
successfully usurp his place in a Second Reality 
of dreamworld imaginings.1,331
This view of man, society, and the world— in the absence of
any divine ground or divine reality— dissolves the essence
of man "into sociology and abandon[s] noetic participation
in favor of the dogmatic assertion of libido dominandi in
radical rebellion and closure against divine being."332 The
"deeper stratum of the Marxian disease,... is the revolt
against God."333 Thus man and reality is reduced and
deformed and placed in an eclipsed reality, which "expresses
itself in the coviction that the movement of the intellect
in the consciousness of the empirical self is the ultimate
source of knowledge for the understanding of the universe.
Faith and the life of the spirit are expressly excluded as
an independent source of order in the soul.1,334
Let us now turn to a Voegelinian analysis of National
Socialism. National Socialism is based in a view of man in
which the idea of a human being is in substance (essence)
defined as being a member of, or part of, a masse totale.
In other words, man is defined, foundationa1ly, through the
331Sandoz, A Government of Laws. 17.
332Sandoz, A Government of Laws. 17-18.
333Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution. 261.
334Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution. 273.
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collective of humanity, as opposed to his individuality. 
According to Voegelin, such an understanding of man can 
appeal only to "a man who has not much substance of his own. 
His personality must be sufficiently underdeveloped, that is 
to say it must be deficient in spiritual organization and 
balance to such a degree, that the anxiety of existence 
cannot be controlled and absorbed by the normal processes of 
the mature, meditative life [the life of the spoudaios].1,335 
He, therefore, submerges himself into a collective 
personality or "tribe.1,336 If the ideas and symbols 
contained within the collective are near enough to the 
traditional ones of the given society, then it will easily 
"deceive the not so discerning.”337 German National 
Socialism was able to define itself as an exclusive masse 
totale by combining nationalism, a form of tribalism, with 
racialism, which is another form of tribalism.
As can be deduced from its own defining 
characteristics, National Socialism is founded on a denial 
of a universal nature of man. Is Aryan man a natural type 
or his he an ideal? He is the ideal that the collective 
personality "knows" and which each part (person) of the 
collective is called to strive toward. The supposed virtues 
of Aryan man are all based in blood. The physical
335Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution. 96.
336Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution. 97.
337Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution. 97.
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attributes of blood, only to be found in Aryan man, is the 
basis for "the good man."338
This theory of man and human affairs is flawed in that 
it locates the essence of man in his material attributes, 
namely through blood and national origin. The reality of 
the metaxic existential structure of human consciousness, 
which is classically referred to as the psyche, has been 
replaced with dogmas about race339 and nationality, which 
are qualities carried in the bloodline of the collective.
The possibility of the full actualization of a human 
being, which requires the human-divine movement and 
countermovement between the divine Nous and the human nous, 
as well as a recognition of the necessity of the rest of the 
metaxic structure of existence and reality, is eclipsed and 
replaced with the lowest rungs of the metaxic structure—  
from the Apeirontic depths to the passions of the psyche. 
On the horizontal axis of the diagram of the peri ta 
anthropina, we again observe an eclipse, an eclipse of the 
individual person by the collective society and by a 
deterministic history that calls forth the inevitable 
"overcoming" by the master race of the collective which is
338For a thorough treatment of racism and National 
Socialism, see Thomas W. Heilke, Voegelin on the Idea of 
Race: An Analysis of Modern European Racism, esp. 63-139.
339For a good discussion of Voegelin's refutation of the 
ideology of race, see David J. Levy, Political Order: 
Philosophical Anthropology. Modernity, and the Challenge of 
Ideology (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1987), 81, 93, 95-96, 132.
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determined by the "superior" qualities of blood. Virtue is 
not to be attained (merited) through learning and work, it 
is to be inherited by blood.
National Socialism and Marxism share important 
commonalities. They both sever the sacred aspects of the 
metaxic structure— the divine nous and the noetic psyche 
which is able to participate with the divine in human 
existence and reality. They also both stress society and 
history as the shapers of individual persons as opposed to 
the view that individual persons are the shapers of 
societies and histories. In order to see the consequences 
for a theory of man and human affairs that results from the 
view that stresses the idea that individual persons are the 
shapers of societies and histories, let us briefly turn to 
an analysis of liberalism.
Voegelin views liberalism, as well as humanism, 
enlightenment, progressivism, positivism, Marxism, and 
National Socialism, as being modern manifestations of 
secularized gnosticism. This work has offered only brief 
sketches of the Voegelinian analyses of National Socialism 
and Marxism because any in-depth attempt to adequately 
analyze the many forms of modern gnosticism diagnosed by 
Voegelin would be the topic of a dissertation in itself.340
^For a much more thorough discussion of Voegelin and 
the politics of spiritual revolt, see Michael Franz, Eric 
Voegelin And The Politics of Spiritual Revolt: The Roots of
Modern Ideology. Although it seems to me that Voegelin has 
serious problems with the tenants of liberalism, there are
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Let it here suffice, therefore, to say that Voegelin was no
partisan to any of these modern gnostic theories, and his
analyses of them are very sharp and critical. He interprets
them all, to varying degrees, to be modern gnostic movements
in which some eschatological end has been immanentized.
This having been said, in The New Science of Politics.
in his tracing of the process of corrosion in Western
civilization, he argues that England and the United States
are more resistant against Gnostic totalitarianism than the
other Western nations. This is not to say that they are
entirely free of its influence, but it is to say that they
are less affected. He attributes this to the fact that the
timing of the several Western political revolutions affected
the process of corrosion of Western civilization. Those
political structures set up after the English and the
American revolutions tend to be influenced by gnostic
infections to a greater degree.
When the revolution occurred early, a less 
radical wave of gnosticism was its carrier, and 
the resistance of the forces of tradition was, at 
the same time, more effective. When the 
revolution occurred at a later date, a more 
radical wave was its carrier, and the environment 
of tradition was already corroded more deeply by 
the general advance of modernity. The English 
Revolution, in the seventeenth century, occurred 
at a time when gnosticism had not yet undergone 
its radical secularization....When the 
adjustments of 1690 were reached, England had
differences as to how much and on what points. For a 
contrasting opinion, see David Walsh, After Ideology: 
Recovering the Spiritual Foundations of Freedom (New York: 
HarperCollins Publisher, 1990), 233-234.
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preserved the institutional culture of 
aristocratic parliamentism as well as the mores 
of a Christian commonwealth, now sanctioned as 
national institutions. The American Revolution, 
though its debate was already strongly affected 
by the psychology of enlightenment, also had the 
good fortune of coming to its close within the 
institutional and Christian climate of the ancien 
regime.... The German Revolution, finally, in an 
environment without strong institutional 
traditions, brought for the first time into full 
play economic materialism, racist biology, 
corrupt psychology, scientism, and technological 
ruthlessness— in brief, modernity without 
restraint. Western society as a whole, thus, is 
a deeply stratified civilization in which the 
American and English democracies represent the 
oldest, most firmly consolidated stratum of 
civilizational tradition, while the German area 
represents its most progressively modern 
stratum.341
Furthermore, the principle of the postulate of balance 
is incorporated into the English and American systems to a 
greater degree than they are in most political systems. 
This manifests itself in the recognition of the need for a 
balance between polar tensions. The institutionalized 
separation of powers, which each structure has, promotes and 
sustains a tensional balance of power, perspectives, and 
interests.
It is clear from the preceding analysis, as well as the 
analyses of preceding chapters, that Voegelin's mystical 
epistemology and his theory of human consciousness are 
revolutionary breakthroughs which allow him to make the most 
thoughtful, thorough, and well documented diagnoses of the 
ills of modernity that has ever been made. The uneasy
^Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. 188-189.
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stirrings in his early life experience with the social
fields surrounding him, the realization of the need to
resist the untruth that he accordingly perceived, and then
the pursuit of this resistance in his life-long vocation to
diagnose and seek a therapy for the modern malaise, led
Voegelin to "uneasy" conclusions that many of his colleagues
would have preferred to have ignored. He showed great
courage in his willingness to call things as he saw them.
He did not hesitate to speak up when he recognized the fact
that the Emperor did not really have on any clothes, even
though most of his peers refused to apperceive.
Voegelin's new science of politics has a diagnostic
aspect which can be used to discern what corrective measures
might be called for, but it does not create a "system" that
we can follow and institute as the "correct political
system." The social fields of the people to be governed
must be accounted for. There is no one correct political
order. Correct political order, just as correct individual
order, is to be discerned by a proper ordering of the soul,
which is best ordered by an appropriate orientation toward
the good, toward the divine ground of being.
Philosophy is not a doctrine of right order, but 
the light of wisdom that falls on the struggle; 
and help is not a piece of information about 
truth, but the arduous effort to locate the 
forces of evil and identify their nature. For 
half the battle is won when the soul can 
recognize the shape of the enemy and,
2 0 2
consequently, knows that the way it must follow 
leads in the opposite direction. 2
^Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle. 62-63.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
...Voegelin saw that if the task of science is to 
provide reliable knowledge, social science as the 
positivist construes it is virtually useless. It 
cannot supply the knowledge needed in the face of 
the collapse of the European and Russian 
civilizations before the onslaught of National 
Socialism and Communism. There the need is for a 
critical instrument able to yield explanations of 
the triumph of barbarism and to show the rational 
grounds for favoring civilization and justice 
over state terror, mass murder, and the 
systematic eclipse of man and truth by ideology 
and propaganda....Voegelin's motive in devising a 
new science was, thus, to resist the evil that is 
destructive of one's very humanity.... [T]he 
primarily nonsensory modes of experience address 
dimensions of human existence superior in rank 
and worth to those sensory perception does: 
experiences of the good, beautiful, and just, of 
love, friendship, and truth, of all human virtue 
and vice, and of divine reality.... Inasmuch as 
such nonsensory experiences are constitutive of 
what is distinctive about human existence itself- 
-and of what is most precious to mankind— a 
purported science of man unable to take account 
of them is egregiously defective.343
The fractured and partial truths of reality in the 
modern world create broken human lives and societies. This 
is an age old theme that is just as true today as it was in 
the Athens of Socrates' day. Most men, women, and 
communities live and move and have their being in a broken 
world and they are in need of being healed.
Voegelin recognized this suffering plight of many of 
his fellows when he was a young man. He set out on a 
journey to find the answers to explain it and to seek the
^Sandoz, "Editor's Introduction," The Collected Works, 
vol. 12, xix-xx.
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remedies for its cure. What he discovered and diagnosed, 
early on, was that much of humankind— -individuals, 
societies, and governments— were and are spiritually 
diseased. This is quite clearly evident as early as 1938 in 
Political Religions. Voegelin spent the rest of his natural 
life seeking to convince others of the reality of this 
spiritual malaise and trying to discover and offer a therapy 
that might cure those who are afflicted.
Voegelin's thought was motivated by his existential 
resistance to the untruth and evil which he found himself 
living in. Politically, this resistance was against 
National Socialism and Marxism, which he found 
unsatisfactory. Epistemologically, it was against
positivism and idealism, which he found to be deficient as 
grounds for knowledge. Through his resistance, he realized 
that proper and good order, as well as knowledge, could only 
come about with a proper understanding of human nature and 
the discovery of a ground of being, and so, he set out on 
his quest for an examination and analysis of human 
experiences of the Ground of Being.
We began this work by setting out to examine and 
analyze his mystical epistemology and its influence on 
ethics and politics, step by step. Voegelin began with his 
resistance to untruth, which epistemologically, took the 
form of a critique of positivism. In this critique, 
Voegelin illustrates why positivism is a deficient theory of
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knowledge and a deficient methodology. He demonstrates that 
it is only a partial view of reality which eclipses the 
splendor and fullness of true reality and creates a false 
understanding of the world and that which is contained in 
the world. He argues that, implicit within positivism, is 
an irresistible tendency to shun or to shut out other 
metaphysical questions and answers due to the subject-object 
dichotomy. He further demonstrates that the objectivity of 
positivism is not objective at all, but is, in fact, forced 
to choose values just as any other science is. He rightly 
points out that there is more to man than the quantifiable 
aspects that our sciences can capture. He, therefore, 
argues for a more encompassing theoretical foundation for 
knowledge, one that recognizes the comprehensive spectrum of 
human experiences of reality.
The second stage of this analysis, contained in Chapter 
Three, examined Voegelin's search and analysis of the lost 
horizons of human experience. Here, we have briefly 
examined examples from the historical field from which he 
rediscovers symbolizations of divine-human participation. 
In short, Chapter Three briefly sketches Voegelin's journey 
to find an order to history. This includes examinations and 
analyses of his discoveries of the analogical nature of 
communication, as well as his theory of symbolic compactness 
and differentiation with its corresponding priestly and 
prophetic movements.
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Chapter Four is the actual examination and analysis of
Voegelin's mystical epistemology. It is a theory of
knowledge that recognizes and incorporates the whole metaxic
range of human experience, from the apeirontic depth to the
height of the divine Nous, and everything in-between. It
emphasizes and highlights apperception (noetic and
pneumatic) and its affinity with faith in search of
understanding, as a rational and legitimate means toward the
attainment of knowledge. He, therefore, argues against the
modern distinction between philosophy and science in
preference to the distinction between noetic consciousness
and intentional consciousness.
Noetic knowledge...is not abstract knowledge 
obtained by gathering cases of participation and 
examining them for general characteristics. 
Rather, it is concrete knowledge of participation 
in which a man's desire for knowledge is 
experienced as a movement toward the ground that 
is being moved by the ground. In this movement 
the divine ground of being is illuminated as the 
ground of man and world. With this sentence, the 
accent of our analysis shifts from reality to 
knowledge.344
In brief, Voegelin's epistemology denies the dualism of 
Cartesianism and its impending subject-object dichotomy. It 
battles the fractured view of reality in order to catch a 
glimpse of the whole. And once this glimpse is attained, 
through faith in search of understanding, the knowledge that 
it brings about is transcendent and ineffable, and so, 
cannot be adequately brought down to earth and captured in
^Voegelin, Anamnesis. 183.
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our linguistic symbolizations. This is why the knowledge is 
rightly referred to as mystical. This is captured quite 
clearly in Saint John of the Cross when he writes:
I entered in, I know not where,
And I remained, though knowing naught,
Transcending knowledge with my thought.
Of when I entered I know naught,
But when I saw that I was there
(Though where it was I did not care)
Strange things I learned, with greatness fraught.
Yet what I heard I'll not declare.
But there I stayed, though knowing naught,
Transcending knowledge with my thought....345
In the spirit of Saint John of the Cross, Voegelin's 
epistemology is concerned with the mystery of being— the 
cloud around the mountaintop. He makes no particular
knowledge claims, but affirms the transcendent reality of 
apperception as "more certain than the light of noonday 
clear."346 This is the major theme of his life's works, and 
is most exemplified and culminated in his death-bed "Quod 
Deus Dicitur". His is a sacred, knightly quest for more 
light, with the Socratic, Pauline, and Augustinian
recognition and knowledge that, at least in this life, he 
can hope only to see as through a glass darkly. In the end, 
he must, as we must also, concur with the Angelic Doctor 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, who, after having experienced his
^Saint John of the Cross, "Verses Written After an 
Ecstasy of High Exaltation," Saint John of the Cross: Poems.
47.
^Saint John of the Cross, "Verses Written After an 
Ecstasy of High Exaltation," 27.
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beatific vision, concludes that all that he has written is
but straw before the divine Mystery. And yet, seeing as
through a glass darkly, and recognizing the fact that full
understanding is not our lot in this world, each person
nevertheless experiences the restless, erotic yearning of
the soul for that which is higher, purer, and more true.
This yearning of the soul is the love between the
individual human and the loving pull of the Divine. It is
this love that allows him to apperceive through his openness
to the ground.
the openness of man's existence toward the ground 
is dependent on the something in man that can 
respond to a theophany and engage in the quest of 
the ground....This divinest part (theiotaton) in 
the psyche is the human 'nous' that can 
participate in the divine 'Nous'.347
This divinest part of man is moved by properly directed
love. This love, when properly directed, creates a
heightened nature of man, which is exemplified in the
Thomistic symbolization of the fides caritate formata. This
two-way love results in friendship between man and God, and
can only be expressed through imaginative symbolizations and
meditations.
In the absence of amicitia between man and God, human 
knowledge becomes profane and deformed, and God, if he is 
the measure of anything at all, is relegated to a reign in 
heaven alone. For in the absence of human-Divine amicitia,
^Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age. 237.
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the chasm between man and God is too great to permeate the
reality of our society and our world. Human-divine
participation is at best an individual endeavor that has no
effect on the grander scale of society, nation, and world.
The loss of amicitia:
...has become socially effective, with 
revolutionary consequences for the whole of 
Western civilization, insofar as it started the 
process of spiritual disintegration of which, in 
our time, we witness the consequences on an 
eschatological scale.348
It is at this point in Voegelin's journey that the ethical
and political implications for his analysis become more
clear. Ethics and politics must recognize and incorporate
the religious dimension of human beings. They must
recognize that there is evil in us, our societies, our
nations, and our world, and they must account for it.
A religious view of National Socialism must 
proceed from the assumption that there is evil in 
the world. To be sure, evil not only as a 
deficient mode of Being, something negative, but 
rather as a genuine, effective substance and 
force in the world. A not merely morally bad, 
but also a religiously evil, Satanic substance 
can only be opposed by an equally strong, 
religiously good force of resistance. A Satanic 
force cannot be combated with morality and 
humanism alone....[T]he world finds itself in a 
severe crisis, in a process of decay that has its 
origin in the secularization of the spirit and in 
the separation of a therefore merely worldly 
spirit from its roots in religious 
experience....[T]he remedy can only be arrived at 
through religious renewal, be it within the
^Voegelin, Studies In the History of Political Ideas.
MS pp. 1144-1145.
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framework of traditional churches or outside of
this framework.349
How is this religious renewal to be brought about? 
First, and foremost, by a more all-encompassing science of 
man, one that recognizes his spiritual and ethical 
dimensions. When these aspects are ignored or eclipsed, we 
are left with value-free science, which left unchecked by 
ethical considerations, can, and oftentimes does, lead to 
dire political consequences. The greatest tool in this 
sacred mission is education. Education must go beyond an 
overview of facts and figures to the penetration of the core 
meaning of human existence. Healthy humans require a 
meaningful and decent place in their world. People must be 
educated as whole persons. It will not suffice to leave out 
moral and spiritual formation from educational programs and 
hope that somehow these things will be acquired by the 
individual on his own. Education must concern itself with 
the fides caritate formata.
But education does not end at the schoolhouse door. 
Any ethical or political formation which is created or 
reformed must include the entire range of the hierarchy of 
being, as exemplified in the metaxic structure and the 
quaternary view of existence which ranges from God, man, 
society and the world. This necessarily means that religion 
and ethics must be included, both symbolically and
^Voegelin, Political Religions. 2-3.
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institutionally. Such is the way to create healthy and 
whole persons. They, in turn, are the only hope for turning 
around and healing our communities, schools, political 
institutions, and governments and leading them to finding 
solutions to the problems of evil which are so pervasive in 
the world today.
Finally, it is clear that given the fact that a true 
understanding of human nature and existence is dependent 
upon the discernment of and the enlightenment from divine- 
human participation, it follows that properly ordered human 
communities require a civil theology. If communities are 
individuals written large as the anthropological principle 
of Plato, Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
Voegelin and many other philosophical thinkers claim it 
should be, then it follows that if humans participate with 
the divine and gain a holistic view of reality by doing so, 
"...a generally accepted account of the ultimate reality"350 
is politically necessary. This does not mean a radical 
reformulation of religion is necessarily required, nor does 
it mean that every member of a society must belong to the 
same denomination or cult, but it does mean that there must 
be a generally accepted religious commonality of belief. 
Following the lead of Aristotle, each particular culture's 
religion must be considered in such a civil theology. Every 
culture already has a set of religious symbols and myths
350Sandoz, A Government of Laws. 51.
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which compose a civil theology. Much of the meaning of 
these symbols is universal and common, since they are 
products of divine-human participation, and humans, whether 
members of one or another culture, all share in the same 
universal human nature. In other words, there already 
exists within the symbolizations a great deal of 
ecumenicalism.
The most important and over-arching implication of 
Voegelin's philosophy for ethics and politics is that man 
exists in a world with a great deal of evil that molests and 
distorts him and causes much human suffering, and yet man 
has the potential to reduce the power of evil and to 
dramatically increase the goodness of life. This is not to 
say that perfection can be brought about in the world, but 
that things can be improved. Humans and their communities 
are called to actualize this potential for improvement. It 
is not an easy task, but it is a noble one. The moral and 
political orders, and their resultant organizations and 
institutions, must incorporate true order by the creation of 
appropriate symbolizations and myths and must reflect what 
man is and what he can become, since they are, or least 
should be, created to serve him. They cannot adequately 
serve man if they do not know what man is. A fit moral or 
political order is "a fit habitation for human beings."351 
It is judged by whether the full range of consciousness is
351Sandoz, A Government of Laws. 1.
accounted for, which means that it must take human nature as 
it is, as opposed to how we might wish it to have been. It 
is the basis of the lessening of human suffering and the 
promotion of human dignity and happiness.
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